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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the shifts in political culture effected by the 'X case' 
(1992), when the State issued an injunction to prevent a fourteen year old 
pregnant and suicidal rape victim from travelling abroad for an abortion. In so 
doing, this thesis focuses on the connection between discourses of Irish 
nationhood, gender and sexuality in the fields of reproductive politics and 
women's citizenship. 
Abortion law and politics has had constitutional status in Ireland since 1983, 
when the right to life of 'the unborn' was officially recognised as ostensibly 
equal to that of women. This has situated debate on abortion access in an 
explicitly national framework, since political sovereignty is invested in 'the 
people'. 
Shifting articulations of nationhood and abortion are examined in three specific 
sites of political culture: the national press; political activist discourses; and 
official legislative debates. The terms of debate in the press and the Oireachtas 
(legislature) in particular are compared over time, from the 1983 campaign to 
recognize a foetal right to life, to 1992, when the legitimacy and meaning of 
constitutional abortion law was thrown into crisis by the X case. 
Two specific reversals in the terms of post-X case abortion politics are 
examined. Firstly the anti-abortion construction of the nation in familial terms 
produced popular pressure in 1992 to allow for a right to abortion in the 
interests of familial integrity. Secondly, the primary antagonism opposing Irish 
'pro-life' traditionalism to English 'pro-abortion' modernism was reversed both 
by the anti-abortion lobby's key role in 'interning' X within the State, and by the 
popular perception that feminist advocacy of abortion access would reassert the 
integrity of the violated family. Significant continuities in the construction of 
abortion law and politics in national terms are also analyzed. 
X 
ABBREVIATIONS 
AAC Anti-Amendment Campaign 
BPAS British Pregnancy Advisory Service 
GREAC Galway Repeal the Eighth Amendment Campaign 
HLII Human Life International Ireland 
GAA Gaelic Athletic Association 
IFPA Irish Family Planning Association 
IRA Irish Republican Army 
IWASG Irish Women's Abortion Support Group 
PLAC Pro Life Amendment Campaign 
REAC Repeal the Eighth Amendment Campaign 
SPUC Society for the Protection of Unborn Children 
TD Teachtai Däla (Elected member of the First House of the 
Legislature) 
WIN Women's Information Network 
WING Women's Information Network Galway 
XI 
GLOSSARY OF IRISH TERMS' 
Bunreacht na hEireann 
Oireachtas 
Dail 
Seanad 
Taoiseach 
Gardai 
Gealtacht 
Constitution of Ireland 
Legislature (First House; Second House; and the 
President) 
Legislative Assembly (First House) 
Senate (Second House) 
Prime Minister 
Police 
Officially designated Irish-speaking region 
1The Irish language is officially the first language of Ireland, as stated in Article 8.1 of the 
Constitution, Bunreacht na hEireann. 
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PART ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The X Case 
On the 12th of February 1992, a headline appeared on the front page of the 
liberal-left wing national newspaper The Irish Times, announcing 'State 
attempts to stop girl's abortion'. A fourteen year old pregnant rape victim, 
referred to as 'X', had been issued with a temporary High Court injunction, 
preventing her from obtaining an abortion, and from leaving the State for a 
period of nine months. The right to life of X's foetus, constitutionally 
recognized since 1983, was judged to outweigh her own rights to bodily 
integrity' and freedom of movement. The news became the focus of 
extraordinary public controversy, as mass demonstrations demanding the 
removal of the injunction became daily events. The State's action, effectively 
compelling a fourteen year old to carry a pregnancy conceived through rape, 
was greeted with popular outrage. Characterizations of X and her family as 
respectable, middle-class, and law-abiding were particularly significant in 
generating this public reaction. The significance of what were perceived as the 
exceptional circumstances of this case has had lasting effect on the abortion 
debate in Ireland, as journalist Aine McCarthy (2000) comments, and indicated 
a rupture of previous political affiliations. As the editorial of the same 
newspaper declared in response to the case, Ireland appeared to have 
'descended into cruelty' in a way similar to explicitly undemocratic and 
tyrannical states. 2 
1This right has been recognized under Article 40.3.1° of Bunreacht na hEireann 
(Constitution of Ireland), 1937, concerning the personal rights of citizens. 
21rish Times 18th February 1992, 'Descent Into Cruelty'. 
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Abortion Politics and Nationhood 
This thesis is interested in the effects this case had on the hegemonic terms of 
Irish abortion politics, through which a coercive anti-abortion regime had 
operated legitimately, and with increasing momentum, during the previous 
decade. More particularly, what follows is concerned with the ways in which 
anti-abortion politics had operated historically through a politics of national 
identity, which relied on, and reproduced, hegemonic constructions of Irishness 
in traditionally familial, patriarchal, and conservatively Catholic terms. The X 
case significantly unsettled these gendered and sexualized discourses of 
nationhood. The specifically familial context of the story produced a hugely 
sympathetic identification with X and her parents, in unprecedented terms, 
which popularly legitimized limited access to abortion. As Murphy-Lawless 
comments, people responded to the X case 'as if this were their own daughter' 
(1993: 57). Younger women also responded in terms of identification with X 
herself. Not only did this shift arguments in favour of women's reproductive 
rights onto the quintessentially national terrain of the Irish family for the first 
time, it consequently undermined the previously hegemonic construction of the 
nation as essentially anti-abortion, copperfastened in 1983 through the 'pro-life' 
constitutional amendment. 3 
Three specific questions will be addressed in the thesis, concerning the 
production and circulation of political culture, key moments in what R. Johnson 
has described as the 'circuit of production' of culture (1995: 584). 4 Firstly, in 
what ways were hegemonic constructions of an anti-abortion nationhood 
3This is not to deny that Irish women have practiced abortion in large numbers, an act which 
undermines this very construction of Irishness as opposed to abortion. As Murphy-Lawless 
argues: '... it has been women's decisions, and particularly one very young woman's decision, 
which have disrupted the Church-state coalition and demolished the view of women 
embodied in the Constitution' (1993: 61). 
4The thesis is not concerned, largely for resource reasons, with the consumption of political 
culture, the third moment in the circuit of cultural production identified by Johnson 
(1995: 584). 
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produced and consequently problematised in popular political culture following 
the X case? Secondly, what impact did the crisis in the hegemonic construction 
of Irishness, generated by the X case, have on the political subjectivity and 
participation of key campaigners on abortion access, themselves primary 
definers of the issues at stake? Thirdly, how was the crisis over national identity 
addressed in official discourses, particularly concerning the privileged position 
of the nation in the republican state? Thus, the following discussion will 
provide an analysis of the production and reproduction of Irish political culture, 
in its popular, official, and entrepreneurial aspects, at a moment of hegemonic 
crisis. An overarching concern is with the ways in which apparently enduring 
political discourses can become destablized or exposed as less stable than they 
may have appeared, as well as reconstructed in relatively new terms in response 
to political events and crises. 
Before going on to consider these questions, I will outline in more detail the 
circumstances and immediate impact of the X case; its legal and political 
background; and the long-term legal and political effects of the case, both in 
relation to the Constitution, and in terms of political activism. I will then 
discuss the analytic tools and overall approach adopted in considering these 
questions, and briefly outline the order of discussion. 
3 
The X Case: Circumstances and Immediate Impact 
The circumstances of the X case were precisely those that had been predicted 
by reproductive rights activists in the early 1980s, during the political campaign 
which had resulted in the constitutional recognition of foetal rights. 5 The anti- 
abortion lobby had insisted that such predictions were impossible. 6 At the time 
the story was initially reported, an application for the temporary status of the 
injunction against X to be made permanent was under the Court's 
consideration, and the Attorney General consequently declared the case sub 
judice, i. e., beyond public comment, until the Court announced a decision. 
Nevertheless, the controversy which initial reports of the case gave rise to, 
including the ban on public comment itself, became central to public debate. 
During this initial period of official silence, the X case was critically debated by 
the media, 7 campaigners, 8 and politicians themselves, 9 particularly in the light 
of international attention, 10 and the eruption of national and international 
protests against the Irish judicial action. 
5For example, a leaflet from the Anti-Amendment Campaign, advocating rejection of the 
proposal to amend the constitution to recognise a foetal right to life, stated: 
'The most likely way for a court case to arise would be for somebody - anybody - to ask the 
High Court for an injunction. It could be an injunction to: 
1. Stop a woman leaving the country to have an abortion; 
2. Stop the sale of some kinds of contraceptives; 
3. Stop doctors, social workers or family planning clinics telling women who ask 
for the information about abortion facilities abroad. 
Members of PLAC [Pro Life Amendment Campaign] have made no secret of their intention 
to seek injunctions along exactly these lines if their amendment is passed' (Leaflet published 
by the Anti-Amendment Campaign, Dublin 7, circa 1982, in author's possession). 
6Apart from arguing that abortion for rape victims was no more morally acceptable than 
abortion in any other circumstances, the anti-abortion lobby had denied the possibility that a 
scenario such as the X case could ever occur as a result of the recognition of a foetal right to 
life (e. g., McNamara 1983: 5-7) 
7For example, the Irish Press ran an editorial on 15th February: 'It is certainly not a problem 
that will be solved by silence'. 
8Protests were held in Dublin, London and New York, against the Irish state's actions (see 
Irish Times 15/02/92, p. 5). 
9The Irish Times reported on discussion of the issue in the Dail (parliament) on the front 
page of its 14/02/92 issue: 'Dail exchanges, AG rules out discussion on case'. The following 
day's newspapers reported the critical comments of Michael McDowell, Chair of the small 
centre-right Progressive Democrats Party, on the High Court's action. 
'°Critical coverage appeared in the British and US press, for example: Joyce, Joe (1992) 
'Irish court stops UK abortion for rape victim' The Guardian 13th February; Holland, Mary 
(1992) 'New Irish PM faces first text on abortion' Observer 16th February; Murdoch, Alan 
4 
The official action, injuncting X from travelling abroad, was the result of a 
combination of a complex legal-political history and distressing personal 
circumstances. X was the victim of long-term sexual abuse by a friend's father, 
who was also a trusted friend of her parents. " Following the discovery of their 
daughter's rape and consequent pregnancy, X's parents agreed to support her 
desire to obtain an abortion. They reported the rape to the Gardai (police), in 
order to commence criminal proceedings. X's father inquired from the Gardai 
as to whether DNA evidence taken from aborted foetal tissue would be 
admissible in the rape trial. Since such evidence had never been presented in the 
courts, the Gardai referred the question to the Office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. The family were finally advised that such evidence would not be 
admissible. They left for Britain on the 6th of February, the same day that the 
injunction was issued. On hearing of the Court's action, however, the family 
immediately returned to Ireland before X had obtained the abortion. Upon 
return, X was diagnosed as suicidal and was placed under medical 
supervision. 12 
(1992) 'Rape victim, 14, denied abortion' Independent 18th February; William E. Schmidt 
(1992) 'Girl, 14, Raped and Pregnant, Is Caught in Web of Irish Law' New York Times 18th 
February; Los Angeles Times Editorial'When Abortion Is Illegal: Ireland shows how not to 
handle the issue' 19th February 1992; Glen Frankel (1992) 'Court Ruling On Abortion 
Shakes Irish: Ruling Illuminates Conflicts over Future' Washington Post 19th February; 
Baltimore Sun 'Irish Abortion Quandry' 21st February 1992; The Philadelphia Inquirer 'Rape 
victim's plight shakes soul of Ireland' 20th February 1992. The author is grateful to Catholics 
for a Free Choice for providing details of coverage of the X case in the United States press. 
11The story behind the case is related in detail by Wendy Holden (1994). See also O'Reilly 
(1992) and Smyth (1992a). 
12The rapist was eventually sentenced in June 1994 to 14 years for unlawful carnal 
knowledge, having been described by Justice Costello in his High Court judgment in the X 
case as a'depraved and evil man'. However, the Court of Criminal Appeal reduced his 
sentence to 4 years in March 1995, and he was freed after serving three years, on 31st May 
1997 (Balls, Richard 1997 'Man in X case freed after serving three years', Irish Times on the 
Web (http: //www. ireland. com) 27th June). In September 1999 he was accused of indecently 
assaulting another schoolgirl in his taxi. Although, the Gardas had been informed by the 
National Taxi Drivers' Union that he was driving a taxi in Dublin, they had nevertheless 
decided to allow him to keep his licence (O'Loughlin, Ann (1999) 'X-case rapist accused of 
sex assault on girl' Irish Independent 20th September). 
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The injunction had been sought by the Attorney General, the chief legal officer 
of the State, whose office is constitutionally charged with the prosecution of 
crimes in the name of the People. '3 He had been informed of the planned 
abortion by the Director of Public Prosecutions. As already mentioned, the 
'unborn' have a constitutionally recognised right to life, which the State is 
obliged to defend. This right, usually referred to as the Eighth Amendment, '4 
had been incorporated into the Constitution following a referendum in 
September 1983, the outcome of an intense three-year campaign by anti- 
abortion groups, in the absence of any feminist campaign for abortion access. '5 
In granting the injunction, the High Court held that the risk to X's life from her 
suicidal state, the consequence of rape and pregnancy, 'is much less and is of a 
different order of magnitude than the certainty that the life of the unborn will be 
terminated if the order is not made' (Costello, J., in Attorney General v. X and 
Others [ 1992] Irish Law Reports Monthly: 410). 
The publication of this decision ended the sub judice ruling, and the 
controversies raised by the case overwhelmed political debate on the streets, in 
the media, and in the Oireachtas (legislature). Massive public demonstrations 
against the ruling occurred daily. Students abandoned their classrooms to 
demonstrate outside government buildings. The singer Sinead O'Connor spoke 
publicly about her two abortions, and successfully demanded a meeting with 
the Taoiseach (Prime Minister), Albert Reynolds, himself only days in office, to 
t3Article 30.3, Bunreacht na hEireann (Constitution of Ireland). 
t4This amendment states the following: 'The state acknowledges the right to life of the 
unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to 
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right' (Article 
40.3.3° Bunreacht na hElreann). 
"Discussion of this campaign can be found in Girvin 1986; Randall 1986; Mahon 1987; 
Hesketh 1990; O'Carroll 1991; Barry 1992; O'Reilly 1992; and Hug 1999. A particular point 
of controversy regarding the result of this referendum was that, although the amendment was 
ratified by 66.9% of voters, only 54.6% of the electorate actually voted. Thus, only 36% of 
the electorate favoured the amendment. Many argued that the low turnout represented a 
protest against the referendum itself (e. g. Girvin 1986). At the very least, it suggests a lack of 
popular enthusiasm for the Eighth Amendment, and perhaps also for the referendum process. 
6 
discuss the case. Newspapers, talk-shows and current affairs programmes were 
absorbed with coverage of reactions to the case, and new political alliances 
emerged aiming at obtaining the repeal of Article 40.3.3°. Of central 
importance to the governmental response to the case was the international 
condemnation the High Court injunction received. This was particularly 
embarrassing at a time when Ireland held the Presidency of the European Union 
(O'Reilly 1992). 
Significantly, it was the Government who persuaded the family involved to 
lodge an appeal against the injunction with the Supreme Court, and offered to 
cover all legal costs. The decision on appeal was delivered on March 5th, when 
the injunction was lifted by a majority of four judges to one. The decisions of 
the majority of the Court, published individually, relied primarily on a 
reinterpretation of Article 40.3.3°, for the first time emphasizing that the 
'mother's' right to life be given 'due regard'. As Chief Justice Finlay defined it, 
abortion would be constitutionally permissible, '... if it is established as a matter 
of probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life as distinct from 
the health of the mother, which can only be avoided by the termination of her 
pregnancy. ' 
Thus, the initial High Court ruling, that suicide did not constitute a substantial 
enough threat to a pregnant woman's right to life such as to justify abortion, 
was reversed. Another major ground for the Supreme Court's ruling was that 
the injunction had constituted an unwarranted interference with the authority of 
the family. 16 The question of whether women's right to travel could be 
compromised by a competing foetal right to life had been raised but not 
resolved in this decision, although the Chief Justice had argued, in a non- 
16This was emphasized in particular by Justice Hugh O'Flaherty. 
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binding (obiter dicta) part of his judgment, that it could be. In fact, a majority 
of three of the judges held that the right to travel was not absolute. Thus, 
Article 40.3.3° had facilitated the legalization, albeit severely limited, of 
abortion in Ireland, precisely what it had been designed to prevent. '7 As the 
Irish Press editorial commented: 
During that [1983] referendum campaign, opponents pointed out that 
cases such as this could arise, with girls and women being arrested at 
ports and airports on their way to Britain for abortion, or on their 
return. The claims were dismissed as scare stories by those backing 
the amendment. Now, suddenly, they are coming true with a brutality 
that even the critics would not have predicted (18th February 1992, 
p. 8). 
The Pro-Life Amendment Campaign 
Prior to the X case, the Eighth Amendment had never been applied to prevent 
any woman from obtaining an abortion in Britain. Abortion had been a criminal 
offence since the passing of the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act, under 
British rule. As Randall comments, the insertion of the Eighth Amendment 
simply reinforced the existing prohibition (1986: 67). Why was the Amendment 
ratified in the absence of any feminist activism on abortion? 
The amendment had been sought at a time when Ireland was becoming 
increasingly open to international influence. The Pro-Life Amendment 
Campaign (PLAC) emerged at the end of the 1970s, provoking an intensely 
bitter conflict which, as Keogh argues, probably had no parallel in the previous 
17Mary O'Carroll (1999) comments that the anti-abortion lobby were 'hung by their own 
rope'. Conor Gearty in highlighting the irony that anti-abortion advocates of the Eighth 
Amendment were now the facilitators of legally available abortion, notes that "'Yes" had 
meant "no", and "no" had meant "yes"' (1992: 443). 
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fifty years of the State's existence (1988a: 152). Its purpose was primarily to 
counter what was seen, from a right-wing perspective, as the growing 
legitimacy of secular, liberal and feminist ideas in Ireland (Randall 1986). 
O'Carroll, for example, has argued that the 1983 referendum emerged from 
anxiety over the continuity of a 'traditionalist' national identity: 
... abortion 
became a symbol which subsumed many of the core values 
of Irish identity - Catholicism, family, patriarchal domination, fear of 
sex and opposition to 'alien' ideas. In the circumstances, the futile pre- 
emptive strike against abortion is best seen as a defence of a 
threatened Irish identity and an aggressive reassertion of ultimate 
distinctiveness (1991: 67). 
The PLAC was formed not in reaction to any campaign or specific legislative 
proposal to legalize access to abortion, but rather in response to a range of 
cultural and legal shifts that had occurred since the late 1960s. 18 These shifts 
had unsettled the post-independence conservative socio-political hegemony, 
through which the nationhood project had been defined and legitimized. The 
newly independent nation-state had been characterised from its inception by a 
sexual puritanism which authorized, for example, extensive state censorship; a 
ban on divorce; bans on married women working in the civil service, local 
authorities, and health boards; and a ban on the importation and sale of 
contraceptives. 19 It was also distinguished by a patriarchal nationalist discourse 
of the 'blood and soil' variety (MacLaughlin 1999), which consigned women to 
lives of domestic labour, and dependence on men for their survival and status. 
These conservative discourses found expression in the new State's Constitution 
18As O'Carroll puts it, the 1983 referendum concerned abortion in theory rather than in 
practice (1991: 54). 
19This latter ban was effected by the 1935 Criminal Law Amendment Act. 
9 
(1937), which recognised both the 'special position' of the Catholic Church in 
the State, 20 and that women's 'life within the home ... gives the state a support 
without which the common good cannot be achieved. '21 The Catholic church's 
control over education, health and other social services was unchallenged 
(Speed 1992). 
The conservative hegemony in the State was not, however, uncontroversial. A 
major instance of conflict had occurred, for example, in the 1950s, over a 
(defeated) government proposal known as the'mother and child' scheme, aimed 
at making free medical care available for mothers and their children up to the 
age of sixteen. Three aspects of this proposed scheme proved unacceptable to 
the religious-political establishment: that doctors could advise mothers on 
issues such as family size; that women could not themselves choose a doctor, 
which meant that Catholic mothers could be assigned to non-Catholic doctors; 
and that the scheme seemed resonant of state-socialism, a secular ideology 
anathema to the Ireland of the 1950s (Keogh 1994: 179-181). However, the 
scheme's failure is generally seen as indicative of the conservative Catholic 
hegemony of the time (Whyte 1980). 
By the late 1950s Ireland was in a state of severe economic crisis, and the 
protectionist economic policy of the previous decades was finally reversed, in 
an attempt to turn the State's economy around. 22 Significant cultural 
transformation followed, as Ireland became industrialized and more outward 
looking, The economy began to grow, and other major changes occurred, such 
as the establishment of a national television station with an outward-looking 
20This was removed by popular referendum in 1972 (Brown 1985: 308). 
21 Article 41.2.1°. Article 41.2.2° is also significant: "The State shall, therefore, endeavour to 
ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the 
neglect of their duties in the home. ' 
22See, for example, Brown (1985); Lee (1989); Keogh (1994). 
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agenda. This provided a new forum where traditional orthodoxies were 
challenged and alternative views defended (O'Carroll 1991: 58). The 1970s in 
particular saw the erosion of conservative power in Ireland's laws and political 
culture. The State joined the E. E. C. in 1973, thereby becoming a member of a 
secular and liberal political association, 23 which had significant effects, for 
instance enabling the introduction of equal pay for women and men, at least 
formally. Other major changes included a partial reversal of the ban on 
contraception in 1973, following a successful constitutional challenge to the 
legislation. The case in question was highly significant in undermining the 
security of the conservative status-quo. Brought by a married woman, through 
the sponsorship of the Irish Family Planning Association, the Supreme Court 
held, on appeal, that the State had infringed a fundamental constitutional right 
to marital privacy when it confiscated the spermicidal jelly which Mary McGee 
had ordered from England on medical advice. The Court had reinterpreted 
what had been thought of as unproblematic legislation, based as it was on the 
same Catholic principles that the Constitution incorporated (Whyte 1980: 408- 
410). The peculiar resonance with the events of the subsequent X case are not 
insignificant. 24 
Other indications of cultural change in the 1970s also signified challenges to 
conservative patriarchal hegemony. The State established the Commission on 
the Status of Women in 1969, following a UN directive (Mahon 1987: 57). 
23By'liberal' I mean officially according priority to individual decisional autonomy, based on 
the recognition of individual legal personality, and individual rights, as opposed to state 
paternalism involving the priority of 'majority will' or 'community norms' over the individual 
(Cohen, J.: 1996). The argument here is not that the European Union exemplifies this 
political value. On the contrary, EU citizenship is structured through particularly racist and 
gendered categories of inclusion and exclusion (e. g. see Brah 1993; Bhavnani 1993). 
However, in relation to the 'common good' republicanism informing Irish laws and political 
institutions, which often translates into religious-derived legal principles militating against 
decisional autonomy for citizens, as the abortion controversy demonstrates, the EU provides a 
more liberal counterbalance which can be used in the service of individual rights. 
24Gearty (1992) situates the X case specifically in relation to the McGee precedent. 
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Feminist groups such as Irish Women United, and the Irish Women's Liberation 
Movement, emerged in this period, and publicly campaigned for access to 
contraception, among other things, although notably not on legalising 
abortion. 25 As Randall points out, feminism in Ireland at this time was small 
and diverse, and did not have a coherent position on abortion. The issue was 
forced on Irish feminists by the anti-abortion lobby (1986: 83). Nevertheless, 
women were increasingly accessing contraceptives through semi-legal 
manoeuvering, with the assistance of the Irish Family Planning Association. For 
example, the contraceptive pill could be defined as a 'cycle regulator' rather 
than a contraceptive, and could be legally prescribed as such. 26 
International changes in legislation on reproductive rights also had an impact 
on the cultural climate in Ireland. The legalisation of abortion in Britain in 1967 
led to an increase in Irish women traveling to that jurisdiction to obtain legal 
abortions (Randall 1986: 68). The 1973 Constitutional Supreme Court decision 
in the United States, Roe versus Wade, provided a significant example of the 
possibilities of judicial action in this area, particularly in the light of the McGee 
judgment already mentioned. The Irish judiciary tend to be influenced by the 
Constitutional arguments and decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court, given the 
similar nature of the institutions (Gearty 1992: 443-447). Indeed, the McGee 
case had specifically relied on U. S. precedent (Whyte 1980: 409). 
This national and international accumulation of events throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s threatened to undermine the hegemony of conservative and 
patriarchal discourse through which Irish legal, political and social decisions 
and policies had been produced. It was against this background that the Pro- 
25Although there was a Women's Right to Choose Group, which began meeting in 1978, it 
was not prominent (see Gordon 1984; Levine 1982). 
26Whyte (1980: 403) points out that in 1978 the Irish Medical Association estimated that 
48,000 women had been prescribed the pill in this way. 
12 
Life Amendment Campaign (PLAC) emerged, with the specific intention of 
preventing the courts in particular from introducing legal abortion to Ireland, 
by conferring a constitutional right to life on'the unborn'. The specific focus on 
abortion can be read as symptomatic of a conservative anxiety about the 
impending transformation of hegemonic discourses of gender, sexuality, and 
reproduction, through which the project of nationhood had been constructed. 
As Randall argues, the amendment itself was a signal of change (1986: 67). 
However, one major cultural effect of the PLAC, given the absence of any 
mainstream feminist movement aimed at decriminalizing abortion, was that 
moral opposition to abortion hegemonically defined the terms of the debate 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, prior to the X case, as the following chapters 
will demonstrate. Notably, the Anti-Amendment Campaign (AAC), launched in 
1982 in opposition to the PLAC, did not position itself in feminist reproductive 
rights terms. 27 However, as Mary Gordon comments, the anti-abortion 
commonsense of the time was such that to oppose the amendment even 
without advocating reproductive freedom was itself extraordinarily radical 
(Gordon 1984: 16-17). 
The most immediate effect of the new constitutional abortion ban following the 
September 1983 referendum was that information on abortion was declared to 
be unconstitutional by the courts. A succession of cases during the 1980s and 
early 1990s closed down information and non-directive counselling services, on 
this basis. 28 A number of clinics in Dublin provided such assistance, and were 
27Rathcr, this campaign was based on five specific arguments: that a constitutional 
amendment would not solve the problem of unwanted pregnancies; that no exceptions would 
be allowed to a constitutional ban on abortion; that the proposed amendment was sectarian; 
that the possibility of legislation on abortion would be prevented; and that the referendum 
was a waste of scarce public funds (Gordon 1984: 14). 
28The definition did not extend to banning 'information' about what might allegedly happen 
to foetuses during the process of abortion. Thus, organizations presenting graphic images of 
foetuses during the process of abortion, and the aftermath, have never been prosecuted for 
infringing the 'information' ban. 
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prosecuted and closed down following judicial action brought by the Society 
for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC) in 1986.29 Student Unions who 
defiantly provided information in their student handbooks were subsequently 
prosecuted in this way. 30 SPUC were joined in their initial action against the 
clinics by the Attorney General, in order to prevent any questions arising as to 
their locus stand!, i. e., their entitlement to take the case, on the grounds of 
whether the group were directly affected by the actions under consideration 
(Robertson 1997: 135-6). 31 
Thus, the period between 1986 and the occurrence of the X case in 1992 was 
characterized by injunctions against organizations providing women with 
support and assistance; counter actions which either ignored or subverted the 
ban; 32 and censorship of anything that might constitute a source of abortion 
information. Self-censorship was practiced by booksellers and newsagents. 
Women's health books which included addresses and telephone numbers of 
29The initial decision in what was to be a long-running series of actions and appeals was 
given by the High Court in December 1986, in The Attorney General at the Relation of the 
Societyfor the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Open Door Counselling Ltd 
and The Dublin Well-Woman Centre Ltd. [1987] Irish Law Reports Monthly: 477. This case 
was eventually successfully appealed to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, 
on 29th October 1992 (1993) 15 EHRR 244. 
30The initial case against the students was: The Societyfor the Protection of Unborn 
Children Ltd. v Diarmuid Coogan, Anna Farrell, David Hughes, Ann Marie Keary, David 
Kilroy, Belinda Flaherty, Kevin MicDermot, Francois Pithion, Andrew Cunningham and 
University College Dublin. 7th September 1988 [1989] Irish Law Reports Monthly: 526. 
Following a series of appeals and counter appeals, including to the European Court of 
Justice, the initial injunction was finally lifted by the Supreme Court on appeal in March 
1997, following significant changes in the law on abortion information, precipitated by the X 
case (See Irish Times 6th March 1997; 10th March 1997). 
31However, in the case brought by SPUC against the Student Unions in 1988, the Attorney 
General refused to join them in the action, on the basis of a technicality. Justice Mella 
Carroll in the High Court refused SPUC's application, saying: 'I am not prepared to have a 
self-appointed group step in and take over the application of the law. ' However, the 
injunction was granted on appeal by the Supreme Court. Justice Mella Carroll was later 
appointed Chairwoman of the Second Commission on the Status of Women (O'Reilly 
1992: 120-121). 
32Although the two organizations offering non-directive pregnancy counselling, Open Door 
and the Well Woman Centres, either shut down or ceased providing counselling, abortion 
advice and information remained available from underground sources (Murphy-Lawless 
1983: 56). This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. 
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clinics in Britain offering abortion services were removed from public libraries, 
as were British telephone directories. British magazines carrying 
advertisements for abortion clinics produced specially censored editions for the 
Irish market. However, the numbers of women travelling to Britain for 
abortions each year did not diminish during this period, and indeed received 
some assistance from a network of reproductive rights activists working 
illegally. 33 British clinics reported that women from Ireland arrived less 
prepared and more anxious than they had been prior to the SPUC cases, since 
the decision-making process had been curtailed by the successful prosecution 
of the non-directive clinics, and the culture of secrecy surrounding abortion 
practice had been intensified (Barry 1992: 116; Conroy-Jackson 1992: 133-4). 
The clinics also reported an increase in later abortions following the 1986 High 
Court injunction against the provision of information and assistance to Irish 
women (Murphy-Lawless 1993: 56; Hug 1999: 164). 
Legal Political Effects 
Constitutional Crisis 
The criterion set out by the Supreme Court's decision in the X case, namely 
that abortion was constitutional in situations where a woman's life was 
threatened by her pregnancy, including a threat of self-destruction, undermined 
the perception that the Eighth Amendment guaranteed an absolute ban on 
abortion. This decision, and the transformation of attitudes to abortion which 
surrounded the political upheavals of the time, was greeted with shock by anti- 
abortion campaigners, who immediately began campaigning for a second 
referendum to have the ban on abortion restored. As they put it, Ireland now 
had the most liberal abortion law in the world, since there was no time 
restriction on when abortions could be allowed (Speed 1992: 97). 
33See Chapter Six for detailed discussion of this network. 
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The situation was complicated by the imminent prospect of further European 
integration, to be effected by the proposed ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1992. Prior to the X case, anti-abortion concerns about the effect of 
European law on the constitutional ban on abortion in Ireland had prompted 
the government, in an attempt to protect the abortion ban from European law, 
to attach a Protocol to the Maastricht Treaty, which declared that: 'nothing in 
the Treaty ... shall affect the application 
in Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of the 
Constitution of Ireland. '34 This was designed to close off the European Courts 
as an avenue of appeal against domestic court applications of the Eighth 
Amendment, a route pursued by abortion information providers when 
prosecuted during the 1980s. However, in the light of the new interpretation of 
that Article in the X case judgment, it seemed to the anti-abortion lobby that 
the right to abortion, in the specific circumstances defined in the X case, would 
be copperfastened by the European Union. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's reinterpretation of the Eighth Amendment 
called previous court rulings on the constitutionality of information on abortion 
into question. In addition, women's right to travel outside the State had also 
been compromised through the X case. The High Court ruling had held that in 
the event of a conflict between the constitutional right of a woman to travel and 
the constitutional right of a foetus to life, the right to life of the foetus would 
outweigh the right to travel of the woman. This issue was not resolved by the 
Supreme Court in its ruling, which lifted the injunction against X travelling not 
on the grounds that travel is a basic right of all citizens in a democratic state, 
but rather on grounds of a threat to X's life, as well as on grounds of family 
privacy, as already mentioned. 
34Protocol 17, quoted in Kennelly and Ward 1993: 117. 
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The Maastricht Treaty could only be ratified in Ireland by popular referendum. 
However, the Protocol attached to that Treaty, guaranteeing that European law 
could have no effect on the Eighth Amendment, now seemed redundant. The 
government was now planning, in response to public pressure, to hold 
referendums to amend the Eighth Amendment in order to deal with the issues 
of travel and information, as well as the right to abortion. Thus, the Protocol 
would have no effect on any new constitutional amendment concerning 
abortion law. It only applied to the Eighth Amendment. Fearing that this new 
uncertainty over the status of Irish abortion law in the European context would 
result in a popular refusal to ratify the Maastricht Treaty, the Government 
sought to have the Protocol amended or deleted. However, its European Union 
partners were unprepared to reopen the Treaty for amendments, fearing that 
other states might also request changes, and that the entire process of 
ratification would be seriously delayed. Instead, member states made a Solemn 
Declaration, stating that the Protocol was not intended to interfere with rights 
to travel and obtain information, and that they would be prepared to amend the 
Protocol if Article 40.3.3° were to be amended. However, as the legal status of 
this Declaration was dubious, the questions over Irish women's citizenship in 
Europe had not been resolved. This provided a major source of feminist 
opposition to ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, both in Parliament and outside. 
Moreover, the 'pro-life' lobby were also opposed to ratifying the Treaty, on the 
grounds that the Protocol protected an Article in the Constitution which 
allowed for, in their view, abortion on demand. 35 Hence the Maastricht Treaty 
35Allowing for abortion on grounds of suicide, as the X case judgment asserts that Article 
40.3.3 does, is in effect allowing for abortion on demand, according to the 'pro-life' activists, 
since risk of suicide is not a medically certifiable condition, and hence is not in fact a threat 
to the life of the woman. Rather, they see it as a threat from the woman to the foetus. The 
argument is that any woman who is genuinely suicidal should be committed to a psychiatric 
hospital and physically restrained from committing suicide until the baby is born (Loscher 
1992). There is a deep suspicion of any woman who claims to be suicidal through pregnancy, 
since they argue that, on the basis of medical and psychiatric evidence, pregnancy is good for 
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campaign saw an unusual association between the pro-choice and anti-abortion 
activists. However, this did not ultimately translate into a popular rejection of 
the Treaty. The economic benefits of membership of the E. U. would seem to 
have outweighed any legal or political questions the abortion issue raised. 
The government finally introduced proposals to amend Article 40.3.3° to deal 
with the issues raised through the X case in the autumn of 1992. Three separate 
referendums were proposed, dealing with travel, information, and what was 
euphemistically termed the 'substantive issue', namely the availability of 
abortion in the State. The travel amendment simply stated that Article 40.3.3° 
could not be used to limit freedom to travel. The information amendment 
similarly stated that freedom to obtain or make available information could not 
be limited by Article 40.3.3°, but this was made 'subject to such conditions as 
may be laid down by law'. This left open the possibility of limiting the 
availability of abortion information legislatively, which was subsequently done 
by the 1995 Information Act. 36 Both of these amendments were relatively 
uncontentious, and were accepted by referendum. The abortion issue, however, 
was the source of more substantial controversy. This amendment stated that: 
It shall be unlawful to terminate the life of an unborn unless such 
termination is necessary to save the life, as distinct from the health, of 
the mother, where there is an illness or disorder of the mother giving 
mental health, and in fact protects women against suicide. Women claiming to be suicidal 
during pregnancy are either not being entirely honest, (i. e., using the threat of suicide in 
order to secure an abortion) or are in need of protection from themselves, and should be 
regarded as irrational. Therefore they should not be treated as autonomous agents whose 
intentions or decisions should be given any weight. 
36This Act distinguishes between information and referral, and continues to criminalize the 
latter. Thus, information providers, including doctors, are unable to make appointments on 
behalf of women, but can furnish clinics with any relevant medical history once requested to 
do so. 
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rise to a real or substantive risk to her life, not being a risk of self- 
destruction. 37 
Although the government attempted to secure the passage of this amendment 
by warning that, in the event of its rejection, liberal abortion legislation would 
be introduced in line with the X case decision, their heavy-handed strategy 
failed. Neither pro-choice nor anti-abortion activists accepted the proposal. For 
the anti-abortion lobby, any move towards legalising what they term 'direct' 
abortion was unacceptable. 38 For pro-choice, left, and liberal parliamentary and 
extra-parliamentary activists, there were many objections to the amendment. 
The distinction between the life and the health of the 'mother' was 
unacceptable. The exclusion of suicide as a ground for legal abortion, the very 
circumstances of the X case, was also unacceptable. For many, legalising 
abortion only on grounds of a threat to the life of a pregnant woman was much 
too restrictive, involving a spurious distinction between life and health. 
Abortion should be available in many more instances than this would cover, and 
particularly for cases of rape and sexual abuse, as in the X case. Many argued 
that the constitution was an inappropriate place to deal with the complexity of 
abortion access, instead advocating the introduction of legislation on the basis 
of Article 40.3.3°, as interpreted by the X case judgment. As a result of the 
broad basis of opposition, this amendment was rejected by referendum. 
"Quoted in Kennelly and Ward, 1993: 119. 
38The 'pro-life' lobby in Ireland rely on the Catholic doctrine of 'double effect' to distinguish 
between 'direct' and 'indirect' abortions. This means that if an abortion was an unintended 
effect of a medical intervention in pregnancy where a woman's life is at risk, for instance in 
cases of ectopic pregnancies, then that is defined as an 'indirect' abortion, and is morally 
acceptable. This use of the concept of intent is different from intent as it is used in Irish law, 
where any foreseeable consequence resulting from an action is defined as intentional. 
Therefore in law, an abortion which results from intervening in an ectopic pregnancy is 
intended, regardless of the fact that it wasn't the primary purpose of the intervention. The 
fact that abortion was foreseeable indicates that it was intended. In principle, such abortions 
should not be able to escape prosecution on the grounds that they are 'indirect' and therefore 
unintentional. The fact that there has never been a prosecution for such 'indirect' abortions, 
which the medical establishment make no apology for performing, suggests that the Catholic 
right wing in Ireland are hegemonic in legal and medical institutions. 
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The Supreme Court judgment in the X case continues to define the law on the 
provision of abortion, although the guidelines issued by the Medical Council, 
the medical profession's regulatory body, continue to define abortion as 
essentially unethical. 39 Hence if a medical practitioner were to perform a legal 
abortion under the conditions laid out by the X case judgment, they would risk 
being struck off the medical register (Hug 1999: 190-191). 
The decision in the X case was reinforced in 1997, in a second case of sexual 
violence and consequent pregnancy, this time concerning a thirteen-year-old 
traveller. 40 The victim in this case, known as 'C', was violently raped by an 
associate of her father's. She became pregnant and was diagnosed as suicidal. 
Following the rape, her parents made her a ward of court, and she was placed 
in foster care. Her father went on national radio to discuss the case, in support 
of his daughter's wish to have an abortion. The case was heard by the 
Children's Court, which held that her right to travel could not be compromised 
by her pregnancy, following the Constitutional amendment guaranteeing 
women's right to travel. However, an anti-abortion organization contacted C's 
father, and persuaded him to change his position in relation to the planned 
abortion. He attempted to have his daughter returned to his guardianship, but 
failed, since he did not appear to be primarily concerned with her best interests. 
C was eventually taken to Manchester for an abortion by the State, in the form 
of the Eastern Health Board, on 3rd December 1997, accompanied by two 
Gardai, who oversaw the process of DNA testing in Britain, the results of 
39The Guidelines issued in November 1998 state the following: 'The deliberate and 
intentional destruction of the unborn child is professional misconduct. Should a child in 
utero suffer or lose its life as a side effect of standard medical treatment of the mother, then 
this is not unethical. Refusal by a doctor to treat a woman with a serious illness because she 
is pregnant would be grounds for complaint and could be considered to be professional 
misconduct' (quoted in The Stationery Office, 1999: 34). 
40Nomadic Irish Travellers, a long-established ethnic group, suffer racist exclusions within 
the culture and political structures of the state, as MacLoughlin notes (1999: 134). 
20 
which were used as evidence in the rape trial. The rapist was tried in December 
1998, and was sentenced to twelve years, with the last four years suspended if 
he agreed to undergo rehabilitation treatment for sex offenders. He was 
publicly named, and given a heavy sentence, not only because of the violence of 
his crime, and his subsequent three month disappearance, but also because, as 
the judge explained, his actions had led to the death of another child through 
abortion. 4' 
In an attempt to address the continuing uncertainty over abortion access, the 
Government established an Inter-Departmental Working Group on Abortion in 
1997. The group invited submissions from interested individuals and 
organizations, receiving over 10,000, as well as 36,500 petitions signatures, 
mostly from an anti-abortion perspective (The Stationery Office, 1999: 57,159- 
161). A Green Paper, essentially a discussion document, outlining and 
analyzing the legal issues involved, and considering a range of possible legal 
responses, was published in September 1999.42 This document attempted to 
redefine abortion provision in medical rather than moral terms. 43 It discussed 
seven possible approaches to revising abortion law, from an absolute ban to the 
provision of abortion on demand. 44 The introduction to the document both 
4I'Rapist at the centre of 'C' case is sentenced to 12 years in prison' Irish Times 18th 
December 1998. Thus, foetal protection discourse was ironically rearticulated in a case where 
the State itself had actually facilitated and paid for C's abortion. 
42As the Green Paper states: 'It is clear that many Irish people regard abortion with 
abhorrence, whatever the circumstances' (p. 58). The section on Ethical and Moral 
submissions is concerned largely with religious perspectives on abortion, although the final 
short paragraph states: 'Some submissions argue that there is a need to respect the moral 
diversity which exists among people of sincerity and good conscience and to respect a 
pregnant woman's moral viewpoint'. Feminist arguments concerning women's rights are 
dealt with as a subsection under the heading 'Other issues'. This position is briefly outlined, 
and then countered by the following: 'On the other hand, as indicated earlier, the view is 
expressed in many other submissions that the unborn have an equal right to life and that a 
woman should not therefore be allowed discretion in relation to the continuation of her 
pregnancy' (ibid.: 79). 
43 The first chapter of the document places abortion in medical context. 
44The following are the proposed options outlined by the Green Paper: an absolute 
consitutional ban on abortion; a constitutional amendment to restrict the application of the X 
case; the retention of the status quo; the retention of the constitutional status quo with 
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noted that very few submissions were received from medical bodies or 
organizations, and explicitly solicited such submissions. 45 More than 105,000 
written submissions were made in response to the Green Paper, and the All- 
Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution invited oral presentations, 
selected from these submissions, to be made at public hearings, which began in 
May 2000. The Committee invited medical professionals, representatives of the 
main maternity hospitals, and Youth Defence, a radical anti-abortion 
organization, to present their positions at these hearings. In July 2000 the 
Committee invited representatives of all church leaders to make oral 
presentations, following reported inquiries from the Catholic hierarchy as to 
whether it would be invited to respond. 46 A number of'pro-choice' groups were 
also invited to contribute to the hearings in July, including the Cork Women's 
Right to Choose Group, and Catholics for a Free Choice, whose presentation 
the Catholic Hierarchy attempted to block by claiming that they distorted 
Catholic teaching. 47 Thus, the constitutional future of abortion law remains 
unclear, not least as the official primary definition of the issue is apparently 
shifting from confessional-moral to medical grounds. 
legislative restatement of the prohibition on abortion; legislation to regulate abortion in 
circumstances defined by the X case; a reversion to the position as it pertained prior to 1983; 
and permitting abortion on grounds beyond those specified in the X case (The Stationery 
Office 1999: 107-108). 
45The Adelaide Hospital Society, a traditionally Protestant organization, made a submission 
recommending that abortion should be dealt with in the context of women's health care, and 
that legislation should be introduced to make this possible, in line with the judgments of the 
X and C cases (Irish Times on the Web Editorial, 'Abortion in Ireland' 18th May 1998, 
http: //www. ireland. com). The publicity this recommendation received led to street protests 
outside the hospital. See 53n below. 
46McGarry, Patsy (2000) 'Churches invited to abortion hearings' Irish Times on the Web 15th 
June, http: //www. ireland. com; McGarry, Patsy (2000) 'Connell to give views to abortion 
hearings' Irish Times on the Web 3rd July, http: //www. ireland. com. These submissions were 
heard on 5th July 2000, and although all agreed that abortion should not be easily available, 
the submissions diverged in terms of which of the Green Paper's seven options were preferred 
(Coughlan, Denis 2000'Archbishop leaves Ahern with no easy way out' Irish Times on the 
Web 6th July, http: //www. ireland. com). 
47Healy, Alison (2000)'Status of Catholic group questioned' Irish Times on the Web 13th 
July, http: //www. ireland. com. 
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Post -X Case Abortion Politics 
The constitutional changes effected by the X case have facilitated the re- 
introduction of non-directive pregnancy counselling and support. In 1992, the 
Irish Family Planning Association (IFPA) established a service in association 
with the British Pregnancy Advisory Service (BPAS). Advice and information 
on all aspects of reproductive health are now available, although, since the 
passage of the Information Act in 1995, organizations have been prevented 
from making 'referrals' on behalf of individual women. The guarantee that 
women have a constitutional right to travel to obtain abortions abroad, and to 
obtain information on abortion services available abroad, has been interpreted 
as popular endorsement of a limited right to abortion, albeit not on Irish soil 
(Murphy-Lawless 1993: 58). This appears to have defused demands to liberalize 
abortion access within Ireland, although pressure for such changes continues to 
emanate from reproductive rights groups such as the Alliance for Choice, and 
professional health care organizations, such as the Adelaide Hospital, as 
demonstrated by submissions on the issue made to the All-Party Oireachtas 
Committee on the Constitution, described above. 
Anti-abortion activism, on the other hand, was unable, in the immediate 
aftermath of the X case, to draw authority from the church in support of its 
position, not least because the church was itself facing a major legitimacy crisis 
of its own, which made it particularly difficult for the hierarchy to take any 
strong moral position concerning sexuality and reproduction. In May 1992, 
shortly after the X case, the Bishop of Galway, Eamon Casey, was forced to 
resign and leave the country, following reports that he had a seventeen-year-old 
son in the United States, whose mother, a distant cousin, had been in receipt of 
church funds (Hug 1999: 177). 48 
48A number of other scandals subsequently emerged concerning the sexual activities of 
members of the clergy. One prominent priest, Fr. Michael Cleary, who had publicly claimed 
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The X case and contemporary circumstances served to undermine, at least 
temporarily, the hegemony of the anti-abortion right wing, not least by drawing 
attention to the vulnerability of children to sexual abuse and violence, and the 
inadequacy of the anti-abortion response to the consequences of such violence. 
In particular, the emergence of a succession of scandals involving children 
abused by clergy and nuns received intense public attention following the X 
case. Thus, the authority of the church, and particularly its relationship to the 
development of social policy specifically in the area child protection, was 
seriously damaged. 49 One case in particular, involving the extradition to 
Northern Ireland of Fr. Brendan Smyth over charges related to child sexual 
abuse, led to the collapse of the government in November 1994.50 The scandals 
surrounding church involvement in widespread child sexual abuse have 
continued throughout the 1990s, and some religious organizations have 
published public apologies in the national press. sl The Bishops eventually 
established an Advisory Committee on Child Sexual Abuse by Priests and 
Religious, whose report, Child Sexual Abuse: Framework for a Church 
that the X case was simply a fabrication of the liberal-left, was discovered to have had two 
children with his house-keeper. Furthermore, newspapers carried reports of a priest found 
dead in a gay club in Dublin, who received last rites from two other priests who were also 
present (Hug 1999: 177). 
49For instance, the death of an eleven month old baby while temporarily in the care of the 
Sisters of Mercy during the 1950s received intense public attention during 1997. The order 
gave the family concerned a £20,000 settlement, and published an apology in the press for its 
'lack of courtesy and compassion at that time' (Irish Times on the Web Editorial, 'The Death 
of Baby Howe' 11th October 1997, http: //www. ireland. com). 
"For an account of the details of this case, see Smyth 1995. 
51For example, the Christian Brothers, primarily an educative order, published the following 
half-page advertisement in broad sheet Sunday newspapers on 29th March 1998: 'Message 
from the Irish Christian Brothers: Over the past number of years we have received from 
former pupils serious complaints of ill-treatment and abuse by some Christian Brothers in 
schools and residential centres. We, the Christian Brothers in Ireland, wish to express our 
deep regret to anyone who suffered ill-treatment while in our care. And we say to you who 
have experienced physical or sexual abuse by a Christian Brother, and to you who 
complained of abuse and were not listened to, we are deeply sorry. We want to do more than 
say that we are sorry. As an initial step, we have already put in place a range of services to 
offer a practical response. Further services will be provided as needs become clearer. ' The 
advert then supplies an independent and confidential help-line number. 
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Response was published in 1996, recommending the establishment of formal 
procedures for dealing with allegations of sexual abuse. An indication of the 
shift in the church's generally authoritative position on matters relating to 
sexuality and reproduction during the 1990s can be seen, for example, in the 
highly critical public response to a speech given by the Archbishop of Dublin, 
Desmond Connell, in March 1999, marking the 30th anniversary of the papal 
encyclical outlining church teaching on contraception, Humane Vitae. The 
Bishop's speech was severely criticized for implying that children who were 
'planned' would be less loved than those who were not. In response, the Bishop 
said that he regretted any hurt caused, claiming, unconvincingly according to 
newspaper reports, that what he was primarily concerned with was genetic 
engineering rather than family planning. 52 
The anti-abortion right-wing were further hindered in regaining moral and 
political legitimacy by the establishment of a high-profile direct action anti- 
abortion group, Youth Defence, following the X case. This youth group draws 
on support from similar organizations in the United States, adopting new 
radical tactics, such as picketing the homes of mainstream politicians, and 
staging dramatic street demonstrations (Hug 1999: 179). For example, in May 
1998 members of this organization were found guilty of charges of assaulting 
Gardai, obstruction, and disorderly behaviour, following a demonstration 
outside the Adelaide Hospital in Dublin. 33 In March 1999 the High Court 
issued an injunction against them, preventing them from 'watching or besetting' 
the offices and Dublin clinics of the Irish Family Planning Association (IFPA), 
32Doyle, Diarmuid (1999)'Archbishop's insensitivity won him no converts' The Sunday 
Tribune 7th March 
53The demonstration occurred following the Adelaide's submission to the Working Party on 
abortion, described above (note 44). Humphreys, Joe (1999) 'Youth Defence protester "tried 
to bash" a garda' Irish Times 9th April; Irish Times 'Members of Youth Defence are 
sentenced' 15th April 1999; Irish Times 'Youth Defence convictions are overturned' 11th July 
2000. 
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or intimidating its officers, staff and customers. An IFPA clinic had been 
picketed since June 1998, and had been forced to close temporarily on one 
occasion, following intimidation of staff and customers. 54 It seems that 
although this group has acquired representative status for the anti-abortion 
lobby during the 1990s, demonstrated for instance by the fact that they were 
the only anti-abortion political organization to participate in the public hearings 
on abortion access during May 2000, their aggressive political style has 
nevertheless further damaged the legitimacy of anti-abortion politics. 
Analytic Tools 
Hegemony 
The analysis, in what follows, of three key sites of cultural production, popular, 
entrepreneurial, and official, relies on two major concepts: hegemony, and 
discourse. The former concept was devised by Antonio Gramsci in the 1930s, 
to explain moral, political, and cultural (as opposed to material/economic) 
power (O'Sullivan et al., 1994: 134). It has been defined as a form of 
intellectual and moral leadership which secures active consent, as distinct from 
direct coercion (Gramsci 1971: 12). Barrett defines hegemony as 'the 
organisation of consent [... ] the processes through which subordinated forms of 
consciousness are constructed without recourse to violence or coercion' 
(1991: 54). Thus, the concept is employed in this particular study as a means of 
explaining how a specific normative position on abortion acquired the status of 
popular commonsense, to the extent that the Constitution was changed, and 
official legal institutions legitimately and coercively marshalled in its defence. 
541rish Times 'Youth Defence ordered to keep away from clinics' 12th March 1999. Members 
of the organization have been prosecuted for staging a sit-in of the 1FPA in Dublin in 
September 1999, eg. Irish Times 'Anti-abortion protesters fined £250' 6th July 2000. 
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Gramsci's elaboration of hegemony, however, relied problematically on the 
Marxist base/superstructure model of explanation, which interprets both 
popular culture and subjectivity as determined by economic inequalities 
(Barrett 1991: 59). The concept has been influentially redefined by Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985), in terms which do not rely, as Gramsci did, on economic 
essentialism. Rather, they define 'society' in post-Marxist anti-totalizing terms, 
not as a superstructural economic effect, but rather as a complex field of 
aggregates, whose relations are contingent rather than determined. They 
redefine hegemony, consequently, as the ultimately impossible attempt to 
'suture' the openness of the social by fixing signifiers, i. e. meaning (Barrett 
1991: 67). As they argue, '[i]t is because hegemony supposes the incomplete 
and open character of the social, that it can take place only in a field dominated 
by articulatory practices' (1985: 134). Thus, this account necessarily positions 
hegemonic struggle in the context of antagonism, rather than the determined 
effect of economic power. As Laclau and Mouffe put it: 
... no hegemonic logic can account for the totality of the social and 
constitute its centre, for in that case a new suture would have been 
produced and the very concept of hegemony would have eliminated 
itself (ibid.: 142). 
Thus, the employment of the term 'hegemony' in this thesis is not intended to 
signify that 'commonsenses' have been determined by economic forces. Rather, 
it indicates a consensus which relies on a fragile opposition. 
Discourse 
The second key concept employed in the following discussion is that of 
discourse, particularly in its Foucauldian formulation. In general, an analysis of 
discourses focuses on the systems of rules and conventions through which 
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meanings emerge. What is of interest is what system of rules are at work, and 
what the effects of those rules are. Thus, the concern is not with the 
verifiability of discursive formations, but with the processes through which 
meanings are produced. In other words, discourse analysis is concerned less 
with the 'truth' of a particular formation than with its meaning and use. As 
Potter and Wetherall explain: 
[discourse analysis] takes the focus of analysis away from questions of 
how a version relates to some putative reality and asks instead how 
this version is designed successfully to compete with an alternative 
(1994: 48). 
The analysis of discourses, in these terms, is concerned primarily with the 
micro-operations of power, and the consequent ways in which these operations 
produce knowledges. The relationship between power and the production of 
knowledge, what Foucault terms 'regimes of truth' about objects, strategies, 
speakers, and rules, is central to this analytic task. " Foucault defined power 
not, in Marxist terms, as a unitary substance which could be overthrown or 
acquired, but rather, as relational, something to be exercised rather than 
possessed (Barrett 1991: 135; Cooper 1995: 9). Thus, power operates at micro 
or local levels, in multiple ways. 56 It is not defined simply as a repressive 
mechanism, although repression is one possible effect. Rather, it is a complex 
operation through which discourses are produced in unsystematic, plural and 
As McNay puts it: 'the discursive and the real are linked together in the symbiotic 
relationship of the power-knowledge complex. On the one hand, all knowledge is the effect 
of a specific regime of power, and, on the other hand, forms of knowledge constitute the 
social reality which they describe and analyse (1994: 108). 
56As Sheridan explains: 'Power is an effect of the operation of social relationships, between 
groups and between individuals. It is not unitary: it has no essence. There are as many forms 
of power as there are types of relationship [... ] It does not exist simply to enforce economic 
exploitation: it does not play the role of superstructure to an economic infrastructure [... ] 
Power is not simply repressive; it is also productive' (1980: 218-9). 
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competing, rather than centralized and monolithic forms (Sheridan 1980: 169- 
70). 5" This analytic approach assumes a plurality of competing and overlapping 
discourses, which are not assumed to form a coherent totality, organizing 
society, for example, in terms of class or gender interests. Rather, discourses 
are assumed to co-exist, conflict, or be articulated together to produce different 
discursive formations and effects. 58 
A primary question which the analysis of discourses addresses is 'what are we 
today? ' (Foucault 1988: 145). In other words, discourse analysis provides a way 
of reflecting on the constitution of identity, particularly in historical terms, not 
least through providing redescriptions of historical 'events', defined as follows: 
An event ... 
is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the 
reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the 
appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once used 
it, a feeble domination that poisons itself as it grows lax, the entry of a 
masked "other. " The forces operating in history are not controlled by 
destiny or regulative mechanisms, but respond to haphazard conflicts 
(Foucault 1977a: 154). 
Thus, the discursive construction of identities in particular can be analyzed in 
relation to the reversals encapsulated in such 'events'. The X case can be 
interpreted as precisely this type of'event', that is, as a moment where a specific 
As Barrett puts it, Foucault's concept of power 'is probably the element of his system that is 
least compatible not only with Marxism but with most modern social science in which 
paradigms of a determining social structure exist' (1991: 134). 
38 As Foucault explained: '... the analysis of statements does not claim to be a total, 
exhaustive description of 'language' (langage), or of 'what was said' ... 
I am not trying to 
discover a lost totality, or to resuscitate, as many would nostalgically like to do, the plenitude 
of living speech, the richness of the Word, the profound unity of the Logos. The analysis of 
statements corresponds to a specific level of description' (1972: 108). He defined 'statements' 
as events, rather than simply as what is spoken or written: '.. a statement is always an event 
that neither the language (langue) nor the meaning can quite exhaust' (Foucault 1972: 28). 
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discourse of nationhood was reformulated in a direction which usurped the 
'feeble domination' of a key political force. The interpretation in what follows 
will be based on an analysis of the discourses constructing the meaning of this 
event, its background, and political effects. 
In short, the value of Foucault's idea of 'discourse' for this project lies both in 
its emphasis on social plurality rather than totality, and in its assumption of 
reversibility rather than fixity or domination of any specific system of meaning. 
Structure 
The three major questions already outlined, concerning the production, 
reproduction, and circulation of political culture in the wake of the X case 
crisis, at popular, entrepreneurial, and official levels, are addressed in what 
follows through an interdisciplinary approach. The shifting terms of abortion 
politics over time are considered, from the first constitutional referendum on 
abortion in 1983, to the X case and its constitutional aftermath in 1992. Thus, 
the approach combines analyses of historical, political, and cultural forms and 
processes, in considering the reproduction and transformation of hegemonic 
constructions of nationhood in terms of abortion. The methods adopted in 
conducting each particular strand of research, and the relevant methodological 
issues and debates, will be discussed in detail in each Part, as described below. 
The thesis is divided into four major Parts. Part One will first situate the study 
within broad debates concerning the relationship between nationhood, gender, 
sexuality. The study will also be positioned in relationship to debates 
concerning the impact of abortion politics on women's citizenship. 
Part Two analyzes popular political culture through considering national press 
attention to abortion politics. A key concern here is how abortion became a 
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focus of widespread anxiety in 1983, and how this was subsequently contested 
in the popular political domain in response to the X case. Key moments in the 
production and circulation of abortion commonsenses are examined, comparing 
the 1983 coverage of and debate on the 'pro-life' amendment campaign with the 
1992 coverage of the controversy surrounding the X case. This Part is 
introduced with a discussion of the media as a site where legal and political 
agendas are produced, particularly through the construction of 'news' in 
national-popular terms. The emergence of 'moral panics' in particular will be 
discussed as a major example of how political consensus is produced within 
and through the national press. The methodology adopted in conducting this 
aspect of the study will also be outlined. 
Chapter Three then considers press coverage of the 1983 'pro-life' 
constitutional amendment campaign in terms of the construction of abortion as 
a moral issue of national political significance, requiring immediate 
constitutional action. The terms of anti-abortion discourse within which the 
coverage of the campaign was hegemonically structured is considered in detail, 
in relation to the marginality of anti-amendment and reproductive rights 
positions. 
Chapter Four then considers the effect of the X case on this pre-established 
anti-abortion hegemony in defining abortion as 'news'. Of particular interest 
here is how the hegemonic construction of the press's national audience was 
both ruptured and reconstituted during 1992, particularly through the 
politicization of the relationship between the State, the family, and the anti- 
abortion lobby, in terms which allowed concerns about women's citizenship to 
enter the debate for the first time. 
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Part Three addresses the tensions between the political subjectivity of abortion 
activists and hegemonic constructions of Irishness in the wake of the X case, 
based on a set of interviews with activists and workers in political and support- 
oriented organizations from both sides of the political divide. Shifting 
constructions of national-political 'insiders' and 'outsiders' is central to the 
discussion in this Part. The Introduction considers the contingency of 
hegemonic national and political subjectivity, particularly in contexts of political 
disruption and crisis. The research process through which interviews with 
activists were conducted, and methodological issues associated with 
interviewing both elites and peers are also discussed here. 
Chapter Five then considers anti-abortion political subjectivity in the wake of 
the X case, in terms of its shifting relationship with disrupted discourses of 
nationhood and abortion. The newly marginal position of this political identity 
is considered, both in relation to the power dynamics through which the 
interviews were conducted, and in relation to the reformulation of anti-abortion 
subjectivity in terms which were designed to reassert the primacy of anti- 
abortion nationhood. 
Chapter Six discusses the emergent political and national legitimacy of 
feminism following the X case, in relation to its effects on feminist national and 
political subjectivity. The chapter considers the shifting national position of 
feminist reproductive rights activists, both in relation to the conduct of the 
interviews themselves, and in relation to the terms through which feminist 
national and political subjectivity was articulated. 
Finally, Part Four analyses the terms through which constitutional abortion law 
was debated in the Oireachtas (legislature). Shifting official constructions of 
'the People', constitutionally defined as the source of sovereignty in the State, 
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are of central concern here, given the direct impact these have for the freedom 
of citizens. The Introduction to this Part outlines the significance of the idea of 
the People in the republican constitution, and the state's position in relation to 
gender and sexuality politics. The research method adopted in collecting 
material for this discussion is also outlined here. 
Chapter Seven considers the 1983 legislative debates on the proposed Eighth 
Amendment, in terms of the construction of official nationhood through a 
reliance on gendered citizenship. The central interest in this Chapter is the 
contradictory terms through which an authoritarian political project was 
pursued through the apparently democratic device of holding a referendum. 
Chapter Eight then discusses the reformulation of official discourses of 
nationhood in terms of abortion law during 1992, following the X case, when 
proposals to recognize women's constitutional rights to (limited) abortion, 
travel and information were debated. The effects of the Eighth Amendment on 
Irish women's citizenship in a broader European context were also debated in 
the context of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Of particular interest in 
the Chapter is the way official constructions of democracy, citizenship and 
nationhood were reconfigured following the X case. 
Before going on to analyse these shifting hegemonies and discursive 
constructions in the wake of the X case, Chapter One will firstly outline in 
detail debates about how and why discourses of national identity are produced, 
particularly through discourses of gender and sexuality, as mentioned above. In 
particular, the historical production of gendered Irishness will be considered, 
specifically in relation to the nation-state project. Chapter Two will then survey 
feminist approaches to the analysis of abortion politics in particular, and 
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reproductive rights politics in general, specifically in terms of the significance of 
this type of politics for women's citizenship. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THEORIZING NATIONHOOD: IRISHNESS AND THE X CASE 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine the production of Irish national-political culture, the 
background against which the X case occurred. Firstly, the processes and 
effects of the production of nationhood and national identity will be considered, 
particularly in relation to gender and sexuality. Secondly, the major organizing 
themes through which Irishness has been hegemonically produced will be 
outlined, in historical terms. Specifically, the connection between Irishness and 
discourses of gender and sexuality will be discussed, in order to examine the 
significance of abortion in general, and the X case specifically, to national 
identity. 
Theorizing the Nation and National Identity 
Claims about the character or identity of the nation have been central to the 
justification and legitimacy of aggressive anti-abortion politics in Ireland. In 
other words, the anti-abortion lobby have presented their position in terms 
which draw on essentialist or'ethnic' claims about Irishness, as the forthcoming 
chapters will demonstrate. However, the claim that nations can be simply 
thought of in this way, namely as naturally occurring groups with innate values 
and culture, fails to explain the discontinuities and transformations in 'national' 
culture both over time and in response to political, economic, and social 
changes. Instead, the 'imagined' or constructed character of nations, in 
Anderson's well-known formulation (1983), provides a way of explaining how 
a plurality of practices and traditions can become distilled in such a way as to 
establish a 'national' coherence over time, across generations, and in the face of 
political disruption. As Calhoun argues, the difference between which traditions 
survive to form part of nationalist discourse, and which do not, is not explained 
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by recourse to claims about the 'natural' emergence of national cultures 
(1997: 49-50). ' Nations and national identities cannot be simply explained either 
as natural phenomena or as the instrumental constructs of powerful interests. 
Rather, nations are best understood as the effects of a complexity of competing 
discourses over time (Billig 1995: 27). Thus, the shifting characterizations of 
nationhoods are contestable, and are often the subject of hegemonic projects 
(e. g., Hall et. al 1978; Gilroy 1987; Smith 1994; Rajchman (ed. ) 1995; Hall and 
Du Gay, (eds. ) 1996). 
Contestation over discourses of nationhood depends on competing, 
normatively defined categories of identity and difference, which emerge, 
necessarily, through the operation of power (Rutherford 1990; Parker et. al. 
1992: 5; Yuval-Davis 1997: 1). 2 Thus, who or what counts as 'the nation' is 
constructed in relation to what or who counts as 'foreign'. 3 In particular, 
colonial and colonized national identities are often constructed relationally. As 
Rattansi comments, the idea of the 'West' was primarily constructed, in 
opposition to colonized identities, as 'white, Christian, rational, civilized, 
modern, sexually disciplined and indeed masculine', a construction which, he 
argues, is constantly threatened by sexuality and gender (1997: 482-487). 
IThus, the well-known distinction between 'ethnic' and 'civic' nationhood relies on the idea of 
a residual 'natural' culture, in claiming that most nations are produced through strong 
continuity with their 'ethnic' traditions (Smith 1991). Billig has underlined the ways in which 
the distinction is often employed, evaluatively, in terms of 'hot' and 'banal' nationalisms, with 
the latter denying its own 'ethnicity' (implicitly defined as 'hot'), while at the same time 
insisting on loyalty to the nation, in the form of the nation-state (1995 46-7). Thus, the 
debate over the 'naturalness' or 'reality' of nations is itself evaluatively connected with 
attempts to distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' nationalisms. 
2This is not significantly different to the construction of other forms of social identity, such 
as gender and sexuality. As Butler, for example, argues: '... the experience of a gendered 
psychic disposition or cultural identity is considered an achievement ... one 
is one's gender to 
the extent that one is not the other gender, a formulation that presupposes and enforces the 
restriction of gender within that binary pair' (1990: 22). 
3For example, as Linda Colley (1992) demonstrates, the construction of'Britishness' 
depended historically on an opposition to Catholic France. 
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Likewise, Irishness is generally constructed as not-English, in the tradition of 
anti-colonial republican nationalist discourse. 
One major aspect of hegemonic configurations of nations and national identities 
is that the processes through which national traditions are produced and 
reproduced tend to rely on discourses of gender and sexuality (Anthias and 
Yuval-Davis 1989; Smith 1994). 4 Specifically, gendered and sexualized 
nationalist discourses often rely primarily on the naturalization of the 
patriarchal heterosexual family as the source of, and justification for, 
hegemonic 'national' culture. This is indeed central to discourses of Irishness, 
and will be considered below. The articulation of a distinctively patriarchal 
familial nation provides justification for the cultural subordination of women, 
both in 'natural', and 'national' terms, an effect which significantly delegitimizes 
feminist critique. As Radhakrishnan points out '... the women's question ... 
is 
constrained to take on a nationalist expression as a prerequisite for being 
considered "political"' (1992: 78). In such contexts, the coherence of feminist 
criticism is compromised, since the articulation of a'national' feminism amounts 
to an inability to criticize the 'naturally' patriarchal character of the (naturally) 
familial-nation. 5 
Such constructions of familial-nationhood generally rely on constructing 
women in overwhelmingly domestic and maternal terms. In this way, 
hegemonic familial discourse, primarily concerning family organization, 
including the 'proper' way to give birth and raise children, is reproduced as a 
4As Kandiyoti, for example, argues: '... the regulation of gender is central to the articulation 
of cultural identity and difference' (1991: 440). 
5This effect is considered in detail in the context of post-Wall Berlin feminist politics on 
abortion rights by Wuerth (1999). 
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national heterosexual familial imaginary. 6 Women occupy a pivotal position in 
gendered national discourses, not only because women biologically reproduce 
group members, but also because women are seen as key to the reproduction of 
group culture across generations (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989: 2-8). As it is 
women's sexuality and reproductive capacity that frequently symbolize the 
nation and its future (e. g. Nash 1993: 47; Wuerth 1999), 7 women's reproductive 
rights are often consequently politicized in nationalist articulations of gender 
and sexuality. 
The Discursive Construction of Irishness 
Irish national identity has been constructed, in terms which are sometimes not 
unlike those mobilized in fascist discourse, 8 through an essentialist construction 
of landscape and 'nature', frequently signified through discourses of sexuality 
and gender, combined with romantic traditionalism. The anti-colonial context 
of its emergence has ultimately made national, religious and political 
commitments interchangeable (Connolly 1997). 9 This section will outline the 
6As Parker et at. point out, this familial discourse is necessarily promoted at the expense of 
non-procreative sexualities, despite the equally central construction of 'national' masculinity 
in terms of passionate brotherhood (1992: 6-7). 
7For example, Parker et. al. refer to the popularity of a book entitled The Rape of Kuwait 
during the 1992 Gulf War as an indication of 'how deeply ingrained has been the depiction of 
the homeland as a female body whose violation by foreigners requires its citizens and allies 
to rush to her defense' (1992: 6). The citizenry here is clearly gendered as male, while the 
nation is constructed in female terms. 
8Fascist doctrine provides a strong example of a political project which self-consciously 
coupled a concern with 'nature' both with national survival and with discourses of gender and 
sexuality, connecting the themes of nature and nation with aggressive war. As Neocleous 
argues, the fascist concern with women's place in society arose from a claim that the 
heterosexual patriarchal family was the natural root of nation and state. Behind the biological 
destiny of women lay the biological destiny of the nation (1997: 76-82). Thus, those who 
rejected their 'natural' role, notably feminist and sexually assertive women, threatened the 
fascist project. Hegemonie Irishness, however, although substantively echoing these themes, 
is not simply produced as a fascist project. It lacks both an expansionary militancy, and the 
necessary devaluation of humanity to the level equal to that attributed to nature in general, 
key elements of fascism which produce racist and eugenic politics. Indeed, opposition to 
eugenics is central to right-wing politics in Ireland. 
9Chubb (1982: 5-23) provides an influential characterization of Irish culture in terms of a 
declining peasant society, marked by expressive Catholicism; antipathy to the symbols of 
Britishness; authoritarianism; kinship loyalty; and anti-intellectualism. However, he fails to 
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major themes characterizing hegemonic Irishness prior to the X case: 
Catholicism; traditionalism; what has been termed 'familism; and a masculininst 
heterosexuality. These themes will be examined specifically in relation to the 
significance of hegemonic anti-abortion politics. 
Catholicism 
Catholicism has been central to the hegemonic definition of Irishness at least 
since the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, when it provided a 
means of uniting the indigenous Gaelic Irish and the English in Ireland in that 
period (Connolly 1997: 46). Subsequently, with the Reformation, religious 
division was mapped onto the division between native and coloniser, as the 
English Parliament pursued a policy of 'planting' Ireland with Protestant 
settlers. Only the 'Plantation' of Ulster was relatively successful, in the sense 
that settlers remained a culturally distinct group in the region subsequently. As 
Coulter points out, religion can offer a sense of moral superiority and the 
possibility of transcendence in colonial contexts which seem otherwise 
hopeless: 
... as blacks [sic] in the southern states of the US will remember, it 
[religion] can provide powerful allegories for the experience of 
suffering and the hope of emancipation when these cannot be 
expressed in an overtly political form (1993: 7). 
The centrality of Catholicism to Irishness was particularly reinforced during the 
nineteenth century. Colonial oppression of Catholicism formally ended in 1829, 
following the Catholic Emancipation Act which enfranchised Catholic men. 
Thus, the colonial administration had shifted towards an acceptance of 
comment on the centrality of discourses of gender and sexuality in production and 
maintenance of these cultural categories. 
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Catholicism in Ireland, and indeed encouraged the particularly Victorian 
puritanical version favoured by the newly legitimate Catholic Church and 
middle classes. Indigenous 'gaelic' Catholicism, characterised by irregular and 
informal semi-pagan practices, was gradually replaced, largely during the 
period from 1850 to 1875, with a highly formalized, centralized and ritualized 
version, a transformation which has been described as the 'Devotional 
Revolution' (Larkin 1976; Brown 1981: 27). 10 As Brown explains: 
The church with her recently regularized rites and practices offered to 
most Irishmen and women in the period a way to be Irish which set 
them apart from the rest of the inhabitants of the British Isles, meeting 
the needs thereby of a nascent Irish nationalism at a time when the 
Irish language and the Gaelic culture of the past were enduring a 
protracted decline. (1985: 28) 
Thus, Catholicism provided a means of maintaining a distinctively national 
culture, as the Gaelic language declined. l" Indeed, Catholicism provided a form 
of cultural expression with heroically anti-colonial associations, in the light of 
colonial oppression of Catholicism, and the persecution of Catholic clergy. As 
Murphy puts it: 
The dual Irish-Catholic identity was [... ] on distrustful guard against 
alien: influences, seen as emanating from pagan England and post- 
10This has been explained either as a popular response to the nineteenth century loss of 
language and cultural identity, a result of colonial policies; to post-Famine (1845-1849) 
changes in class structure effected by the virtual disappearance of the lowest social classes, 
themselves repositories of a more superstitious culture; or to a coalition of Church and 
British interests in disciplining the population for specific purposes (Inglis 1998: 8). 
11This is not to ignore the popular association between Gaelic and poverty, and the 
associated construction of the English language as superior. Rather, what is of concern here 
is the distinctively nationalist construction of Irish as not-English, in distinctively Catholic 
terms. 
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Christian Europe. Whether belonging to the realms of ideology, 
morals, recreation or fashion, they were perceived as being pernicious 
to the national and the spiritual welfare, and destructive of the Irish 
Catholic ethos. (1988: 134-5) 
Nineteenth century Irish Catholicism, furthermore, provided an aspect of 
respectability, in its newly rationalized form, not least in its defence of private 
property (1988: 29). 12 
The effects of this confessional construction of nationhood can be seen, for 
example, in the official incorporation of the social principles of Catholicism, 
alongside those of nationalist republicanism, into the political structure of the 
State. 13 This can be seen in particular in the 1937 Constitution, which 
attempted to combine the democratic ideal of popular sovereignty with 
theocratic authoritarianism. This was accomplished by defining the state as 
democratic, and the nation, from which sovereignty is derived, as religious. The 
Preamble to the Constitution, for instance, declares the following: 
In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and 
to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be 
referred, 
We, the people of tire, 
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus 
Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial, 
12As Brown comments, this defence was vital to producing a distinctively Catholic 
nationhood, given that nationalist politics was strongly underpinned by farmers' desire to 
maintain ownership of the land (1985: 29). 
13Murphy comments as follows on Irish politics during the 1930s: '... for most politicians, 
devoutness was good politics as well as being a genuine disposition of belief (1988: 137). 
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Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain 
the rightful independence of our Nation, 
And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of 
Prudence, Justice, and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the 
individual may be assured, true social order attained, the unity of our 
country restored, and concord established with other nations, 
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution. 
(Bunreacht na hEireann 1937) 
This explicitly confessional statement nevertheless incorporates the idea of 
individual freedom, despite the emphasis on 'the common good'. Similarly, the 
section on Fundamental Rights combines explicit concern with individual 
liberty, particularly in guaranteeing rights such as the equality of citizens before 
the law, freedom of speech, assembly, and association, and habeas corpus, with 
Catholic principles on the family, education, private property, and religion. 
Here, the impact of Papal Encyclicals, particularly as synthesized in the 1927 
Social Code, is marked (Lyons 1973: 545). 14 
Of particular influence were the ideas expressed in the Papal Encyclical 
Quadrogisimo Anno (1931), which declared a 'vocational' state structure to be 
preferable for a Catholic nation-state, as a means of securing against the 
pernicious influences of both atheistic communism and materialistic capitalism. 
This model of the state, which originated in fascist Italy, was based on political 
participation at the level of occupational groups (Keogh 1988: 107). O'Dowd 
describes vocationalism as follows: 
14Catholic social teaching decreed that women working outside the home should be strictly 
regulated; that men should earn a 'family wage'; that men and women should be segregated 
in education, at all levels, including university level; and that women should be allowed to 
serve on juries only in cases affecting women and children (O'Dowd 1987: 16-17). 
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At its core was the rather hazy 'principle of subsidiarity' which 
opposed state intervention in areas within the competency of lesser 
groups, notably, the family, the parish and the 'community'. The status 
of the Church itself vis-ä-vis the state stood outside this scheme. 
(1987: 15) 
Thus, the family is defined in Article 41 of the Constitution as the 'primary and 
fundamental unit group of Society, ... a moral 
institution possessing inalienable 
and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law. ' This 
Article goes on to designate the official position of women: 
41.2.1 ° In particular the State recognises that by her life within the 
home, woman gives to the State a support without which the common 
good cannot be achieved. 
41.2.2° The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers 
shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the 
neglect of their duties in the home. 
Here the family is officially constructed as a patriarchal unit defined by 
marriage. Divorce was banned in this section, and citizens who divorced 
outside the State's jurisdiction were prohibited from remarrying. 15 Furthermore, 
Article 44 recognised the'special position' of the Catholic Church in the nation- 
state. 16However, this did not amount to official designation of the Catholic 
Church as an established Church. On the contrary, Article 44 explicitly 
recognised a range of religions within the state, guaranteed freedom of 
conscience to all citizens, and prohibited religious discrimination (Lyons 
"The ban on divorce was lifted in 1995, following a referendum which was decided by a 
majority of 0.5%. 
16This was removed from the Constitution following a popular referendum in 1972, not least 
due to the escalation of the conflict in the north of Ireland at that time (Whyte 1980: 388-9). 
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1973: 537-47). However, the hegemony of Catholicism was recognised, and the 
section on 'Directive Principles of Social Policy' recommended the exercise of 
an implicitly Catholic morality to the Oireachtas (parliament) in the process of 
law-making. 
The effects of this official recognition of the nation as distinctively Catholic can 
be seen at the level of social policy. In particular, the provision of education at 
primary and post-primary levels, alongside health and social services, has been 
concentrated in the hands of the Church. As Chubb comments, '[t]he impact of 
Catholic teaching has always been evident in the content of public policy on 
marriage and divorce, contraception, censorship, health services, and, above all, 
education' (1982: 18). 
Official recognition of a distinctively Catholic national identity has not, 
however, been uncontroversial, particularly in the context of attempts to secure 
a solution to the political violence in the north. The 1970s were particularly 
marked by controversy over the authority of the Church, specifically in relation 
to education, social policy, divorce and contraception (Keogh 1988a: 152). 17 
Thus, the constitutional recognition of the 'special position' of the Catholic 
Church in the state was removed by popular referendum in 1972, with the 
support of the Church itself (Brown 1985: 308; Murphy 1988: 146). 
Furthermore, the growing importance of a national media, which began to hold 
the Church publicly accountable for the first time in a newly prosperous 
context, contributed to the disconnection between national identity and 
traditional authoritarianism. 18 As Murphy puts it: 
17Chubb comments, for example, that since the 1970s mainstream politicians have been 
concerned to divest the Church of its control over education (1982: 30). 
"The analysts of the Irish results of the European Values Survey concluded: '... there has 
been a general collapse in the 'moral monopoly' of the church, or, at a minimum, a loss of at 
least some moral authority. However, if the Catholic Church in Ireland is no longer 
automatically thought to have the right answers, this should not be taken to mean that there 
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[Church] prestige and mystique were [... ] challenged in the areas 
where they mattered most - the pulpit and the confessional - by the 
confidences now reposed, ever more frequently, in the agony aunt, the 
chat show presenter, the syndicated astrologist and the pop 
psychiatrist. (1988: 146) 
These outward-looking media, rather than the Church, have come to dominate 
the field of morality in Ireland, not only replacing the clergy's pastoral role, but 
also calling the latter to account in ways previously unthinkable: 
It was the media that broke the tradition of not criticising the Church 
and its teachings in public. It was the media, and in particular 
television, which brought an end to the long nineteenth century of 
Irish Catholicism. 19 (Inglis 1998: 93) 
However, the popular connection between processes of secularization and 
anglicization continues to mark political culture, as the politicization of 
abortion access itself demonstrates, despite the declining authority of the 
Church, and shifting popular attitudes in relation to moral issues. 20 
Farnilism 
As mentioned in the previous section, official adoption of the principles of 
Catholic social teaching included a constitutional recognition of the patriarchal 
is a desire that it should restrict its attention to strictly religious matters' (Hornsby-Smith and 
Whelan 1994: 41). 
191nglis defines what he refers to as the 'long nineteenth century of Irish Catholicism' as the 
period from 1850 to 1970, i. e., from the post-famine era to the post-protectionist era, and the 
newly popular practice of television watching. 
20The shift towards less absolutist moral attitudes can be seen in the results of the 
comparative European Values Survey, which canvassed popular values in 1982 and 1990. 
See Whelan (ed. ) (1994). 
45 
family as the 'primary unit' of Irish society. Official recognition of the 
significance of this particular institution articulated a discourse hegemonic in 
structuring socio-economic practices. As Meaney comments, 'In post-colonial 
southern Ireland a particular construction of sexual and familial roles became 
the very substance of what it meant to be Irish' (1991: 6). Arensberg and 
Kimball, in their well-known study of rural life in Ireland in the 1930s, devised 
the term 'familism' to describe the rigid sexual division of labour they found on 
small pasture farms, where the father was the centre of authority, refusing to 
share decision-making even with his adult sons. The term also describes the 
centrality of the family to the local economy, whereby mutual assistance 
operated on the basis of familial need and obligation, rather than, for instance, 
on grounds of a communal morality (Brown 1985: 23-25). 
As with the institutionalization of Catholic practices, this highly restrained and 
authoritarian familial culture also emerged as hegemonic in response to the 
major famine which occurred between 1845 and 1849. The devastation of the 
population effected by that disaster produced major shifts in practices of family 
formation. The famine wiped out the lowest social group of non-landowning 
peasants, thereby effectively increasing the proportion of small farmers, and 
thus fundamentally altering rural attitudes and values. Social status and power 
became closely associated with land, and family structures changed 
consequently. Farms which would previously have been divided among all 
siblings were now passed on to the eldest son, to secure farm sizes as a guard 
against poverty. These changes had a major impact on gender and sexual 
discourses. Women became increasingly dependent on their fathers and 
husbands, as their roles were limited to those of farm workers and producers of 
sons. Girls and women were progressively devalued, as marriage became 
essential to status, while husbands were becoming increasingly scarce. 
Daughters were viewed as a burden on the family capital, since a dowry had to 
46 
be provided on marriage. Furthermore, women's value as farm labourers was 
eroded as agriculture shifted away from labour intensive crop cultivation 
towards pasture farming. Women's farm labour was increasingly restricted to 
domestic tasks. 
This changing sexual division of labour further reinforced sexual inequality, 
justified by a belief system which stressed women's subordination. The new 
system of inheritance forced unmarried daughters and younger sons to seek 
urban employment, generally abroad. Sexual activity became strictly regulated 
in this new context, as marriage was increasingly delayed until a farm had been 
inherited. A sexually puritanical culture emerged aimed at controlling fertility, 
involving the management of women in particular, in an increasingly patriarchal 
context (Hynes 1978). As Nash describes it: 
In this period, sexuality came to be equated with matrimonial 
reproduction and indisputable norms of familial reproductive 
heterosexuality. The cult of the Virgin Mary, which flourished from 
the late nineteenth century - asserted in part in opposition to the 
Protestantism of the colonial rulers - strengthened the construction of 
asexual, maternal and domestic femininity upon which 
hypermasculinity and socio-economic and sexual regulation depended. 
(1997: 115) 
Thus, the cultural idealization of familism depended on constructing women in 
subordinate, domestic, and maternal terms. However, as noted in the 
Introduction, by the 1970s the position of women in Ireland was increasingly 
politicized, not least as a result of the efforts of feminists. 21 
21As Chubb notes: 'A growing corps of somewhat strident women journalists, most of them 
working for the Irish Times, kept women's issues before the public... '(1982: 26). 
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Traditionalism 
Familistic discourse, which locates the patriarchal rural family at the centre of 
the national imaginary, is central to the third strand of hegemonic nationalist 
discourse, namely traditionalism. The opposition between tradition and 
modernity has operated as a major organising theme marking the difference 
between Irishness and colonial culture (Peillon 1984), constructing national 
culture as Catholic, rural, familial, and conservative, in contrast to the 
hegemonic construction of English culture as Protestant, urban, individualistic, 
and liberal. While these constructions have not been uncontested, particularly 
since the official adoption of a 'modernization' programme in the 1960s, they 
operated hegemonically in the establishment and legitimization of the 
independent state. 
A key moment in the reproduction of traditionalism in post-independence 
Ireland is the well-known 1943 St. Patrick's day broadcast made by then 
President Eamon De Valera, the only surviving leader of the doomed 1916 
Rising, 22 prominent statesman, and author of the 1937 Constitution. His 'dream' 
speech contains the following famous passage, which explicitly connects rural 
traditionalism with a gendered familial discourse: 
The Ireland which we have dreamed of would be the home of a people 
who valued material wealth only as a basis of right living, of a people 
who were satisfied with frugal comfort and devoted their leisure to 
things of the spirit; a land whose countryside would be bright with 
cosy homesteads, whose fields and villages would be bright with the 
22A small group of revolutionaries occupied a number of key strategic buildings in Dublin on 
Easter Monday 1916, in an attempt to overthrow British rule. All the leaders were 
subsequently executed by the British authorities, except DeValera, who was an American 
citizen. 
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sounds of industry, with the romping of sturdy children, the contests 
of athletic youths, the laughter of comely maidens; whose firesides 
would be forums for the wisdom of serene old age. It would, in a 
word, be the home of a people living the life that God desires that men 
should live. (in Lee 1989: 334) 
The key opposition here, between 'athletic youths' and 'comely maidens', has 
been central to hegemonic constructions of traditional Irishness, connecting the 
'ethnic' nation with a moral discourse of naturalized gender and sexuality, in 
disciplined and restrained terms. 23 
The speech also draws on the themes of the late nineteenth-century literary 
revival, a cultural nationalism characterized by the idealization of the people 
and landscape of the western seaboard. Duffy comments: 
The Gaelic Revival, the 'West of Ireland' imagery of Synge and Yeats, 
and even the Catholic Motherland visualised by Eamon de Valera, 
owe much to the ethos of Romantic mysticism and exoticism 
engendered by some nineteenth-century artists and writers. Their 
representations of Ireland as exotic, sublime and picturesque reflect 
the way in which artistic imagery incorporated 'blindness and silences', 
dictated by the market and English sensibilities. (1997: 66-67) 
This particular nationalist discourse was a distinctively 'modern' production, 
providing urban and non-Catholic groups, specifically middle and upper class 
Protestants, as well as white collar workers who had themselves migrated from 
230ne effect of this traditionalist construction of national identity has been that Gaeltacht 
(Gaelic-speaking) areas and people have been constructed as representative of the primitive 
or 'ethnic', thereby constructing an internal dualism which, significantly, has facilitated the 
continuity of political and economic equality (Johnson 1997: 174). 
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rural areas, with a means of overcoming their identity crises in a context where 
Irishness was increasingly associated with Catholicism, in opposition to 
commercialism: 
... cultural nationalism offered the possibility of a willed 
identification 
with the Irish-speaking peasantry of the impoverished far west, one 
that transcended the realities of class, lifestyle, economic environment 
and - in some cases - religion and ethnic origin. What was involved, 
inevitably, was not cultural revival, but rather reinvention. (Connolly 
1997: 59) 
This construction of national tradition in the iconic terms of the west produced 
not only a discourse of national restraint, but also of lawlessness and violence, 
although not in the essentially individualistic terms characteristic of American 
'western' discourse (Gibbons 1984). 24 However, despite these competing 
significations of the idealized west, the connection between the nation and the 
'traditional' community remains discursively hegemonic, including its gendered 
and sexualized constructions. 
Gender and Sexuality 
As Coulter comments, the construction of feminism and nationalism as 
mutually exclusive is a misperception characteristic of Irish social criticism, 
relying on the one hand on an account of nationalism in terms of the defence of 
patriarchy and traditional Catholicism, involving the subordination of women 
24As Gibbons points out, in Irish terms the hegemonic idealization of the west reverses that 
at work in US culture, placing the community, rather than the individual at the centre. For 
example, Gibbons discusses Synge's well-known and highly controversial play dealing with 
these themes, The Playboy of the Western World, where the outsider is rejected by the 
community, in contrast to the narratives typical of American Westerns, where the 
community, usually figured as a woman, is rejected by the individual cowboy-outsider 
(1984: 12). 
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and the idealization of the past, and on the other hand an account of feminism 
as secular, modern, and international, which, it is assumed, 'will play an 
important role in emancipating Ireland from the shackles of its obsessions with 
the past and allow it to take its place among the nations of the new Europe' 
(1993: 2). As she points out, this view obscures the roles of feminists in the 
national project, as well as, I would add, the role of nationalism in the feminist 
project. 
However, Irish national identity has been constructed as not-English explicitly 
in terms of gender and sexuality. 25 As Meaney notes, the sexualization of 
political identity is not specific to Irish republican nationalism, as demonstrated, 
for instance, by Unionist resistance to legally available abortion and the 
decriminalization of homosexuality in the north of Ireland (1991: 19). Nagel 
traces the broad thematic connections between discourses of nationhood and 
discourses of gender and sexuality, arguing that 'the "microculture" of 
masculinity in everyday life articulates very well with the demands of 
nationalism... '(1998: 252). 
In republican anti-colonial discourse colonial constructions of the Irish nation 
were simply reversed, as Nash describes: 
... in reaction to colonial and racial discourses and the celebration of 
feminine Celtic qualities of otherworldliness in the Celtic Twilight 
writing of the literary revival, authors of the so-called Irish-Ireland 
25The heterosexuality of this construction is encapsulated in the title of Beriss's (1996) 
Introduction to the special issue of Identities dealing with the sexualization of nation/states: 
'If You're Gay and Irish, Your Parents Must be English'. He saw this slogan painted on a 
placard at the 1991 New York St. Patrick's Day Parade, in protest at the participation of the 
Irish Lesbian and Gay Organization (ILGO), As he comments, the slogan's position, that 
only descent from the corrupting, imperial English could make an Irish person gay, does not 
explain the existence of the ILGO, nor its members' nationalist identities (p. 194). 
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movement asserted the masculinity of the Gael and criticised the 
effeminacy of both the English and misguided Irish men. This 
hypermasculinity inverted the colonial stereotype but retained its 
ideology of gender inequality. Masculinity was asserted in contrast to 
the femininity of women and thus demanded absolute difference 
between the characteristics and roles of men and women. (Nash 
1997: 114) 
Thus, the construction of Ireland through a discourse of masculine heroism and 
feminine vulnerability was as much about the production of gendered 
sexualities as it was about the making of nations (Nash 1997: 116), a 
particularly masculinist construction of femininity and its relationship to 
nationhood (Nagel 1998: 252). Meaney points to the impact colonization often 
has on discourses of gender and sexuality, namely that post-colonial 
masculinity is often exaggerated, not least through the extreme subordination 
of femininity, in order to assert the legitimacy of self-rule: '[a]nxiety about one's 
fitness for a (masculine) role of authority, deriving from a history of defeat or 
helplessness, is assuaged by the assumption of sexual dominance' (1991: 7). 
Thus, women often become the territory over which post-colonial authority is 
exercised. 
One major site of articulation between discourses of gender, sexuality and 
nation is that of national sport, and specifically the institutionalization of 
national-rural games through the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). Chubb 
notes that the countrywide organization and militant separatism of this 
association played a major role in socializing generations of Irish people, and, 
significantly, providing many of Ireland's political leaders (1982: 12). 26 In this 
26The rules included the following ban since 1905: 'persons who play rugby, soccer, hockey, 
cricket or any imported games shall be suspended for two years from date of playing such 
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way, ironically, a distinctively Victorian masculinity was produced at a popular, 
and specifically rural level, which emphasized athletic prowess and strength in a 
highly disciplined national and anti-colonial context (Boyle 1992: 636). 
The associated construction of femininity in terms of vulnerable sexual 
innocence or motherhood, in need of masculine protection, was particularly 
national. It employed the established connection between self-sacrificial 
motherhood and a national discourse of 'Mother Ireland' (Meaney 1991: 3). 
Nash traces the genealogy of this discourse: 
In the eighteenth-century Irish poetic tradition of the aisling, Ireland is 
figured as a speir bhean or sky-woman and calls the implicitly male 
reader to rescue her from colonial oppressors ... These different 
projects show the flexibility of associations between gender, sexuality 
and nationhood as well as prefiguring the nature of later constructions 
of gendered nationhood and national gender identities along lines of 
heroic masculinity and national motherhood. (Nash 1997: 113) 
Thus, as she puts it, the purity of women became the measure of the nation, 
particularly in terms of anxiety about the foreign corruption of Irish women 
(Nash 1997: 115). This is not insignificant in the context of anti-abortion 
discourse, where Irish women obtain abortions on the foreign territory of the 
colonial oppressor. The impact of this uncompromising discourse of national 
gender and sexuality can be seen, for example, in the fact that only 6% of 
married women in the Republic worked outside the home up until the 1960s 
games ... That [British] police, militiamen and soldiers on active service be prevented from 
playing hurling or football under GAA rules' (in Cronin 1996: 4). The first part of this ban, 
concerning 'imported games', was removed in 1971 (Keogh 1994: 33). 
53 
(O'Dowd 1987: 27), and the uncharacteristically high rates of female emigration 
relative to male. 27 
Nevertheless, some have argued that the election of Mary Robinson, a 
prominent feminist politician and lawyer, to the Presidency in 1991 indicates 
that hegemonic discourses of national sexual and gender identity have come 
under severe pressure, despite the fact that her success at the polls may have 
been due more to protest votes against the campaigns run by her opponents 
than to positive preference for her own candidacy. As Meaney points out, 
'[a]ttempts by political opponents to use Mary Robinson's sex as a weapon 
against her failed and the knee-jerk response of distrust and loathing of 
femininity was not forthcoming' (1991: 5). 
Abortion 
Why has abortion been key to hegemonic struggles over the production of Irish 
national identity? Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1989) have noted the links 
between abortion, reproductive politics and nationalist politics. As the 
foregoing discussions have demonstrated, the particular hegemonic 
construction of Irishness as familial, Catholic, traditional, and heterosexual had 
come under pressure in response to the changes of the late 1960s and 1970s. A 
political focus on abortion provided a means of reasserting the connections 
between the major themes of this construction, namely sexuality, gender, 
familism, and religion, in distinctively 'national' terms. 
Abortion politics in Ireland has not, however, generally been analysed in these 
terms. 28 Rather, abortion politics is thought to indicate, more narrowly, the 
27'Between 1941 and 1971, for example, more than a third of all women left (Kelly and Nic 
Giolla Choille, 1990)' (Walter 1995: 39). 
28The only analyst who explicitly interprets Irish abortion politics in terms of discourses of 
nationhood is O'Carroll (1991), quoted in the Introduction. 
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erosion of Church hegemony in response to rapid social change (e. g. Brown 
1985; Girvin 1986; Hesketh 1990; Inglis 1998). 29 For example, Brown argues 
that 
... the [1983 
'pro-life'] campaign [... ] stimulated an intense, bitterly 
conducted debate. In this it was revealed that a far from insignificant 
minority of Irish people was unprepared to support the moral 
absolutism that could be discerned in the amendment as proposed 
(1985: 356). 
From a feminist perspective, the significance of abortion politics is usually 
understood to indicate the patriarchal character of the state, as evidenced by its 
institutionalization of unequal citizenship and moral absolutism, rather than 
conflict over the construction of the nation. 30 Indeed, some recent observers 
accept the homogeneous account of Irishness underpinning anti-choice 
discourse. For instance, Chrystel Hug argues that, '[t]he Irish felt they had the 
right to choose the kind of state which they wanted to live in -a state that 
29Hesketh's (1990) analysis of the 1983 campaign to amend the Constitution with a foetal 
rights clause deals extensively with the accusations by the Anti-Amendment Campaign 
(A. A, C. ) that the proposal was sectarian. However, the author fails to take up the 
relationship, which his title The Second Partitioning of Ireland? itself suggests, between 
nation-building and abortion politics, in the context of political violence in Northern Ireland, 
This is indeed ironic, not only because the book was written at Queen's University, Belfast, 
but also because Hesketh actually takes his title from an Irish Times editorial which places 
the amendment precisely in that framework. 
30The collection of essays in The Abortion Papers, Ireland, edited by Ailbhe Smyth (1992), 
and published in response to the X case, attempts to provide a comprehensive feminist 
account of Irish abortion politics in historical context. The book presents the legal, historical 
and cultural context of abortion politics, outlining obstetric interest in abortion law (Murphy. 
Lawless), and the history of pro-choice politics (Speed, Barry). The X case, as well as 
previous events in the history of reproductive politics, is interpreted in terms of the actions of 
the patriarchal state (Smyth), the outcome of unequal citizenship (Ingram), and a failure to 
value moral pluralism (Dooley). Feminist abortion ethics and politics are also outlined 
(Hogan, Riddick). However, the influence of discourses of nationhood on the parameters of 
the debate are not explicitly considered in this collection. 
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would protect their beliefs and, by the same token, their identity' (1999: 3). 31 
This position does not explain the popular outrage expressed at the X case 
injunction, a reaction which was also expressed in distinctly 'national' terms, as 
the forthcoming discussion will demonstrate. Furthermore, an explanation of 
the significance of abortion as a barometer of flagging Church hegemony does 
not explicitly address shifting attitudes on abortion articulated through a 
nationhood discourse combining, in complex ways, constructions of sexuality, 
tradition, familism, gender and sexuality which both draw on and reject 
Catholic doctrine at different moments. This complexity provides the focus of 
analysis in the forthcoming discussion, following a consideration, in Chapter 
Two, of feminist analyses of the significance of abortion and reproductive 
politics generally for gender politics and women's citizenship. 
31 Similarly, Martin (2000), in her work on 1990s abortion politics, which pays explicit 
attention to constructions of nationhood, also defines Irishness in an essentialist way which 
avoids examining the implicit significance of doing so. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ABORTION, FEMINISM, AND THE X CASE 
As mentioned in the Introduction, feminism in Ireland did not have a coherent 
position on abortion prior to the 1983 Constitutional 'pro-life' campaign. 
Rather, feminists were compelled to consider abortion politics and law 
primarily through the determined efforts of the anti-abortion right-wing. This, 
combined with the hegemonic construction of anti-abortion politics as 
commonsensically 'national', in the terms outlined in Chapter One, seriously 
constrained the development of a mainstream feminist position on abortion 
access prior to the X case. 
This chapter is concerned primarily with debates within feminism over the 
significance of abortion politics. While these debates have emerged primarily in 
the specific political contexts of the US and Britain, they provide a means for 
considering the significance of the X case. A consideration of feminist 
perspectives on abortion will provide the context for the forthcoming 
discussion of how the X case disrupted hegemonic associations between 
discourses of nationhood, the family, gender and sexuality. 
Specifically, this chapter will outline alternative feminist interpretations of 
abortion politics, ranging from a narrow view, concerned primarily with 
women's access to services; to a broader perspective, which views abortion as 
key both to the politicization of women's embodiment, specifically in terms of 
sexually compromised citizenship, on the one hand, and to the possibility for 
reproductive freedom, through the exercise of embodied sexual autonomy, on 
the other. These will be discussed in turn in what follows. 
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Abortion and Privacy 
One major strand of feminist perspectives on abortion politics views the anti- 
abortion position primarily as an attack on women's privacy, articulated as 
women's right to 'choose' whether and when to become mothers. The broader 
contexts through which women's reproduction has been constructed as a socio- 
political and moral problem are not addressed. 
An example of this particular view of what is at stake in abortion politics is 
provided by Marsh and Chambers's well-known study of abortion politics in 
Britain (1981). Although these authors are in sympathy with the 'pro-choice', or 
as they term it, the 'pro-abortion' position, one of them having been actively 
involved in campaigning to prevent the erosion of the 1967 Abortion Act, their 
view of the link between abortion and feminist politics is highly limited. Their 
concern with this link is expressed only terms of the impact feminism has had 
on defining abortion as an issue concerning women's rights, at least within the 
British Labour Party. They also comment on the way in which abortion access 
has provided a focus for feminist politics both within and outside parliamentary 
politics (p. 192). Thus, their detailed analysis of parliamentary abortion debates 
does not address the general cultural-political context within which the 
articulation of political positions on abortion were constructed. This is 
particularly demonstrated by their uncritical comment on the attempts of the 
influential Abortion Law Reform Association to establish a pressure group 
which would concentrate on birth control as a means of drawing attention to 
the problems of overpopulation, amongst other aims (p. 43). ' 
'This position also characterized nineteenth century birth control campaigns. For example, 
June Rose describes the politics of Marie Stopes, who left her clinic to the Eugenics Society 
in her will, as follows: 'Marie was an elitist, interested in creating a society in which only the 
best and the beautiful should survive. Brought up on the ideas of Darwin, she responded 
enthusiastically to the view that his theory of natural selection argued for the need to create a 
super breed of humans. ' (1993: 134) 
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This narrow interpretation of what is at stake in abortion politics can also be 
found in the US context. For instance, Linda Cisler, a US feminist, in 
presenting her argument that access to birth control is essential to women's 
liberation, explains the very high rates of sterilization among Puerto Rican 
women in New York city as a pragmatic response by those women, precisely 
through the exercise of private choice, both to Catholic regulation of sexual 
morality, and to the difficulty of practicing birth control legally in Puerto Rico. 2 
In other words, the very high rates of sterilization among Puerto Rican women, 
she assumes, is due to a form of private female resistance to enforced 
motherhood, rather than as the result of specifically racist official policy. 3 This 
view of what is at stake in abortion politics notably fails to take into account 
classed and raced construction of gender and sexuality, and therefore produces 
a mistaken account of abortion practices. 4 
This misinterpretation illustrates the tension in the idea of 'choice' which, on the 
one hand, acknowledges that women's decisional and bodily autonomy is at 
stake in (anti-) abortion politics, and, on the other, facilitates the 'illusion', to 
use Himmelweit's term (1988: 40), that a woman can make a 'private' choice 
free from social, economic, and political constraints. As Petchesky comments, 
2Angela Davis has argued, rather, that the very high rate of sterilization of this particular 
group of women is rather the result of a government policy which has operated since 1939 
(Davis 1981: 219). 
3Cisler's interpretation is actually countered by an editorial footnote drawing attention to the 
racism of official birth control programmes (Morgan 1970: 257). Her interpretation of 
reproductive politics and the effects on particular groups of women was not uncontroversial 
at the time Cisler presented it. Criticism, for example, can be found in a statement on birth 
control published in the same anthology, from the Black Women's Liberation Group, which 
underlines the perception among Black Americans that the birth control movement operated 
as a form of genocide (1970: 360-360). However, this competing interpretation of 
reproductive politics argues that, despite its racist agenda, birth control nevertheless offers 
black women and children the freedom necessary to fight racism and genocide. The 
controversial status of birth control in the Black Civil Rights Movement, and specifically the 
resistance by women within the movement to the claim that birth control was simply a form 
of racist population control, can be found in Greenwood and Young (1976: 98-101). See also 
Davis (1981), particularly Chapter Twelve. 
4This position, Cisler argues, was favoured even by a majority of Catholics who responded to 
a 1969 poll on the issue (1970: 277). 
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'... the idea of "a woman's right to choose" as the main principle of reproductive 
freedom is insufficient and problematic at the same time as it is politically 
compelling' (1986: 6-7). 
In contexts where privacy is defined either in familial, domestic terms, or in 
terms of possessive individualism, the interpretation of abortion politics in 
terms of private choice fails to interrogate the political context within which 
'privacy' is constructed. Feminists, for example, have defined 'privacy' not in 
familial, domestic, or economic terms, but rather as the imaginary sphere of 
personal identity and self-realization. 5 However, the hegemonic construction of 
'privacy' in US abortion law in particular has facilitated the official restriction of 
abortion access in explicitly classed terms. The decision in Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services (1989) significantly eroded legal access to 
abortion services by deciding that the withdrawal of public financial support for 
abortions does not obstruct the 'right to choose'. 6 Interpreting abortion as an 
issue of private choice is insufficient to prevent the state from actively 
obstructing access (Cornell 1995: 33). As Marlene Gerber Fried points out, 
abortion is the only reproductive health care service which Medicaid, the 
5Jean Cohen, for instance, offers the following definition: 'Let me formulate the standard that 
underlies this aspect of privacy as the right not to have an identity imposed upon one by the 
state or third parties that one cannot freely affirm and embrace. '(1996: 201) Nancy Fraser 
has argued that the feminist project is aimed not at the collapse of the boundaries between 
public and private, but rather 'to overcome the gender hierarchy that gives men more power 
than women to draw the line between public and private' while also taking account of other 
dimensions to that power imbalance, not least those of race, ethnicity, and class (1997: 115). 
Furthermore, Kandiyoti emphasizes the major difference between privacy and patriarchy, 
arguing that feminists should be wary of ethnocentric definitions of the private and the 
public, and should acknowledge that the 'private' is often problematically defined by the state 
(1991: 430). 
6Reagan notes that one third of women in the US live in counties without any abortion 
provision, and that more that 80 per cent of the counties there is no legal abortion available. 
She points out that during 1991 to 1992, of the programs for residents in obstetrics and 
gynecology, only 12 per cent routinely taught first trimester abortions. She argues that this 
teaches young doctors both that abortion is less than honourable, and also that they can 
disregard the expressed needs of women in particular and patients in general. Furthermore, 
she points out that 'illegal abortionists are in business again; women are dying again because 
of illegal abortions. They tend to be low-income women, women of color, or minors trying to 
avoid parental notification requirements. ' (1997: 251-2) 
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publicly-funded medical services programme, does not cover, while it does 
cover sterilization for welfare claimants (1997: 38). She describes mainstream 
'pro-choice' tactics in the US during the 1980s, which explicitly avoided 
lobbying against this prohibition of public funding for abortions: 
Even using the word 'abortion' was considered too controversial. The 
movement favoured the more euphemistic notions of 'choice', 
'personal freedom' and 'privacy', in hopes that this was a discourse that 
even conservatives couldn't find objectionable. (1997: 40) 
This call for choices, she argues, facilitates the erosion of abortion access by 
appealing only to those who already have choices, excluding low-income 
women; women of colour; and young women. In particular this strategy does 
nothing to challenge the anti-abortion construction of women as persons whose 
moral capacities are not to be trusted. This position, she argues, has actually 
embraced population control arguments, not least by failing to address women's 
right in relation to having children (1997: 42). Thus, as Petchesky noted 
... class and race 
divisions in reproductive health care determine not 
only women's access to decent gynecological services, counseling, and 
the like, but their risk of exposure to involuntary sterilization, 
dangerous contraceptive drugs, or unnecessary hysterectomy. 
(1986: 10) 
Thus, interpreting abortion politics as an issue of 'privacy', defined in terms of a 
woman's right to control her body without public interference, evades any 
consideration of the socio-political forces which produce both involuntary 
pregnancies and calls for abortion access. The complex contexts of abortion 
decisions are left unexamined in interpreting abortion politics in terms of 
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'private' choice (Davis 1981; Petchesky: 1986: 7; Himmelweit 1988). Thus for 
example, Steinberg notes that the right to choose was constructed in part as the 
right to make eugenic decisions in the context of the 1988 British parliamentary 
debate on the Alton Bill (1991: 187). 7 As Cornell argues, concentrating on 
personal 'choice' trivializes the abortion decision, and fails to appreciate that 
abortion is not a procedure that any woman would actually choose to undergo. 
Indeed, as she points out, if women were actually in control of their bodies, 
abortions would be unnecessary (1995: 33; 246 n. 4). In particular, the private 
choice perspective fails to appreciate the possible alignment of those sorts of 
arguments with racist and eugenic political discourses. 8 
In the context of abortion politics in post-X case Ireland, the decision of three 
out of the five Supreme Court judges, that the injunction issued by the High 
Court had been an unwarranted interference in the private affairs of the family, 
has facilitated the emergence of a discourse of private choice, articulated in 
both anti-abortion and 'pro-choice' terms. The changes precipitated by the X 
case mean that it is legal at least to travel abroad in order to obtain an abortion, 
a position which the anti-abortion lobby in general endorse, in the light of 
popular outrage at the events of 1992. In effect, this means that a woman can 
'choose' to obtain an abortion only if she has the means to migrate and to avail 
of private medical facilities abroad. At least 6,000 women obtain abortions in 
Britain in this 'private' way every year. 9 In other words, women in Ireland can't 
'choose' abortion in a public/national idiom. However, the events of the 1997 C 
case, when the state itself facilitated the 'choice' of a ward of court to travel to 
7The eugenic dimensions of foetal protection policies in the US are traced, for example, by 
Mason (2000). 
8 The entanglement between feminist and population control discourse has been traced, for 
example, in the discourse of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (Linda 
Gordon, quoted in Greenwood and Young 1976: 104). 
9During 1999 6,214 women from the Republic and 1,428 from the north of Ireland obtained 
abortions in Britain (Aine McCarthy '"I always thought I was against abortion, but... ` Irish 
Times 4th July 2000). 
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Britain to obtain an abortion, underlines the limitations and contradictions of 
this legal situation. 
Reproductive Freedom and Abortion 
The Construction and Regulation of Women's Embodiment 
An alternative feminist perspective locates abortion politics in the broader 
context of reproduction, and the politicized construction of women's 
embodiment. This broad approach to abortion access emphasizes the cultural 
politics within which different groups of women are defined differently, 
particularly in relation to a moral discourse through which the unequal 
distribution of reproductive freedom is justified. Leslie Reagan, for example, 
describes this perspective as follows: 
Real reproductive freedom for women requires that all women, 
regardless of race, class, age, sexual orientation, or marital status, be 
able to avoid unwanted childbearing through the use of contraception 
and abortion and be able to bear children without being stigmatized, 
impoverished, or compelled to give up their education, employment, 
or children. (1997: 249)10 
This framework views the anti-abortion position as a politics concerned 
primarily with a distinctive moral construction of gender and sexuality (e. g., 
Davis 1981, Petchesky 1986, Berer 1988; Gerber Fried 1997). Reagan 
describes the anti-abortion perspective in these terms: 
IOShe adopts this perspective in her analysis of how the medical profession in the US 
consolidated its professional power during the nineteenth century primarily through 
opposition to abortion, in the guise of midwifery, pointing to how those professionals claimed 
the moral authority of religious leaders in order to legitimize their authority over women's 
reproduction, and consequent power in regulating gender and sexuality (1997: 82), 
63 
... women cannot be trusted to make moral 
decisions about children 
and family, but must be overseen and regulated by men; procreation is 
a state mandate not a choice; women's lives, sexuality, and bodies are 
not their own. (1997: 253) 
In other words, anti-abortion discourse is concerned to construct women's 
embodiment primarily in terms of what has been referred to as the 'maternal 
function' (e. g., Rich 1986; Cornell 1995). The coherence of women's embodied 
subjectivity, captured, for instance, in the title of the celebrated feminist health 
book Our Bodies Ourselves (Boston Women's Health Book Collective 1971), 
is denied as reproductive capacity is separated off and prioritized over the 
complexity and plurality of selfhood. In Cornell's terms, the denial of abortion 
serves to fragment women's integrity: 
The denial of the right to abortion should be understood as a serious 
symbolic assault on a woman's sense of self precisely because it 
thwarts the projection of bodily integration and places the woman's 
body in the hands and imaginings of others who would deny her 
coherence by separating her womb from her self. (1995: 3 8) 
In this view, anti-abortion constructions of pregnant women and 'the unborn' 
affect not only access to abortion, but general perceptions of what it means to 
be a woman, in a distinctly moral discourse which reproduces masculinist 
constructions of gender and sexuality. Thus, anti-abortion discourse which 
constructs women primarily in maternalist terms affects the treatment of 
women during pregnancy and birth, as well as, for instance, the position of 
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women in the labour market, and in relation to domestic labour (Rich 1980; 
Petchesky 1986; Faludi 1992; Duden 1993; Cornell 1995; Reagan 1997). " 
Barbara Duden documents the ways in which hegemonic anti-abortion 
discourse, articulated through a specific foetal iconography which will be 
discussed in more detail below, constructs women as the delicate and 
potentially dangerous eco-system which 'life', in the form of the foetus, inhabits. 
In these terms, the 'environment' must be regulated in the interests of foetal 
survival (1993: 2). In the US in particular, this has meant the extension of 
maternal responsibility for child welfare to responsibility for foetal welfare, to 
the extent of producing a culture of surveillance, including self-surveillance, of 
women who are not pregnant but may be trying to conceive (McNeill 
1991: 151). 
Thus, the construction of women primarily in terms of the maternal function is 
generally regulated, through a moral discourse of gender and sexuality. In the 
US and Britain this has been performed by the medical profession, who have 
acquired both physical and moral jurisdiction over reproduction, '2 whereas in 
Ireland religious authorities have performed this task, although, as indicated in 
the Introduction, this is shifting in the direction of medical authority. 
The X case, involving as it did a fourteen-year old rape victim, underlined the 
embodied context of pregnancy and hence of reproductive politics in 
mainstream debate for the first time. Hypothetical arguments about abortion, 
previously cast in terms of theological debates concerning when precisely 
11 The effects of foetal protection policies in the workplace have been traced, for instance, by 
Blank (1993). 
t2Abortion regulation was pivotal to the nineteenth century professionalization of medicine, 
when the status'of medical knowledge and practice was enhanced through positioning newly 
institutional medicine in opposition to abortion providers (Luker 1984, Pctchesky 1986, 
Reagan 1997, Thomson 1998). 
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human life could be said to have begun, were newly recast in terms of girl's and 
women's embodiment, thereby opening up the moral-political debate to less 
dogmatic authoritarian perspectives. However, as the forthcoming chapters will 
illustrate, the 'exceptional' context within which female embodiment was 
politicized in the X case, which focused on the specific context of child rape 
and sexual innocence, prevented the development of these new 'embodied' 
perspectives into any comprehensive advocacy, in the political mainstream, for 
reproductive freedom. 
Foetal Iconography: Modernity and Abortion 
The feminist perspective which situates abortion access within a framework of 
reproductive freedom has focused in particular on the significance of the iconic 
foetus in reproductive politics. Interpretations of foetal iconography have 
focused firstly on the distinctly 'modern' scientific context within which it has 
emerged, and secondly, on the ways in which this iconography legitimizes a 
hegemonic anti-abortion moral equivalence between women and foetuses. 
Barbara Duden has argued that the human fetus, as conceptualized today, is 
not a creature of God or a natural fact, but an engineered construct of modern 
society. ' (1993: 4) Iconic representations of the foetus-as-baby which transform 
religious/mystical discourse into a medical-technological one (Petchesky 
1987: 58), particularly Lennart Nilsson's famous foetal photographyr3 and the 
anti-abortion film The Silent Scream, 14 have produced a discourse of 
13These pictures were originally published in 1965 in Life magazine, entitled 'Drama of Life 
Before Birth' (Thompson 1998: 65). As Duden puts it, these pictures'... show the unfinished 
child looking like an astronaut in its transparent bubble, a bluish-pink figure with protruding 
veins sucking its thumb, the vaguely human face with closed eyes covered by a tissue veil. 
The fetus shown in the photographs was removed from a dead woman or a tubal pregnancy. 
The 'beginning of life' sequence Nilsson sold to the press and the textbook publishers showed 
mainly corpses' (1993: 14). 
14This film, apparently based on ultrasound pictures of a twelve-week foetus, is described by 
Rothman as follows: 'With the use of special effects (dramatic slowing and speeding up of the 
film to make fetal movement appear to change in intensity) and powerfully suggestive 
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autonomous foetal embodiment, '5 in narrativized 'moving picture' form (ibid. ), 
in which the foetus is constructed as hero-adventurer characterized, for 
instance, by athleticism (Franklin 1991: 201-2). In Barbara Katz Rothman's well 
known description, 
the fetus in utero has become a metaphor for `man` in space, floating 
free, attached only by the umbilical cord to the spaceship. But where 
is the mother in that metaphor? She has become empty space. (in 
Petchesky 1987: 63). 
The primary effect of this discourse is to construct the foetus as a patient, 
through separation from the pregnant woman, in terms which are aimed not at 
the improvement of health, either of woman or foetus, but rather at extending 
clinical control over reproduction, as Petchesky argues (1987: 64). Franklin 
tracks the emergence of a medical discourse which constructs the foetus both 
as the 'commander' of pregnancy, and as innocently tranquil. This is sharply 
different from previous constructions of the foetus as the inert passenger in a 
pregnancy. Against this new foetal-centred discourse, which has specifically 
emerged since the 1970s through the development of ante-natal technology, 
violent images of foetal destruction are particularly disturbing (1991: 195). 
Although, as Petchesky comments, the development of pre-natal imaging does 
not necessarily always operate against the interests of pregnant women 
(1997: 78), the extension of medical control over pregnancy in contemporary 
cultural contexts, through extensive ante-natal screening, is aimed at 
language (the 'child' in its 'sanctuary') the audience is asked to share the identification with 
the fetus within, and to ignore entirely the woman - never shown - in whom it resides. ' 
(1989: 115) As Braidotti explains, the film is accompanied by a soundtrack which claims to 
give voice to foetal feelings about being murdered, and is interspersed with images of Nazi 
concentration camps (1994: 69). 
"The embodiment of the foetus is only achieved in this sense through the disembodiment of 
pregnant women, as Braidotti (1994: 69) points out. 
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intervening in, or terminating, pregnancies which do not conform to 'normality'. 
In other words, a eugenic agenda is central to this medical control over 
reproduction. 
Thus, women's authority over pregnancy has been replaced by medical 
technology, the effects of which Duden describes as follows: 
.. 
in the course of one generation, technology [... ] has transformed 
pregnancy into a process to be managed, the expected child into a 
fetus, the mother into an ecosystem, the unborn into a life, and life 
into a supreme value. (1993: 2) 
Scientific interest in dominating and controlling nature has produced an 
alternative discourse of 'life', characterised as observable, and manageable 
(Duden 1993: 104). 16 This is what Sarah Franklin refers to as a discourse of 
'biologization', which serves primarily to naturalize the construction of foetuses 
as persons morally equivalent to women (1991: 191-2). This is the effect of 
foetal iconography's reliance on a dualistic hierarchy between the biological and 
the social, as well as between the pregnant woman and the foetus: 
It is this double move, of displacing and replacing the social with the 
biological, that enables a woman's pregnancy, the work of nurturing a 
child, the meaning of motherhood, the social meaning of personhood 
(in terms of kinship, identity, naming, reciprocity, interdependence, 
etc. ) all to be rescued to one dimension, which is that of biological 
life. (Franklin 1991: 200) 
16As she puts it: 'Life has gained prominence as nature has died' (1993: 104). 
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Thus, foetal iconography both relies on, and reproduces, a discourse of 
progressive modernity, in terms which can be articulated with both anti- 
abortion and eugenic authoritarianism. 
In the context of the X case, a distinctively modem discourse of disembodied 
motherhood, where foetal signifiers dominate the political landscape, enables 
official attempts to resolve the political dispute over abortion access by 
appealing to medical authority. This appears to provide a means both of 
recuperating anti-abortion hegemony, articulated in the national idiom, while at 
the same time assuaging fears that women's lives and health are officially 
disregarded through the specific operation of anti-abortion policies. 
Reproductive Freedom and Citizenship 
What implications does the construction of the foetus as autonomously 
embodied have for women's citizenship, given that foetal iconography relies on 
the representative disembodiment of women and motherhood? 17 This section 
will outline feminist arguments over the impact this discourse of disembodied 
motherhood has on women's rights, in relation to the implications of the X case 
for women in Ireland. 
As many feminists have noted, women have historically been denied citizenship 
rights, since those rights have been distributed through a basic gendered 
opposition between public and private spheres, whereby women's association 
with maternity, care work, and domesticity has both removed them from the 
public sphere, and consequently, has disqualified them from the political, 
17This point is made, for example, by Steinberg (1996). As Newman argues: '... the woman's 
body is sacrificed to fetal subjectivity in multiple ways: in absence; in the visual schemas of 
the midwifery manuals; and, dissected and opened, made manipulable, in the gendered plots 
of anatomical illustrations and sculpture. ' (1996: 88) 
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economic and social rights and duties accorded to citizens (e. g., Petchesky 
1986; Himmelweit 1988; Franklin 1991; Poovey 1992). As Pateman argues: 
... the meaning of civil 
liberty and equality, secured and distributed 
impartially to all 'individuals' through the civil law, can be understood 
only in opposition to natural subjection (of women) in the private 
sphere. (1988: 114) 
Thus, the historic disqualification of women from citizenship has relied on a 
double move. Firstly women are associated with the private, non-political, 
familial and domestic sphere. Secondly, women ontologically fail to qualify as 
citizens by virtue of their reproductive capacity. In other words, the 'maternal 
function' excludes women from the category of 'individuals', to whom 
citizenship is granted. As Newman puts it, '[w]oman's failed singularity - her 
reproductive body - justified the refusal to extend to women the rights claimed 
for universal "Man" ... ' (1996: 66). 
Newman shows how anatomical and obstetrical images of normality, including 
foetal imagery, have a long tradition of being represented as male. Typical 
representations of the foetus employ the characteristics usually associated with 
masculinity, including those of rationality and moral autonomy. In particular, 
the Lockean idea of possessive individualism is articulated in the context of 
foetal iconography, whereby the foetus is constructed as the owner of property 
in 'his' person, which nobody else has a right to, including the pregnant woman 
upon whom 'he' is entirely dependent. 
Thus, the concept of citizenship has historically depended on the idea of the 
public individual. Mary Poovey (1992) argues that this concept is embedded in 
what she calls a 'metaphysics of substance' which constructs the individual in 
70 
essentially male terms. The female body, unlike the imagined foetal body, is 
excluded from this metaphysics, and hence can be excluded from citizenship. 
Thus, the rights-bearing citizen depends on a tradition which privileges the 
'individual' with primary importance above all other categories, a tradition 
which Williams traces to the development of modern legal, political, and 
economic theory during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (1976: 135-6). 
The 'individual' has become the substantial entity from which all other 
categories, including citizens, are derived. Thus, the construction of the foetus 
in masculine and autonomous terms, in opposition to the construction of 
pregnant women in less than individual terms, facilitates the recognition of 
foetal citizenship, at women's expense. 
The construction of reproduction through norms of gender and sexuality has 
served to legitimize unequal citizenship, as women's civil, social and political 
rights's have been curtailed through their reproductive capacity. This raises the 
question of whether 'individually'-based citizenship can be claimed by women, 
whose 'indivisibility' appears to be denied through pregnancy and birth. As 
Petchesky argues, feminists should be wary of advocating women's absolute 
right to control reproduction, since this depends on an essentialist construction 
of women as mothers, and of men as disconnected from pregnancy and child- 
care (1986: 7). However, this interpretation of citizenship as an inherently 
patriarchal construct (Pateman 1988) leaves feminist claims for women's rights 
in difficulty, as Petchesky acknowledges. The alternative to individually-based 
citizenship, namely some form of group or sexually-differentiated rights, as 
recommended for example by Pateman (1988), Young (1990), and Walby 
(1994), similarly fails to overcome the problem of essentialism. '9 
18This refers to Marshall's influential three-part conception of citizenship (1950: 10.11). For 
a discussion of this scheme see, for example, Lister 1997: 15-18. 
19This point is made, for example, by Mouffe (1992: 374-5) and Fraser (1997: 229). 
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Feminist advocacy of abortion rights could claim recognition for the minimum 
conditions required for all sexual beings to achieve individuation, without 
resorting to claims for recognition of specific, and necessarily essentialist, 
group-differentiated rights (Mouffe 1992 376-7; Cornell 1995: 64). This would 
rely on a definition of individual citizenship in terms not of bodily 'indivisibility', 
but rather, in Cornell's terms, of the imaginary perception of one's self as whole 
over time. Thus, the citizen's 'indivisibility' bears a complex relation to their 
embodied personhood, as it is the imaginary, rather than the physical, 
underpinning of individuality, and individuated sense of selfhood, that is at 
stake. This position seems to provide a substantial alternative to the privacy 
perspective, and would overcome the fear that feminist claims for recognition 
of women's rights as individuals would require a disavowal of women's 
distinctive embodiment. 
In the context of post-X case reproductive politics, where the citizenship rights 
accorded to the 'unborn' in 1983 were judicially subordinated to the rights of 
'mothers' for the first time, how does the construction of citizenship through a 
gendered and sexualized discourse of nationhood and reproduction translate in 
terms of women's rights? 20 Specifically, how does anti-abortion articulation of 
foetal autonomy, through a distinctly 'modern' discourse of scientific progress, 
often employed in other contexts for eugenic purposes, reconcile with the 
discourse of nationalist traditionalism otherwise promoted by the anti-abortion 
lobby? What impact can feminist advocacy for women's reproductive rights 
have on the hegemonic post-X case political culture? 
20As Kandiyoti (1991) Yuval-Davis and Werbner (1999) note, national discourses often 
employ women as markers of national boundaries, in terms which jeopardize women's 
citizenship. 
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These questions will be discussed in detail in the forthcoming chapters, and 
particularly in Part Four, which considers official discourses of abortion and 
gendered citizenship. The next Part will consider the construction of popular 
political culture, not least in terms of prevalent ideas about nationhood and 
abortion, both during 1983, as the right-wing were aggressively engaged in 
their hegemonic anti-abortion project, and in reponse to the disruption of that 
hegemony in 1992, through the event of the X case. 
73 
PART TWO 
POPULAR POLITICAL CULTURE: 
THE X CASE, ABORTION, AND THE NATIONAL PRESS 
INTRODUCTION 
The press reports of February 1992, that a fourteen year old pregnant rape 
victim was to be prevented from travelling to Britain to obtain an abortion, 
precipitated extraordinary public protests, political embarrassment, and 
ultimately constitutional change, as outlined in the Introduction. Given that the 
X case was apprehended by most people through the news media, this Part is 
concerned with how that event was constructed through the national press. The 
ways in which the coverage of the case disrupted, reconfigured, or reproduced 
the thematic construction of abortion which had become hegemonic in popular 
political culture during the 1983 constitutional referendum campaign is 
specifically of interest in what follows. 
The national press provides the focus for the next two chapters as a site which 
explicitly constructs popular political culture. Not only do newspapers have 
close connections with politics', often associated with distinct party-political 
perspectives (Epstein and Johnson 1998: 73), they also explicitly articulate a 
discourse of nationhood in so doing, as the discussion below will outline 
(Anderson 1983; Billig 1995). Thus, what is of interest in this Part is how 
abortion'common senses' were consistently articulated across a diverse national 
press, despite the specific and often politically partisan audiences addressed by 
each particularly newspaper. 
IAs Curran and Seaton argue, 'the mass media and mass politics have inspired, reflected, and 
shaped each other more than has commonly been realized' (1991: 1). 
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The 'news' is not simply a direct account of events as they happen. Rather, it is 
just one version of a plurality of possible interpretations of a range of events. 2 
Thus the media play a key role in defining both what events are of public 
significance, and what their significance might be (Hall et al. 1978). Events are 
made comprehensible in the 'news' by referring to them through the already 
available 'maps of meaning' which make sense of the world by drawing on 
hegemonic discourses (Hall et al. 1978: 53-63). In this way, the media' play a 
major role in reproducing the discourses of the powerful, in ways which, in 
turn, invest the media with institutional power in the production of 'common 
sense'. 
Politicians, extra-parliamentary political activists, and the electorate all 
encounter major political 'events' through the 'news' media. Thus, the concern 
with this Part is to consider the press mobilization of 'popular' or 
commonsensical constructions of the political significance of abortion, prior to 
considering the more particular constructions of that issue by political activists, 
and by legislators in Parts Three and Four, respectively. A study of the press 
coverage of the X case, in relation to a study of similar coverage of the 1983 
Pro Life Amendment Campaign, will indicate the ways in which 
'commonsenses' connecting abortion and nationhood were articulated in 1983 
in ultimately contradictory terms which were ruptured in 1992.3 
2The selection process through which news' is constructed is carried out in accordance with 
a complex set of criteria, defined for example by the internal structure of a particular 
newspapers, as well as professionally established journalistic values, for example 
'impartiality', 'balance', and 'objectivity', which justify, for instance, the distinction between 
'fact' and 'opinion'. What counts as 'newsworthy' is largely defined in relation to 'news 
values', such as unexpectedness, drama, and human tragedy. While these values are widely 
shared across different media, they are given different 'inflections' in particular contexts (Hall 
et al 1978: 53-63). 
31 am grateful to Joan Haran for this description of events. 
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Three key questions are central to the following chapters: how were the 
contradictions in popular abortion discourse, which the X case exposed, set up? 
What role did the media play in producing this contradictory discourse, and 
how did it respond to the disruption caused by the X case? In what ways were 
readers constructed as 'the people' through press attention to abortion politics, 
initially in 1983, and subsequently in response to the events of 1992? Chapter 
Three will indicate how anti-abortion hegemony was established in 1983 
through the production of a 'moral panic', outlined below, by drawing on a 
discourse of republican democracy in order to construct abortion as a threat to 
national survival, and consequently displace concerns about women's rights. 
Chapter Four will consider how the contradiction between advocating foetal 
rights on the basis of democratic republican citizenship on the one hand, and 
restraining the articulation of concerns about women's citizenship on the other, 
became unsustainable, as the X case confounded the popular panic about the 
apparent threat to the nation's future from abortion, by highlighting the specific 
effects of anti-abortion hegemony in explicitly national-familial terms. The 
analysis contained in Chapters Three and Four will consider the power of the 
mass media to set popular legal and political agendas, and consequently to 
affect legal and political frameworks and ideas, specifically concerning women's 
citizenship. These chapters will also suggest how apparently enduring ideas or 
commonsenses can be less secure than they generally appear. 
First, the analytic framework employed in Chapters Three and Four will be 
briefly outlined below, involving a consideration both of the ways in which the 
news-media produce audiences in distinctly national terms, and of media 
interest in and strategies for producing political consensus, particularly through 
the construction of a'moral panic'. 
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The Press's 'National' Audience 
The ways in which the media engage in reproducing popular culture cannot be 
studied in isolation from the way audiences are addressed, and thus created. As 
Raymond Williams commented: '[t]here are in fact no masses; there are only 
ways of seeing people as masses' (1961: 289) (see also Ang 1991, Hartley 
1982). 4 Hartley points out that '... one of the commodities newspapers like to 
produce is readers', in other words, that '... newspapers deliver readers to 
advertisers' (1982: 130). In so doing, they are also delivering readers to 
themselves (Curran and Seaton 1991: 3), through claiming, defining, and 
inhabiting the domain of the commonsensical, what they identify as the national 
'we'. 
In terms of providing an analysis of the construction of the X case as 'news', a 
general consideration of the style of reportage evident in each newspaper, 
together with the historical context of the emergence of each of the three 
national dailies considered in this section, indicates how each paper constructs 
its particular audience. Firstly, the Irish Times, which tends to focus on 
explanation and analysis, implicitly addresses the urban middle and upper class 
"intelligentsia". This was historically the paper of the Protestant unionist 
minority, and is self-consciously liberal in its agenda. It has the smallest 
circulation of the national dailies. Secondly, the Irish Press, which has ceased 
publication, emphasized personalities and gossip, converting from broadsheet 
to tabloid form in the 1980s, prior to its demise in the 1990s. The paper was 
originally established as a vehicle for the Fianna Fail party, and tended to reflect 
that party's populist 'catch-all' strategy. It characteristically addressed the 
4To quote Hartley: 'They [the media] must develop a practical 'mode of address' which 
expresses not only the content of the events they relate but also their orientation towards the 
viewer or reader, since this orientation is an unavoidable constituent element of all language. 
However, it cannot be just any old orientation, for it is the 'mode of address', the 'tone' of a 
newspaper or broadcast, that distinguishes it from its competitors and provides much of its 
'appeal' to us as viewers and readers' (1982: 88). 
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to tabloid form in the 1980s, prior to its demise in the 1990s. The paper was 
originally established as a vehicle for the Fianna Fäil party, and tended to reflect 
that party's populist 'catch-all' strategy. It characteristically addressed the 
traditional male wage-earner and his family. The Irish Independent addresses a 
business-oriented constituency. The paper reflects the middle class Catholic 
ethos popularly associated with the Fine Gael party, but is viewed as a non- 
partisan newspaper, without a distinctive political agenda. 
Despite the foregoing characterisations of the differences between the three 
national dailies, the focus in Chapters Three and Four is rather on their 
similarities, as already mentioned. What is of interest is the way readers are 
primarily addressed as members of the nation, rather than as differential publics 
constructed through the particular features of the production process (e. g. 
McQuail 1987: 182). While there are high levels of local as well as national 
newspaper consumption in Ireland, with a local press thriving and constructing 
local identities in ways not comparable to Britain, attention is focused on 
national dailies for the purposes of this Part precisely because they set the terms 
of debate on a national level, on a daily basis, for distinctively national 
readerships. The nation provides the 'banal' commonsensical context through 
which what counts as newsworthy is filtered (Billig 1995). 5 In so far as the 
questions being addressed in this Part centre on the media as a key site of 
nationhood discourse, attention is paid not to those processes of production 
and consumption which involve complex market competition and audience 
differentiation, but rather on the surprising levels of similarity between the three 
competing newspapers in terms of addressing their audiences as members of a 
nation. Billig has argued that national newspapers 'evoke a national "we'll 
5For example, national newspapers are generally organized around a division between 'home' 
and 'foreign' news. 
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(1995: 115). They establish and depend on the idea of a large-scale community 
of readers, defined as a nation, In Anderson's well-known formulation: 
... the newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of 
his own paper 
being consumed by his subway, barbershop, or residential neighbours, 
is continually reassured that the imagined world [of the nation] is 
visibly rooted in everyday life. (1983: 40) 
Thus, newspapers make the idea of the nation significant, both through their 
visible circulation, and in their mode of address, constructing readers implicitly 
as sharing a national 'commonsense'. 
The gendered and sexualized constructions of the hegemonic nation in 
particular are central to press articulations of nationhood. For example, many 
media analysts have noted that women are generally addressed and constructed 
by the media as consumers, and more particularly as housewives and mothers 
(e. g. Brooks and Holbrook 1998: 175) rather than, for instance, as voters 
(Holland 1998). Chapters Three and Four will specifically consider the press 
construction of nationhood and abortion in terms of gender and sexual 
discourses, not least in considering the political effects of these press practices. 
The Press and Political Consensus 
Consensus building, or the production of 'commonsense', is essential to the 
production of large audiences, a necessary function of mass media, such as 
national newspapers, whose major task if they are to survive is to deliver their 
audiences to advertisers, as already mentioned (Mattelart 1986; Ang 1991). As 
Roger Fowler explains: 
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Consensus assumes that, for a given grouping of people, it is a 
matter of fact that the interests of the whole population are 
undivided, held in common; and that the whole population 
acknowledges this 'fact' by subscribing to a certain set of beliefs: 
everyone agrees that p and that q and that r. (1991: 49) 
Consequently, this mass media practice has an essentially conservative effect, 
contrary to the popular notion of the press as guarantors of democratic 
openness and debate. 6 The convergence between journalistic requirements to 
report on the activities of the state without upsetting advertisers on the one 
hand, and official political requirements to persuade the public of the legitimacy 
of the state actions on the other, has led to the media specifically prioritizing 
hegemonic political forces (Keane 1991: 106). Thus, for example, continuity 
and order are generally constructed out of chaos and disruption through the 
media, particularly in times of crisis (Mattelart 1986). In other words, 
consensus-building is central to the political practice of newspapers. 
Encoding/Decoding: The Production of the 'Preferred Reading' 
To argue that the news industry plays a major role in producing political 
consensus is not to claim that newspaper positions are always embraced by 
readers (van Zoonen 1994). As Fiske (1989: 196) argues, popular reception 
always involves 'misreading' or 'misunderstanding', as audiences tend to use 
media selectively rather than as a source of authoritative messages (see also, 
for example, Ang 1991). The reception of newspaper reportage, while of 
obvious interest in a study of popular culture (Johnson 1995: 582-4), is beyond 
the scope of this Part, which focuses only on the 'encoding' side of the 
6As Curran and Seaton (1991: 3) point out, this widespread belief about press freedom is 
based largely on the mistaken idea that anyone who doesn't find their views expressed in the 
press can start their own newspaper. 
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production of popular meaning (Hall 1980). While there is some 
correspondence between the 'encoding' and 'decoding' moments in mass 
communication, otherwise 'we could not speak of an effective communicative 
exchange at all' (Hall 1980: 136), the 'correspondence' is constructed through 
setting up 'preferred readings'. This is where the mass media are generally most 
active in the production of commonsense consensus, since 'preferred readings' 
are produced by employing hegemonic discourses. Preferred readings are 
'encoded' in the media text through a particular articulation of hegemonic 
'meaning structures', although not in entirely consistent and 'closed' forms. This 
is then decoded through the reader's preferred 'code' or discourse, either some 
form of negotiated 'code' which accepts particular aspects of the encoded 
hegemonic discourse, or an oppositional 'code' which explicitly resists the 
'preferred reading' in interpreting the text. The employment of hegemonic 
discourses as a means of encoding 'preferred readings' by the national press in 
the context of this study is central to the discussion in Chapters Three and 
Four. 
The Opinion Sections 
A major site where the production of popular political consensus is explicit is in 
the 'opinion' sections of the press, as Chapters Three and Four will indicate. 
Overtly opinionated sections of the press explicitly evoke consensus in the face 
of confusion, fear or danger. Editorials in particular explicitly refer to 'the "I", 
"you" and "he/she/it/they"' (Fowler 1991: 210), where the relationship between 
newspaper, audience and 'other' (constitutive of the 'we') is clearly evoked. 
Editorials adopt both an authoritative and emotive mode and vocabulary, as 
well as an argumentative style, while at the same time presupposing solidarity 
and consensus with the audience. Thus, the reader can feel qualified to join the 
newspaper and affirm the editorial judgment (Fowler 1991: 210-20). 
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The 'Letters to the Editor' section provides a significant means of actively 
producing common sense, as the next two Chapters will demonstrate. These 
letters perform a particular function for newspapers, which print both the 
letters of the power elite, outlining their position to readers, and also the letters 
of ordinary readers, conveying these 'popular' opinions to those with power. 
The status of the letter writer is important in determining which views are 
published, with editors favouring the statements of powerful individuals and 
organizations, as well as 'grassroots', or what are presented as 'typically 
popular' opinions. The emphasis depends on the particular paper's orientation. 
Letter writers are influenced by what has been described as 'public motives', in 
other words, they are not intended to communicate with the editor, but rather 
with policy makers and other influential agents, through the newspaper. Letters 
usually express their particular concerns through the terms already defining the 
issue in the news. As such, they provide a substantial indication of the primary 
definition of the issues. In particular, those which explicitly articulate popular 
'commonsense', asserting what 'everyone knows', argue their case much less 
than those whose attitudes can less easily claim popular support (Hall et al. 
1978: 120-125). 
The letters provide a 'balancing' effect in newspapers, an important journalistic 
value, especially when a newspaper defends a particular position on a 
controversial issue, such as on abortion law. The inclusion of letters from 
different perspectives contributes to the legitimacy of the press's claim to be 
democratic, while actively engaged in the construction of political consensus, 
as Chapters Three and Four will indicate. The letters page does not simply 
represent 'public opinion', but rather is a highly structured forum, often aimed 
at shaping public opinion, in the name of that public, through trading on reader 
participation (Hall et al. 1978: 120-125). The ways in which the 'opinion' 
sections of the national press explicitly produced a national consensus during 
82 
Moral Panics 
Definitions 
The production of a 'moral panic' is a significant media strategy for producing 
consensus, whereby popular awareness of, and attitudes towards, what is 
established as 'deviant' or immoral, for example abortion, is produced and 
maintained through the media, with the notable effect of mobilizing institutions 
of social control. 
The theory is generally credited to Stanley Cohen who elaborated it in his 
influential study of perceptions of youth culture in the 1960s, Folk Devils and 
Moral Panics, Cohen studied the role of the media in shaping public 
perceptions of'mods' and 'rockers', and in generating public concern about their 
activities. He defined a moral panic as follows: 'A condition, episode, person, 
or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values 
and interests' (1980: 9). The media's role in maintaining and policing definitions 
of social behaviour as 'deviant' or problematic is seen as central to the stability 
and hegemony of those definitions. The production of consensus through a 
'moral panic' becomes an explicitly institutionalized form of social control. 
The theory was further elaborated by Stuart Hall et al. (1978), in their well- 
known work on the emergence of 'mugging' as a crime. Policing the Crisis 
defined a 'moral panic' as follows: 
When the official reaction to a person, groups of persons or series of 
events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered, when 
'experts', in the form of police chiefs, the judiciary, politicians and 
editors perceive the threat in all but identical terms, and appear to talk 
'with one voice' of rates, diagnoses, prognoses and solutions, when the 
media representations universally stress 'sudden and dramatic' 
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increases (in numbers involved or events) and 'novelty', above and 
beyond that which a sober, realistic appraisal could sustain, then we 
believe it is appropriate to speak of the beginnings of a moral panic. 
(1978: 16, original emphasis) 
Thus, a 'moral panic' can be described as the orchestration of 'commonsense' 
regarding the construction of a particular behaviour, event, person, or group, 
as a social threat. In the terms outlined above, the effectiveness of a moral 
panic depends on the apparent spontaneity of its emergence, and the 
subsequent exponential growth in the incidence of its subject. 
Such panics are typically characterized in terms of a three-stage process. 
Firstly, an initial event occurs, which receives dramatic media coverage, and 
establishes intensive media surveillance. One key effect is that subsequent 
events are identified and coded as similar. The action or category of persons is 
established as a threat to values or interests. Secondly, popular media coverage 
begins to draw attention to wider social implications that the event is defined as 
raising. This is done primarily through the use of what are referred to as 
'accredited witnesses' and 'primary definers', that is, those experts and officials 
who generate definitions of events and issues, due to their powerful positions 
as guardians of public morality. The media itself plays a crucial political role in 
reproducing the definitions of these accredited witnesses. 'Moral entrepreneurs', 
including particular media institutions themselves, may offer competing 
definitions of events, if they obtain media access. However, their arguments 
must generally engage with the already established definition of what is at issue, 
since the limit for further public discussion is set by the primary framing of the 
problem. Once a primary interpretation of events is established, it 'commands 
the field' within which the subsequent debate takes place, and becomes 
extremely difficult to alter. At this second stage, the moral panic involves a 
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'signification spiral', or an apparently'self amplifying sequence' which makes the 
event or activity seem increasingly threatening to the social order (Hall et al., 
1978: 58-9). The idea of a threshold is introduced to indicate an escalation in 
the threat beyond which society cannot survive (p. 223). The overall effect of 
this media attention is to 'discover' a widespread and menacing social problem. 
Ultimately, the media abandon any semblance of 'balance' in their reporting. 
Finally, the third stage involves the dramatic exposure of social control, 
particularly in relation to the state. Thus, the exaggeration of relatively trivial 
crimes through the media has serious effects, based on the assumption that, 
unless strict action is taken, things will spiral out of control. What results is 
calls for more severe penalties, greater police powers, and possibly the creation 
of new criminal offences. 
Moral panic theory, particularly Hall et al. 's version outlined above, has been 
subjected to substantial criticisms, three of which will be considered below in 
order to assess the usefulness of this framework for providing an analysis of the 
effects of the X case on popular political culture. The following discussion will 
consider first criticism of the claim that a moral panic depends on a 
'disproportionate' public response to an event or group; second, the 
conspiratorial emphasis on consensus-building; and third, the functionalist, or 
teleological trajectory and consequences of such a panic. 
Proportionality 
The emphasis on the disproportionate public response appears to demand 
measuring representation against what is 'real', rather than concentrating on the 
significance of representations in themselves (Thompson 1998: 140). How is a 
response measured as reasonable, or proportionate? Waddington, for example, 
has argued that the value of the theory is largely polemic, since the idea of 
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'panic' is unfeasible: what is a panic from one perspective is a legitimate 
concern from another (in Baker 1999). 
For instance, accepting the principle of 'proportionality' enables Goode and 
Ben-Yehuda (1994) to claim that the conflict over abortion provision in the US 
cannot be described as a moral panic, for precisely this reason. Nor, they argue, 
can the anxiety over AIDS. Neither represents a moral panic because there is a 
correspondence in each case between the 'real' threat posed by abortion and 
AIDS, and the public reaction to those threats. In the case of abortion, they 
argue that if a foetus is defined as a human being, then there is a real threat that 
legal abortion constitutes state-sanctioned murder, which it is entirely 
appropriate or 'proportionate' to panic about, and to consider restricting 
through the law. Similarly, in the case of AIDS, they argue that the threat to 
public health is real and serious, and it is reasonable that the state should be 
called upon to take steps to minimize the disease's spread. However, clearly 
these arguments rely on highly controversial accounts of what the 'real threat' 
is, in measuring public and political responses as 'proportionate', and therefore 
as not 'panicked'. 
What counts as public morality is itself a 'commonsensical' category in need of 
interrogation, as is the construction of what counts as an 'actual' threat to that 
morality. Thus, the measure of 'proportionality' produces a circular argument, 
whereby a 'panic' is defined as such because it is 'unreasonable' to panic about 
that particular issue or event. In other words, the 'proportionality' principle 
relies for explanatory purposes on what it attempts to explain. 
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Moral Panic as Conspiracy 
The development of moral panic theory has also been criticised for being overly 
conspiratorial. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) in particular make this 
argument, characterizing Hall et al. 's classic elaboration of the theory as an 
'elite engineered' model. They argue that the claim that moral panics are 
'engineered' by the media simply in order to reproduce the interested parties of 
the capitalist class, as they put it, is implausible. They favour instead a more 
limited construction of the theory, which they term an 'interest-group' model. 
By this they mean that moral panics can be explained as the effect of a 
convergence of a variety of independent interests, who, together, have a stake 
in bringing a particular issue to the fore of popular culture, in a particular light, 
and demanding stricter law enforcement (1994: 137-9). 
However, rejecting the 'engineered' aspect of the theory enables Goode and 
Ben-Yehuda to ignore the broad power contexts within which moral panics 
may occur. While the operation of power may not simply and inevitably 
reproduce the interests of capitalism, it seems equally problematic to ignore the 
hegemonic projects and discourses through which commonsenses, and political 
consensus in particular, not least concerning morality, are constructed. 
Significantly, Goode and Ben-Yehuda's rejection of the 'conspiracy' aspect of 
Hall et al. 's model leads them into analyses of discrete moral panics in 
themselves, independently of any concern about the possibility that the 
occurrence of a 'moral panic' may be symptomatic of broad political tensions 
and transformations (Jones 1997). Thus, they fail to examine the historical 
background and political context through which particular 'panics' emerge, and 
particularly the broad power struggles within which panics tend to be 
embedded (1997: 13). 
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A Functionalist Theory 
A third criticism of the theory, as Hall et at develop it, is that their version 
relies on a functionalist teleology (Jones 1997). Specifically, Policing the Crisis 
pays little attention to oppositional forces in the process of defining particular 
issues as morally significant. This implies a view of the socio-political and 
cultural spheres as a coherent totality, controlled through domination. Hall et 
at do not adequately deal either with resistances to the production of 
hegemonic definitions, or with the possibility that oppositional forces may 
achieve successes. If some resistance occurs in defining a particular issue, such 
as illegal drug use, abortion, or 'mugging', as threatening the morality of the 
nation, the 'inevitability of increasingly coercive social control may be 
undermined. The third stage, the institution of increasingly coercive social 
control, can be avoided at best, or reversed at least. In the light of this, Jones 
advocates instead the idea of 'competing moral enterprises' rather than 'moral 
panics', arguing that it better captures the conflict through which certain issues 
come to be defined as morally significant at the expense of others. However, 
this alternative, while describing the process of competition between discourses 
struggling to achieve or retain 'common sense' hegemonic status, fails to 
capture, as 'panic' does, the centrality of the popular or the national in the 
process of competition. This is particularly problematic given that moral panics 
generally concern nationhood discourses, while also involving calls for political 
action from the state.? Thus, redescribing the process through which popular 
anxiety emerges in terms which calls for an escalation in official regulation as 
an effect of 'competing moral enterprises' fails to capture the centrality of 
popular culture to processes of formal and informal control. 
71 am grateful to the participants in the Feminist Media Studies seminar held at the 
University of Warwick during 1999/2000 for this point. 
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Thus, the theory of 'moral panic' remains useful, within limits, and can offer 
powerful explanations of the connection between the media, the state, national- 
popular politics, and the official limitation of citizenship rights. However, the 
emphasis on 'proportionality' adds little to the explanatory power of this 
framework. Similarly, interpreting a'moral panic' as a simple collusion between 
the media and the forces of regulation ignores the complexity and hegemonic 
struggles through which such panics both emerge and are stifled. The value of 
the idea of a moral panic thus lies precisely in the way it captures the centrality 
of popular culture to political processes through which legal controls are 
increased, and particular groups, practices, and events are deemed threatening 
to national survival. It is in these more limited terms that the theory will be 
employed, not as a means for explaining an inevitable teleology through which 
press treatment drives anti-abortion politics, but rather, to explain how an anti- 
abortion morality acquired commonsensical status in 1983, in terms which 
excluded any consideration of women's citizenship rights throughout the 
amendment campaign, and which ultimately produced the events of the X case 
in 1992. 
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Methodology 
Particular moments in the extensive newspaper coverage of abortion politics 
will provide the focus for analysis in Chapters Three and Four, which consider 
the discourses evident in newspaper texts, rather than the visual coding in, for 
example, the layout and typography. The three highpoints of debate examined 
in detail in Chapter Three are 28th April, 29th August, and 6th September 
1983. Having surveyed the press coverage from January 1980 to December 
1983, I focused on three moments during 1983 when coverage of the proposed 
constitutional amendment was intense, as indicated by the level of major front 
page headlines. Detailed study of three periods followed, ' and the three days 
discussed in Chapter Three illustrate the themes of these periods. The 28th 
April was the day following the Government's defeat in the Dail on an 
alternative form of words for the proposed referendum, on the grounds that it 
did not confer a positive 'right to life' for the 'unborn', as the opposition party's 
wording did. The 29th August was a Monday at the beginning of the last full 
week of campaigning in the run up to the election, and the 6th September was 
the last day of campaigning prior to the referendum, when arguments were 
summarized in a final effort to win votes. 
Chapter Four focuses on five days in 1992,18th February, 6th March, 5th 
May, 27th May and 25th November. Again, these days were the focus of major 
events in abortion politics. A similar research process was followed to that 
described above, namely a survey of the major front page coverage of the case 
and its aftermath during 1992 as a means of focusing on key news moments 
during the year. The initial coverage of the X case story on 18th February 
provides the first moment of media attention, when the main story was that X 
8These were 21st to 30th April; 22nd to 31st August; and Ist to 9th September 1983. 
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was diagnosed as suicidal. The coverage of the Supreme Court's decision to lift 
the injunction against X travelling abroad or obtaining an abortion provides the 
second point of analysis in Chapter Four. Thirdly, a survey of front-page 
headlines during May and June of that year, when abortion law had been a 
major political issue during the Maastricht referendum campaigns, indicated 
five highpoints of media attention, from which two in particular will be 
discussed. These were 5th May, when a story similar to the X case was 
reported, and 27th May, following a Bishop's statement on the Maastricht 
referendum. The 25th November, the day prior to the three abortion 
referendums which the X case had brought about, and illustrative of the entire 
period immediately prior to and following those referendums, is significant 
because of the scarcity of coverage of those referendums. 
Chapters Three and Four will interpret the press coverage of the abortion issue 
in terms of a moral panic, as described above. Chapter Three will focus on the 
production of popular anxiety over abortion in the context of 1983 newspaper 
coverage of the campaign to amend the Constitution to provide a foetal right to 
life. As already mentioned, the thematic configuration of anti-abortion 
discourse at this formative moment provided the basis for the later crisis. Only 
by carefully examining the tensions and contradictions evident in 1983 can the 
significance of the X case be properly considered. 
Chapter Four will consider how the press coverage of the X case and 
subsequent legal and political battles affected the popular 'commonsenses' 
which had been established during 1983. In particular, the way popular 
abortion discourse shifted in relation to the reconfiguration of discourses of 
nationhood will be discussed. Again, the political agency of the national press 
will be considered in terms of its cultural and legal effects. Finally, classical 
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moral panic theory as defined by Cohen (1980) and Hall et al. (1978) will be 
reconsidered in the light of the moral rupture which the X case produced. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
1983 AMENDMENT IN THE PRESS: 
A NATIONAL MORAL PANIC 
Introduction 
The campaign to amend the constitution in 1983 produced the discursive 
configuration which was later thrown into crisis by the X case, as already 
discussed. Press coverage of this campaign was formative in constructing anti- 
abortion commonsense, and will be considered in this chapter. 
The major question to be addressed in what follows is what role the press 
played in establishing a popular anti-abortion political culture in 1983, in terms 
which were later disrupted by the events of the X case. This question will be 
considered by employing the model of a moral panic, already outlined. In terms 
of the 'classic' trajectory, however, it is difficult to pinpoint any particular 
event, or series of events, which could be characteristic of the first stage, when 
an issue is initially defined as a threat to social values. In fact, the Pro Life 
Amendment Campaign (PLAC) themselves prefer to claim credit for alerting 
the public to the threat posed, in what they refer to as their 'pre-emptive strike' 
against the forces of secular pluralism. The 'hysterical climate' that 
characterized the debate in 1983 (Brown 1985: 346) was overtly created and 
proudly claimed by that anti-abortion campaign. Thus, the 1983 debate does 
not, in its initial stages, conform with the apparent authorlessness of the classic 
model. 
The events of 1983, however, seem to accord closely with the model's second 
stage, i. e., the apparently spontaneous 'spiral of signification, where media 
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attention focuses on wider social implications that the specific issue is defined 
as raising, and establishes that issue in terms of a threshold beyond which 
society cannot survive. Abortion was indeed defined as a threat to the survival 
of Irish values, as this chapter will demonstrate, despite competing definitions 
of its significance. This was not achieved through narrating particular abortion 
tragedies. Instead, the debate in the newspapers focused on moral-theological 
questions, particularly concerned with when human life might begin. The 
themes which characterised the construction of this threshold will be discussed 
in detail below. The impact of the X case on the commonsensical status of the 
abortion threshold will be examined in Chapter Four, which will also reconsider 
the value of classical moral panic theory in terms of its final stage. 
Abortion in the National Press: Key Themes 
The key themes structuring the treatment of abortion in the national press 
during 1983 drew explicitly on the well-established constructions of nationhood 
outlined in Chapter One. The specific configuration of nationhood through 
abortion involved three major strands. Firstly, anti-modern traditionalism was 
central to the 'moral panic' constructing abortion as threatening to national 
survival. This theme was articulated through emphasizing the distinctly 
Catholic and generally Christian nature of national culture, in terms of the 
'civilizing' force of that doctrine, a particularly modern formulation. Secondly, 
the anti-abortion panic relied on patriarchal familism as central to national 
morality. Specifically, this theme was articulated in terms of a national morality 
which opposed eugenic practices, epitomized by abortion. Finally, the 
orchestration of anti-abortion panic relied on a discourse of republican 
democracy through which the 'people' are invested with political sovereignty. 
This was specifically articulated in terms which marginalized any consideration 
of feminist, pluralist, secular, or even non-Catholic opinion on abortion, an 
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effect which was itself marginally thematised as anti-democratic and indeed as 
'McCarthyist' during the year. 
Abortion in the National Press: The 'Nervs' and Popular Political Culture 
What Audience, Whose Nation? 
The primary definition of the significance of abortion was not provided by 
advocates of women's rights or reproductive freedom, perspectives which were 
marginal to the coverage. Rather, members of the clergy, medical practitioners, 
theologians, and representatives of grassroots organizations were primary 
definers of what was at stake. Press access for feminists and other anti- 
amendment campaigners, including left wing politicians, liberal doctors, and 
professional organizations concerned with reproduction, such as the Irish 
Family Planning Association, depended on their ability to engage with the 
debate in the terms already established by the primary definers. The press 
appeared to have abandoned the general emphasis in news production on 
'balance'. In other words, the press played a politically significant role in 
constructing their audiences as 'national' and anti-abortion, through controlling 
what could be said by whom. 
The Traditional Catholic/Christian Nation 
The first theme informing the 1983 newspaper debate was that the Christianity 
of the nation was apparently at stake in the referendum. From this perspective a 
failure to ratify the proposed amendment would constitute a betrayal of the 
nation's historic mission as a civilizing Christian exemplar in the world. This 
theme can be traced to a historic construction of Ireland as the land of saints 
and scholars', a centre of missionary Christianity. This discourse was 
constructed as a position from which to resist the secularism associated with 
the modern industrial world. 
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The Post-Colonial Christian Nation 
The atmosphere was very friendly, but highly emotional and intense. 
They were there to pray for the success of the pro-amendment 
campaign, and ... many members of the congregation prayed aloud 
for 
the restoration of moral values they see slipping away in Ireland. 
(Kennedy, Maev 1983 'Papal Nuncio offers Mass of atonement' Irish 
Times, 29th August, p. 8) 
The construction of the nation as specifically Catholic and generally Christian 
was prominent in journalism, editorials, and letters on abortion. The above 
quote reproduced the terms within which the abortion referendum had already 
been defined throughout the coverage. The reporter conveys a strong sense of 
community, contrasting the small size of the church to the large 'friendly but 
intense' congregation. As Harris (1984: 161) comments, "'[c]ommunity" has 
become a local level proxy for 'the nation' [in Irish culture]'. By focusing on 
Catholicism, the reportage conveys an association between the religious 
national community and intense anti-abortion feeling. The connection is 
expressed at the level of 'what we all know', the commonsensical. 
The report included details of a letter sent to all Irish Catholic priests from a 
group of English non-Catholic Christians, which was read out at the mass. The 
substance of the letter was to urge Ireland 'not to go the way England had 
gone', in other words, to prevent the introduction of legal abortion in Ireland. 
Again, Ireland is characterised, in post-colonial terms, as more Christian than, 
and consequently envied by, its former colonial master. 
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However, this was not a self-satisfied Catholic-Christian nation, given the 
threat posed by decriminalized abortion. It was reported that a man prayed 'that 
Ireland might become once again an island of saints and scholars', the phrase 
used to describe the pre-colonial era, and a woman prayed 'that Ireland may 
become pure again'. This desire to return to a golden age of Christian morality 
was constructed as central to anti-abortion feeling. Ireland could only retain its 
enviably Catholic character if the proposed 'pro-life' amendment were passed by 
the people. The sense of urgency this report conveys about the need to defend 
against legal abortion indicates the orchestration of panic in the press. The 
threat posed by the possibility that foetal life might not be granted citizen status 
would appear to threaten the survival of this distinctive confessional nation. 
The sense of panic in the face of imminent danger is expressed in an article 
written in favour of the 'pro-life' amendment by a senior cleric, a member of a 
particular group who the media had recruited as primary definers of what was 
at issue: 
For fifteen years now a struggle has been going on for the soul of 
Ireland. A planned campaign has been conducted by pressure groups, 
inspired by highly organized forces outside our country who are bent 
on dismantling the Christian way of life. Among their aims has been 
the legalisation ultimately of abortion. (Cremin, Monsignor F. P. 1983 
'A Catholic view of the Amendment' Irish Independent 29th August, 
p. 8) 
Monsignor Cremin addresses his audience, in national terms, as Christian 
freedom-fighters, implicitly male. The colonial construction of the Catholic 
nation is significant. This article, flagged as a piece of 'thought and advice', 
constructs Ireland as the site of an international battle between Christianity and 
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its pro-abortion antithesis. Ireland's freedom is once again under threat from the 
secular modem world, which is attempting to colonize the nation by destroying 
its moral (anti-abortion) character. Urging a 'yes' vote, the Monsignor advised 
electors that, '... you will have resisted a mortal blow at our Irish Christian 
ethos and Faith' (ibid. ). By alluding to resistance in these combative terms he is 
implying that the nation's identity and future are at stake in the abortion 
referendum, as they had been in the past in more overtly militarized settings. ' 
Christianity and Modernity 
The press treatment of abortion during 1983 through this traditionalist 
Catholic/Christian discourse explicitly equated the latter with 'civilization', a not 
uncommon theme in colonial discourse (Said, 1978: 67; 100). For example, the 
Irish Independent published a letter from a Protestant clergyman based in 
Northern Ireland, quoting from a statement endorsed by Anglican Bishops in 
1979, urging that the Republic accept the amendment in order to defend 
Christian civilization against liberalism: 
Th[e] sacredness of life which is a fundamental truth of Christianity is 
being increasingly violated through liberal abortion laws even in so 
called civilised countries... 
It is my sincere prayer that Ireland will witness to the world that 
"the sacredness of life is an absolute which should not be violated". 
(Kerr, Reverend Cecil, Letters to the Editor, Irish Independent 6th 
September 1983, p. 8) 
'He quoted from a speech given by the Pope on his visit to Ireland in 1979: 'Ireland is at a 
point of decision in her history. The Irish people have to choose today their way forward ... You the present generation of Irish people must decide; your choice must be clear and your 
decision firm ... Your country seems 
in a sense to be living again the temptations of Christ ... Satan, the Tempter, the Adversary of Christ, will use all his might and all his deceptions to 
win Ireland for the way of the world ... 
Now is the time of testing for Ireland. This generation 
is once more a generation of decision, Dear sons and daughters of Ireland ... pray that Ireland 
may not fail in the test' (ibid. ). 
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The Reverend Kerr addresses his audience primarily as fellow-Christian 
defenders of 'civilization', rather than as fellow-nationals. He appears, from this 
letter, to consider the Republic as the last frontier of Christian civilization, 
which can withstand the liberal tide only by ratifying the 'pro-life' amendment. 
The publication of his letter, which portrays the abortion issue as a possible site 
of north/south agreement, since it is defined as an issue through which 
'Christian civilization' can be defended, indicates the ways that the press were 
centrally involved in producing an anti-abortion consensus. Again, the former 
colony is represented as the more civilized culture, from the perspective of the 
colonizer. As Christian values are being eroded by liberalism, it seems that 
civilization is also under threat. This is indicated by the reference to 'so called 
civilized countries', by which he means Britain, as his subsequent comments 
indicate. The more usual antagonisms between Protestant and Catholic versions 
of Christianity, particularly as mapped onto antagonisms between the north and 
south of Ireland, are overridden here, in favour of a common Christianity, 
embattled in the face of liberal abortion laws. In this articulation the abortion 
threat is escalated beyond the survival of the Irish nation in particular, to 
threaten civilization in general. This functions specifically as a counter to the 
major position of the Anti-Amendment Campaign (AAC), outlined below, that 
the proposed 'pro-life' amendment was sectarian, in the sense that Catholics 
were divided from non-Catholic Christians, together with other religions, over 
the moral status of the foetus. In other words, the AAC position, that the 
proposed amendment would worsen political conflict in the north, was refuted 
through the publication of letters such as this, from a Protestant clergyman 
based in the north, admiring the 'pro-life' political culture of the south. 
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The 'Pro-Life' Familial Nation 
The second theme characterising the 1983 debate in the national press was that 
the Irish nation was defined, through its comprehensive 'pro-life' ethic, in terms 
of patriarchal familism. This theme defined Irish familial culture in terms of a 
moral code which values human life in all its diverse forms. Abortion, an act 
which violates the patriarchal family by undermining its construction of women 
in primarily maternal and subordinate terms, was constructed as precisely the 
opposite of this moral code. In particular, abortion was constructed through 
1983 press coverage as a eugenic practice upon which prejudice against groups 
of people, defined both through their physical and their cultural 'undesirability', 
depends. A failure to recognize the moral status of 'unborn' life as equivalent to 
that of born 'persons' would, in this view, amount to facilitating the survival not 
only of disabled persons, but of national familial culture itself. 
The Anti-Eugenic Familial Nation 
... Mr. Kemmy [party leader) and his party are saying that they want a 
society in Ireland which cannot include handicapped people. 
I want to point out to Mr. Kemmy and the D. S. P. [Democratic 
Socialist Party], and to all others who advocate the killing of unborn 
handicapped children, that we in Ireland love the handicapped, that 
handicapped people have brought tremendous happiness to their 
families and to their communities, and we in Ireland will always have a 
place for handicapped people, and we will fight to protect the right to 
life of all citizens and all unborn children, regardless of whether they 
are handicapped or not. (Irish Press Letters to the Editor, 29th 
August 1983, p. 8) 
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The orchestration of a moral panic through press mobilization of hegemonic 
themes of nationhood can be seen in this letter, written in response to a public 
statement from the marginal Democratic Socialist Party (D. S. P. ) that it 
considered abortion a justifiable reaction to severe foetal abnormality. The 
letter-writer explicitly defined abortion as an issue concerning anti-eugenic 
familial national identity. Mr. Kemmy and his party are excluded from the 'we 
in Ireland', since their statement disqualified them from belonging to the anti- 
abortion nation, 'handicapped people' are also excluded from the national 'we'. 2 
The author, a doctor, and hence a primary definer of what was at stake both in 
abortion access and in the care of 'handicapped' people, clearly objected to 
abortion on grounds of national identity, constructed through an anti-eugenic 
familial and communitarian moral code. The republican tradition, registered in 
the assertion that 'we will fight to protect the right to life of all citizens and all 
unborn children' is also important in this appeal to Irishness. By drawing on a 
set of 'commonsenses' about the nature of Irishness, which referred to family, 
community, respect for humanity regardless of ability, and the republican 
tradition, this letter effectively constructed any argument in favour of legal 
abortion as opposed to these elements of nationhood, and hence as not- 
national. 
The anti-eugenic nation at risk 
The chair of the PLAC, a primary definer of the issues at stake, argued in a 
letter to the Irish Times that the practice of what she termed 'discriminatory' 
abortion is implicitly eugenic, and so immoral. She made this argument through 
an attack on a Methodist Church statement setting out its position on the 
2Furthermore, the phrase 'we in Ireland will always have a place for handicapped people' 
indicates that the latter constitute a 'they' which'we' are happy to live with, implicitly on our 
terms. 
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referendum, which declared its opposition to 'indiscriminate' abortion, although 
not to abortion per se: 
... 
just a little abortion should be accepted seems to be the message 
from the Methodists. 
So who will we discriminate against for a start? The physically or 
mentally handicapped, perhaps, but only the really bad ones, of 
course? They don't have the required perfection to be allowed to live 
in our Christian society. 
Those conceived, through no fault of their own, in less than ideal 
circumstances (incest or rape)? 
Well, that shouldn't amount to very many per annum and wouldn't 
disturb any thinking person. Right? 
But hang on. Weren't the 161,000 babies (including 4,000 Irish 
ones) aborted in Britain last year discriminated against for one reason 
or another? Is this what discriminatory abortion can become ... 
abortion on demand? (Marie Vernon, Chair of the PLAC, Irish Times, 
Letters to the Editor, 29th August 1983, p. 11) 
The letter addresses its audience by flagging nationhood through a republican 
discourse which draws on commonsense anti-British feeling. Her argument 
focused not on the equal worth of all humans, regardless of the circumstances 
of conception or physical capacities, but rather on implying that Irish babies 
were being aborted in Britain as a result of 'discrimination', implicitly on 
grounds of nationhood. 
The anti-abortion position was thus constructed in anti-eugenic and anti- 
authoritarian terms. The references in this letter to British state policies which 
discriminate against physically or mentally 'handicapped' people evoke 
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resonances with Nazi Germany, and crimes against humanity. By extending the 
idea of eugenic discrimination on grounds of race or physique to implicitly 
cover discrimination against the Irish in Britain, a correspondence between the 
treatment received by the Irish in Britain and the 'handicapped' in Nazi 
Germany is established. The implication is that the failure to accord 'the unborn' 
with a right to life would entail colluding with anti-Irish policies, and would 
ultimately amount to national suicide. 
Thus, national vulnerability, combined with a national anti-eugenic familial and 
republican ethos, is positioned in opposition to the practice of abortion. The 
latter must, in these terms, be resisted if the 'pro-life' familial nation is to 
survive. 
Republican Democracy and Popular Sovereignty 
The third theme characterising the debate, as already mentioned, was that of 
republican democracy, a theme more usually associated with anti-authoritarian 
political discourses. This anti-abortion articulation of democratic discourse 
emphasized the constitutional position of the nation as sovereign. 3 The 
campaign for constitutional recognition of a right to life for 'the unborn' relied 
on the claim that this was what the people wanted. The amendment was aimed 
at ensuring that abortion would not become legally available in the future 
without the people's consent. In other words, the nation's interest in protecting 
its sovereignty was, in this view, at the heart of the referendum campaign. 
Ratifying the amendment would ensure that any future proposed changes 
would be referred to the 'pro-life' nation. Democracy would thus be protected, 
as the people would have to be canvassed before the government could 
3This is determined by Article 6 of the Constitution: 'All powers of government, legislative, 
executive and judicial, derive, under God, from the people, whose right it is to designate the 
rulers of the State and, in final appeal, to decide all questions of national policy, according to 
the requirements of the common good' (ßunreacht na hEireann, 1937). 
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introduce any legal changes, whether of their own instigation, or on the basis of 
European law. Republican democracy would also be protected through the 
ratification of the 'pro-life' constitutional amendment, in this view. The 
'common good' and national sovereignty would thus be protected from'foreign' 
influences. 
The Threat from Government 
A "YES" vote means Yes, I want the existing Constitution amended 
(changed) so that abortion cannot be brought into this country 
without a majority vote of every citizen of this State. 
A "NO" vote means No, I do not want the present Constitution 
amended (changed) because I think that we need abortion in some 
cases - however few or many - at some time in the future, and this 
could be brought about by challenging in court the existing Offences 
Against the Person Act (1861), without the mandate of all the citizens 
of the State. (Angela MacNamara, Christian Counsel, Irish Press, 
Letters to the Editor, 6th September 1983, p. 8) 
The main assertion evident in the press coverage of the referendum campaign, 
as the above quote indicates, was that without constitutional protection the 
supposedly popular anti-abortion ethos would be disregarded by those with 
political power. If the proposed constitutional amendment were to be rejected, 
the danger was that government, either legislative, executive or judicial, would 
usurp this sovereignty, and thereby undermine the republican constitution. 
The pro-amendment lobby insisted, in the face of criticism, that their campaign 
was aimed simply at ensuring that those with political power would be guided 
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by 'the people', whom they claimed to represent. A report in the Irish Press on 
the opposing arguments in the debate indicates this: 
We are painted as bigots and religious fanatics. But pressure groups 
are a normal way of bringing grass-roots opinion to the attention of 
governments and that's what we have done. The fact that we have 
succeeded is held against us. We got what we wanted, the rights of 
the unborn to be decided by the Irish people themselves. (Irish Press 
'Campaign dividing the nation' 29th August 1983, p. 9) 
This statement was reportedly made by PLAC spokesman Brendan Shortall, 
who characterised the pro-amendment lobby here as defenders of democracy, 
concerned primarily with enabling the people, rather than the government, to 
'decide' on the legal status of abortion. Despite the defensive tone of the 
comment, which implicitly acknowledged that there was intense disagreement 
over the proposed amendment, the speaker succeeded in aligning the PLAC 
position with a defence of the people's sovereignty, with connotations of an 
anti-democratic project informing PLAC's opponents. Abortion was thus 
defined as an issue of major national significance requiring the people's special 
attention. 
The possibility that governmental action on abortion law might not be guided 
by 'the people', represented by the PLAC, was highlighted through parallels 
drawn with legal change in the US. The Irish Times, for example, published the 
following letter from a US Congressman: 
Ten years ago abortion was illegal in America. Like you, our 
Constitution did not specifically guarantee protection for the unborn. 
Like you, most of our anti-abortion laws were passed in the 1860s. 
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Our laws were challenged in court. Since then there was no specific 
mention of the unborn in our Constitution, our Supreme Court 
imposed abortion on demand for all nine months of pregnancy. (Chris 
Smith, Letters to the Editor, 6th September 1983, p. 11) 
This letter, from a politician who had travelled to Ireland at the invitation of 
anti-abortion campaigners in order to share 'the tragic American abortion 
experience', as he put it, with the people of Ireland, addressed readers as fellow 
citizens. The author offered a warning of how apparently popular anti-abortion 
feeling in the US had been over-ridden by the judiciary. Newspaper coverage of 
abortion provision in the US carried stories, he claimed, of 'children surviving 
the abortion procedure - only to be killed after birth'. They also carried what he 
described as 'frightful stories ... 
[of] women who suffer extreme psychological 
hardship and pain and permanent physical damage because of their abortion'. 
By drawing explicitly on largely negative press coverage of legal abortion in the 
US the congressman was indicating a parallel between Ireland and the US, in 
terms of popular anti-abortion feeling, and suggesting that this popular feeling 
was not considered by the US Supreme Court when they 'imposed' legal 
abortion on the American people. The publication of a letter of this sort, the 
tone of which is distinctly anxious, indicates press participation in the 
production of a popular 'panic' concerning the future and status of abortion 
law. 
The Threat from Europe 
The threat to the sovereignty of the people also came, through the courts, from 
Europe in this 'democratic' anti-abortion discourse. For example, a report 
published on the eve of the referendum on the controversial wording of the 
amendment included comments from the prominent law professor, barrister and 
right-wing political campaigner, William Binchy, to this effect: 
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Barrister Mr. William Binchy said the legal protection of the unborn 
was too fundamental a matter to be left to the European Commission 
or Court to resolve, especially when all the evidence indicated that 
these bodies favoured liberal abortion and would oppose laws that 
prevented it. ('Objections to form of words "are contrived"' Irish 
Press 6th September 1983, p. 4) 
The Irish Press drew on Mr. Binchy as a primary definer of what was at issue, 
and, in so doing, reproduced a 'commonsense' which associated Europe with 
liberalism in contrast with Irish conservative traditionalism. The people's 
sovereignty was constructed as threatened both by the national government and 
by international institutions. 4 Again, the construction of legal abortion as the 
threshold beyond which the nation could not survive is evident. The threats are 
thus constructed as multiple, and almost overwhelming, according to legal 
experts such as Mr. Binchy. A panicked popular reaction would appear 
reasonable in this construction. 
The Threat of Modernity (Feminism and Liberalism) 
Central to this 'republican democratic' theme was the construction of arguments 
in favour of abortion access, generally associated with feminism and liberalism, 
as unlrish, and indeed as a threat to the state. This went hand-in-hand with the 
marginalisation of 'pro-choice' and reproductive rights positions in the general 
coverage of the debate, as already mentioned. This construction relied on 
defining 'the unborn' as morally and ontologically equivalent to pregnant 
4The hostility of the anti-abortion right towards Europe can be explained not only by their 
fear that the Irish electorate would not be given an opportunity to vote on any possible 
changes to the law on abortion, but also by the fact that the right themselves lacked any 
significant power in Europe. While the anti-abortion campaign in Ireland had proved highly 
successful in 1983, due to the influential positions of many of its key figures in Irish public 
life, it could not hope to exert such influence at European level. 
107 
women, and consequently defining abortion as an act of murder, a 
characteristic strategy of anti-abortion discourse which positions women as 
threats to 'the unborn'. 5 In this context however, reproductive rights 
campaigners are also constructed as comparable to terrorists, as enemies of the 
nation-state. The activities of 'pro-choice' campaigners in general, and feminists 
in particular, were constructed as anathema to the Christian, pro-life nation, 
already discussed, and, as such, threatening those very principles upon which 
the state was established. 
The connection between campaigners against the amendment and those who 
favoured legalized 'killing' was constructed in and through the press coverage 
as 'what we all know', in other words as'commonsense': 
Not all those opposed to the amendment favour abortion but there is 
no doubt that many individuals and groups involved in the anti- 
amendment campaign do favour limited or unlimited killing of the 
unborn. (Irish Press, Letters to the Editor, 6th September 1983, p. 8) 
This letter-writer does not present any evidence to convince the reader of the 
claim made, but simply asserts it as beyond doubt. As Hall et al. (1978: 120- 
125) point out, the less argued the claim made, the more it necessarily appeals 
to popular commonsense. The agenda of those who favour 'killing', if 
successful, would destroy the nation, and consequently the nation-state: 
The fact is there is nothing to be lost by the amendment going 
through, but there are the lives of thousands of future citizens to be 
5See for example Luker 1984, Hadley 1996, Reagan 1997. As Petchesky has argued, the 
particular presentation of foetal imagery, not only in anti-abortion propaganda, but in 
medical practices such as ultra-sound scanning, depends on precisely this logic of abortion as 
equivalent to murder (1984: x-xi). 
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lost if it fails, an[d] this would diminish and degrade this noble nation 
... Are we going to 
forbid the children of the future by killing them in 
the womb. (Irish Press, Letter to the Editor, 6th September 1983, 
p. 8) 
This letter-writer evokes the national 'we' in his mode of address, employing 
nationalist discourse in his call to readers to defend the nation's future against 
the anti-amendment threat. Not only would the 'noble nation' be degraded, 
implicitly by abandoning its 'pro-life' values, but its very survival would be 
jeopardized by the possibility of legal abortion. 
This aspect of the anti-abortion articulation of a discourse of republican 
democracy was explicitly anti-modernist. For instance, Patrick Nolan, the Irish 
Times Religious Affairs Correspondent, began an opinion piece on the value of 
the proposed amendment with the following statement: 'I share the view of 
many people on both sides of the amendment debate that abortion is one of the 
great evils of the modern world' ('Why I am voting "Yes"' Irish Times, 6th 
September 1983, p. 6). Moreover, the following letter compared legal abortion 
with the holocaust: 
Many thousands of people have made tremendous sacrifices through 
prayer, time and money in an effort to ensure that the holocaust of 
murder [sic] of the innocents by abortion will never reach our shores. 
... 
[in the event of a Yes vote on the referendum] a fresh and fragrant 
breeze of hope and confidence will sweep away for ever the smell of 
corruption and death accompanying abortion and ... a new era of 
happiness will dawn for our beloved country. (Irish Times, Letters to 
the Editor, 29th August 1983, p, 11) 
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Again, the national 'we' is addressed here, a nation characterised by its struggle 
against modern, industrial-scale murder. The nation's future, argues the letter- 
writer, depends on the success of what he called 'this glorious project', namely 
the anti-abortion campaign. The PLAC is characterised as the inheritor of the 
republican legacy. This distinctively 'modern' anti-modernism emphasizes 
resistance to corruption as a progressive project. As Strathern points out, 
evoking 'tradition' in opposition to modernity can only be done through a 
'modern' agenda which makes society its project (1996: 40-41). 
What is at stake in this particular anti-abortion anti-feminist republicanism is 
the right-wing's narrative of nationhood, configured through a modernist 
discourse of national superiority over the colonial ruler. The national struggle 
for independence provides the justification not only for the establishment of the 
state and the conservative formation of its institutions and culture, but also for 
this latest campaign to bestow citizenship rights on 'the unborn'. When the 
nation's narrative is reassessed retrospectively, the referendum will have been 
discursively positioned so as to appear to be a necessary episode in the story of 
national liberation (Ricoeur 1981: 276-7). 
A key figure in this right-wing nationalist narrative is the vulnerable foetus, 
who is likened to the vulnerable nation, both apparently at risk from the 
'modem' feminist and liberal-inspired anti-amendment campaign. The republican 
nation-state's survival is essentially at stake, in this view. That the foetus was 
generally characterised as male in popular representations, and as an 
independent entity from the woman whose body was actively producing and 
nourishing 'him', 6 indicates a masculinised construction of the nation which 
necessarily depends on women's subordination through enforced maternity. 
6This is typical of anti-abortion discourse internationally, as discussed in Chapter Two 
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Thus, legal abortion was constructed as a deadly, and indeed colonial, threat to 
Irish values, the threshold beyond which the nation-state could not survive, in 
typical 'moral panic' terms. In this discourse, feminists advocating women's 
reproductive rights were constructed as having both an economic and a 
colonial interest in securing access to abortion for Irish women. They were 
characterized as an organized network aimed at undermining the norms of the 
state. The constitutional core of the state logically provided the site of conflict 
and resistance in this formulation. 
Republican Democracy and Equal Citizenship 
Those who provided competing definitions of what was at issue, the 'moral 
entrepreneurs', articulated their position mainly in relation to the primary 
flagging of republican democracy. It was through this theme that competing 
issues were raised, such as the effect the proposed amendment would have on 
women's rights; on freedom of speech and conscience; and even on the 'unity' 
characteristic of republican democracy. However, the failure of these 
competing definitions to deliver votes suggests the extreme difficulty of 
reframing the primary definition of the issues and defusing the emerging moral 
panic. 
Republicanism 
Our moral civil war, someone has called it. And given the bitterness, 
intimidation and division which the debate on the proposed 
constitutional amendment on abortion has generated, at virtually every 
level of our society, that seems a not inappropriate description. (Irish 
Press, Editorial, 29th August 1983, p. 8) 
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The most prominent, and arguably most successful, reformulation of what was 
at stake was that articulated for example by the above editorial comment, 
namely that the abortion debate was destroying national unity, a value at the 
heart of republican democracy. The national 'we' is clearly evoked and 
addressed by the Irish Press in an authoritative and emotive style, in order to 
condemn what the newspaper sees as the unnecessary and harmfully divisive 
anti-abortion campaign. Abortion, to which 'the vast majority in both parts of 
this country are vigorously opposed' (ibid) is characterised as a distraction 
from the important political issues of the day, particularly economic collapse 
and soaring unemployment. ' That divisive issues should be avoided in the 
interests of the 'common good' is an important element in republican politics 
(Whelan 1996: 59-65). This particular oppositional definition found widespread 
expression amongst mainstream participants in the public debate, most notably 
by the Fine Gael Taoiseach, Garret FitzGerald, whose party is generally 
associated with peripheral 'liberal' and middle class interests. 8 Also, the Minister 
for Defence, Michael Cooney, attempted to reassert a sense of national unity 
on the eve of the September referendum by calling for 'patriotism'. His address 
to a Fine Gael meeting was reported on the front page of the liberal Irish 
Tines. As he argued, '[i]f there has been bitterness over the past few weeks, if 
divisions run deep, then those involved have a patriotic duty to forget their 
bitterness and to close in the divisions' (Walsh, Dick 1983 'Bigger role for 
Supreme Court says Taoiseach' 6th September, p. 1). Thus opposition to the 
amendment campaign based on a republican concern for unity articulated a 
distinctly non-moral 'national' discourse, in contrast to the specifically moral 
nationhood in anti-abortion lobby discourse. 
7Brown (1985: 327) outlines the extent of the economic collapse at precisely the time of the 
PLAC, pointing out for example that unemployment rose by 77 per cent between 1979 and 
1982, from an already 'dangerously high' figure. By December 1984 unemployment stood at 
16.4 per cent of the labour force, and continued to rise thereafter. 
8See for example the front page coverage of the debate in the Irish Independent 28th April 
1983. 
112 
The latter were criticised from this perspective for producing the divisions 
which anti-amendment spokespeople were concerned to overcome, as the 
following letter indicates: 
As an Irishman who believes firmly in democracy, I would like to 
express my utter disgust at the manner that this amendment campaign 
developed. 
This unnecessary, ambiguous and totally confusing amendment 
wording did not come about as a result of popular demand, but rather 
because of clever opportunism on the part of a group of fanatics... 
Let us hope the people of this country will not be intimidated and 
blackmailed in this fashion and vote a resounding no on September 7. 
(Letters to the Editor, Irish Press, 29th August 1983, p. 8) 
Significantly, however, this letter was not written by a person of high standing; 
nor did it represent any activist group. It was the opinion of one reader, and did 
not substantially echo the concerns expressed across the news coverage as a 
whole. It may have been deemed worthy of printing for precisely these reasons, 
providing legitimacy for the press claim to provide a democratic forum for 
debate. 
A major discourse employed by anti amendment campaigners, and reflected in 
the press as a distinctly 'national' concern, was that the proposal to recognise 
foetal rights would undermine the republican values at the heart of the Irish 
state due to its explicitly sectarian and consequently divisive agenda, The 
employment of the term 'sectarian' has strong resonances in the Irish republican 
tradition. What the use of that term implied in this context was that the 
proposed amendment, if passed, would result in a political situation, not unlike 
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that defended by unionists in the north, which would further hinder the 
prospect of reunification. The religious tolerance which the republican tradition 
advocates, as captured in the famous aspiration of the United Irishmen to unite 
'Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter', would be undermined by a sectarian 
Constitution. 9 Victor Griffin, Dean of St. Patrick's Cathedral in Dublin 
(Protestant Church of Ireland) was quoted on the front page of the Irish Times, 
commenting on the Dail's acceptance of the wording for the proposed 'pro-life' 
constitutional amendment: '[o]ne would have to be naive indeed if one could 
not see that such a move was fraught with sectarian implications and would be 
seen as such by Protestant people in Northern Ireland' ('A bad day's work, says 
Dean Griffin' 28th April 1983, p. 1). 
The issue of sectarianism was intimately linked to the republican aspiration for 
national unity, both within the Republic and across the entire island. The Irish 
Press reported a statement made by Senator John Robb, himself elected as a 
representative of the north of Ireland, on the eve of the referendum: 
Sen. Robb said that in Northern Ireland the passing of the amendment 
would be interpreted as "the southern version of majority rule, or even 
worse, of minority rule should the poll be low, " It would result in the 
Constitution being a less unifying document that [sic] it was at 
present. 
He called on "those who cherish the need to promote the Constitution 
as a unifying force to vote 'No"'. (North doctors say vote Yes' 6th 
September 1983, p. 4) 
9As a letter writer to the Irish Times commented: 'At issue is not abortion but whether Ireland 
becomes a sectarian Catholic State. Whether the State is Maynooth [Catholic seminary] and 
Maynooth is the State. ' Philip Ryan, 29th August 1983, p. 11. 
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The perceived role of the republican Constitution expressed here was that it 
should function to promote unity over diversity. It should not promote the 
views, particularly the religious views, of one group over another, but should 
deal only with principles on which all could agree. This (notably republican) 
desire to promote unity over diversity was threatened by the proposed 
amendment. As Senator Robb reportedly put it, the inevitable result of passing 
the referendum would be to reproduce in the south the 'majority rule' regime in 
power in the north at that time. Not only would this have a detrimental effect 
on northern perceptions of the south, but it would alienate minorities within the 
south. The republican ideal of national unity would inevitably suffer. 
Although this position acknowledged division within the nation over abortion, 
as evidenced by the sectarian charge, it nevertheless demanded national unity, 
although not in religious terms. Explicit in the press reportage of this 
perspective was that opponents of the amendment who expressed it were 
nevertheless opposed to abortion, and would not like to see it legally available 
in Ireland. Thus, the charge that the proposed amendment was sectarian was 
prominent in the press coverage during 1983 primarily because it was 
articulated in a national idiom. 
Democracy 
An emphasis on democracy was latent in feminist interventions in the press 
coverage of the debate. In particular, the absence of any consideration of 
women by the primary framers of the debate, and indeed the often abusive 
attitude to women by those key figures, were implicitly criticised in democratic 
terms. For example, the Irish Press carried a report, on the eve of the 
September referendum, of a speech made by the Anti-Amendment Campaign 
(AAC) leader, Anne O'Donnell: 
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Speaking at the final press conference of the Anti-Amendment 
Campaign, Mr. [sic] O'Donnell said that a strong No vote would deter 
the "lunatic fringe" within the pro-amendment lobby from their stated 
intentions to attempt to close family planning clinics, take action 
against women seeking abortions in England and their attempts to 
make the IUD (coil), morning after pill and low-dose pill illegal. 
('Group accept defeat but urge No vote' 6th September 1983, p. 4) 
Women's specific right to life was not explicitly at issue here. The focus was 
rather on the right to travel and to obtain contraception. This attempt to raise 
issues which concern women's citizenship rights was couched in practical 
terms, and only implicitly engaged with the issue of democracy. It did not call 
for any change in the law on abortion, again apparently accepting the primary 
assertion of popular anti-abortion feeling. However, the effects the amendment 
would have on women's rights were explicitly stressed, the implication being 
that women's rights to travel and to bodily integrity were basic rights accorded 
to citizens in democratic contexts. Nonetheless, the report was entitled 'Groups 
accept defeat... ', indicating an editorial construction of the failure of this 
strategy to make any substantial impact on the 'popular' account of what was at 
issue. 
The Irish Press carried a very short report on public criticism of a Bishop's 
comment on the issues involved in the 'pro-life' referendum, which also 
indicates the marginal press space given to feminist interventions in the debate. 
The chairwoman of the Employment Equality Agency, Ms. Sylvia 
Meehan, yesterday criticised the Bishop of Clonfert, Dr. Cassidy, for 
repeating the "cheap and cruel slogan" that the most dangerous place 
to be is "in the mother's womb. " 
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Ms. Meehan, who was chairing an Anti-Amendment Campaign 
meeting of concerned women in Dublin, hit out at the "cruelty, 
[v]ulgarity and total insensitivi[ty]" of the Bishop's statement, made 
during a radio interview yesterday. ('Bishop is criticised on "slogan"' 
6th September 1983, p. 4) 
Although the failure of democracy effected by the exclusion of women from the 
primary framing of the issues involved wasn't explicitly raised in this report, the 
criticism it contains could only have significance in the light of the already 
established connection between abortion and republican democracy, specifically 
constructed in terms of the right of the 'people' to participate in the process of 
law-making. However, the brevity and marginality of this reported criticism of 
the Catholic Church, primary framers of the debate in 1983, indicates that 
democratic theme was not taken up by the newspaper as 'popular'. 
McCarthyism 
There was, said Mr. O'Connell, a "whiff of McCarthyism" about the 
campaign. This was designed to "contain people politically and 
neutralise them" so that when it came to dealing with other issues such 
as divorce their views would be dismissed. (Hogan, Tracey 1983 
'Kelly stand "insulting to thousands"' Irish Independent, 6th 
September, p. 5) 
Some newspaper reports and letters pointed to the perception that those 
attempting to oppose the primary definition of what was at stake felt 
themselves to be subjects of a McCarthyist witch-hunt. The implication was 
that they were presumed to be plotting the destruction of Ireland and its way of 
life. For example, the above report contained comments from former Fine Gael 
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Senator Maurice O'Connell making this argument. Not only were those with 
competing moral enterprises unable to substantially reconfigure the hegemonic 
account of the significance of abortion in the press, they actually felt targeted 
by primary definers of the issue, and effectively silenced. The accusation of 
McCarthyism explicitly attempted to thematise the collaboration between the 
anti-abortion movement, the State, and the media, in producing a highly 
circumscribed debate which defined what could be said in the public debate, not 
least by producing a sense of 'panic', in such a way as to promote a popular 
sense of urgency to protect the nation, and the republic, from an apparently 
imminent abortion threat. 
The definition of what counted as McCarthyism, however, depended on how 
far the primary account of the issues at stake was contested. For example, a 
comment from the Minister for Health and Social Welfare, Barry Desmond, 
was reported by the Irish Independent: '[h]e felt the accusation of 
McCarthyism was in some cases justified, because anti-Amendment people, 
who actually opposed abortion, were being accused of being pro-abortion' 
(Blackwell, Annette 1983 'Divisions within Govt. parties widen over 
Amendment' 29th August, p. 9). What the Minister defined as 'McCarthyism', 
and what he objected to, was that the freedom to speak from an anti- 
amendment position was being restricted by false accusations that anti- 
amendment people were necessarily 'pro-abortion'. Thus, the Minister did not 
find it objectionable that freedom of speech may have been restricted in cases 
where speakers were actually 'pro-abortion', or favoured women's reproductive 
freedom. This indicates the hegemony of the anti-abortion construction of 
national identity and republican democracy. The obstacles to a 'popular' 
concern for women's reproductive rights in a national press which was actively 
engaged in producing a 'moral panic' about abortion access are demonstrated 
here. 
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Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion has outlined the primary definition of the abortion 
debate evident in press coverage of the 1983 anti-abortion referendum 
campaign. The explicit framing of the debate in the press through a particular 
discourse of nationhood successfully marginalised competing constructions of 
the issues at stake, particularly any concern with the effect the amendment 
might have on women's rights. Furthermore, women were not specifically 
addressed through the press coverage as a group with a particular interest in 
the debate. 
The hegemony of this anti-abortion discourse can be understood as an effect of 
the press's role in the production of a 'moral panic'. Abortion was constructed 
as the threshold beyond which Irish society could not survive, particularly by 
establishing an association between colonised nationhood and the image of the 
vulnerable male foetus; the anti-abortion campaign with the heroic republican 
tradition; and the anti-amendment campaign with the destruction and evil 
characteristic of modernity, particularly in the guise of feminism. The press 
played a distinctly political role in privileging anti-abortion discourse, 
positioning the latter as defender of the Catholic/Christian, familial, anti- 
eugenic nation at the heart of republican democracy. While the centrality of 
republicanism in the press coverage provided space for criticism of the 
proposed amendment as sectarian, this did not challenge the anti-abortion 
construction of the nation as morally unified, or as anti-abortion per se, The 
'panic' effect of this hegemonic construction facilitated what was referred to as 
a 'McCarthyist' political climate, which silenced anti-amendment opposition, 
and specifically any concerns for women's citizenship to which the proposed 
amendment gave rise. 
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Thus, the press coverage indicates the proximity of the anti-abortion lobby to 
social and political power. The status of this lobby in providing the primary 
definition of what was at stake in abortion law facilitated a departure from the 
general press concern with 'balanced' reportage. In other words, the mass 
media's concern with demonstrating its position as a key element of a 
democratic society, particularly through reporting 'both sides' of a 'debate' was 
absent in the coverage of the 1983 campaign. Concerns about democracy were 
themselves defined by the anti-abortion lobby, in terms of the need to facilitate 
'the people's will' on abortion. Thus, the press were not concerned with 
ensuring significant represention of the views of PLAC's opponents, since such 
views were already constructed, in the primary terms established by the anti- 
abortion lobby, as anathema to democracy. 
Thus, the press coverage of the 1983 campaign illustrates the tensions upon 
which anti-abortion hegemony rested at that moment. On the one hand the 
campaign to recognise a foetal right to life was constructed in the press as 
essentially democratic, since it was reportedly concerned with ensuring official 
recognition of the people's sovereignty in matters of morality. However, on the 
other hand this apparently democratic campaign depended on an authoritarian 
view of the relationship between morality and the law, as well as of the 
apparently anti-abortion nation, specifically as it was constructed through 
discourses of gender and sexuality, 
The impact of the X case on this anti-abortion national 'commonsense' will be 
considered in Chapter Four. The apparent stability of right-wing hegemony, 
constructed as a defence against modernity, in the form of feminism and 
liberalism, was ultimately undone through the impact of events in 1992, when 
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the tensions at the heart of the anti-abortion articulation of anti-colonial politics 
undermined, at least temporarily, that discursive hegemony. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE X CASE IN THE PRESS: 
A RUPTURED MORAL PANIC 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the ways in which an anti-abortion 
commonsense was produced in press coverage of the 1983 'pro-life' 
constitutional amendment campaign, primarily through the orchestration of a 
'moral panic'. A failure to recognise foetal rights was constructed as threatening 
to the very survival of the nation, itself characterized as 'pro-life', traditionalist, 
familial, specifically Catholic and generally Christian. Republican democracy 
itself, defined in terms of popular sovereignty and the promotion of the 
'common good', was judged to be at stake in the referendum. The specific 
configuration of traditional familial Irishness was, however, based on a number 
of contradictions. Firstly, national traditionalism was constructed through a 
distinctly 'modern' discourse which emphasized the 'civilizing' effects of 
Christianity. Secondly, the articulation of an anti-abortion republican 
democratic discourse insisted that 'the people' must be recognized as sovereign, 
while dissenting perspectives either on the value of the proposed constitutional 
amendment or on abortion access were actively restrained through the press. 
This chapter will consider the ways the 1992 X case crisis ruptured the tensions 
upon which this anti-abortion national commonsense relied. The following 
discussion will also examine how a discourse of 'pro-life' nationhood was 
reproduced in the press coverage of that crisis. Finally, the effect of the X case 
on the classic moral panic trajectory will be assessed. 
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Coverage of the X Case and Abortion Politics 
As outlined in the Introduction to this Part, five days of newspaper coverage 
provide the focus for discussion in this chapter. The temporal shifts in 
commonsense attitudes to abortion during the course of 1992 are significant, 
changing considerably from the intense coverage of February and March, to a 
reduced interest in May, and finally a dearth of attention by November. As this 
chapter will demonstrate, this decline in media coverage was connected to a 
gradual reconfiguration of abortion commonsense in the wake of the X case. 
The initial coverage of the case in February and March was overwhelming, and 
dominated the political landscape. Further events during May, notably the story 
that a man was attempting to obtain an injunction to prevent his pregnant ex- 
girlfriend from travelling to Britain for an abortion, reconstructed the moral- 
political issues at stake in national-popular terms. Press attention to the 
Bishop's statement during that month, advising the public on how to vote on 
the Maastricht Treaty, again saw the articulation of a reconfigured national 
abortion commonsense. By November 1992, when the three referendums on 
Constitutional amendments concerning abortion law were held, press coverage 
was minimal, suggesting depoliticization of abortion through the production of 
a new hegemonic national abortion discourse. The following discussion will 
trace thematic shifts in the reproduction of that discourse in relation to 
previously established anti-abortion hegemony. 
Key Themes 
Four major themes structured newspaper coverage of the X case and its 
aftermath. Firstly, press treatment of the extraordinary public reaction to the 
case, and the consequent shifting moral terrain of abortion politics, continued 
to be principally informed by the familial construction of the nation, 
emphasizing the inviolate nature of the national family. Secondly, the nation 
was constructed as 'compassionate', a theme which emerged in response to the 
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politicization of child rape and consequent pregnancy that the X case produced. 
Thirdly, the nation continued to be constructed as 'pro-life', although 
reconfigured in response to a new emphasis on the risk of suicide in girls and 
women experiencing crisis pregnancies. Finally, republican democracy was 
prominently thematized in the press coverage, in terms which placed new 
emphasis on pluralism, i. e., internal moral differences, together with a new 
concern with women's rights. The specific formulation of these themes through 
the press, and the political effect of this reformulation, will be discussed in what 
follows. 
The X Case in the National Press: Popular Political Culture in Crisis 
What audience, Whose Nation? 
In contrast to the 1983 debate, explicit feminist discourse was not only evident 
in 1992, but often provided primary definitions of what was at stake, 
particularly during February and March, in direct commentary on the two court 
rulings published in that period. For the first time abortion was debated in 
terms of women's rights, as will be illustrated below. The primary definition of 
the X case and the issues it raised were not now provided by the 'pro-life' 
lobby, but rather by reproductive rights activists, women's organizations, 
opposition (left/liberal) politicians, as well as by artists and musicians, ' all 
constructed in distinctly 'national' terms. 2 In a reversal of the 1983 situation, the 
'pro-life' lobby engaged with, and to some extent began to co-opt, feminist 
INewspapers reported, for example, on a roadside protest by actors, which attacked state 
patriarchy by staging a display of masculine authoritarian officialdom in contrast to pregnant 
women. State fascism was particularly suggested by the reported employment of 'German 
shepherd dogs' (see Battersby, Eileen 1992 'Protesters march on Dail' Irish Times 18th 
February p. 7). 
2lndeed, the Irish Times emphasised the presence of 'respectable' people on marches and 
rallies, such as elderly women and men (Battersby, Eileen 1992 'Protesters march on Dail' 
Irish Times 18th February p. 7). 
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discourse. The impact that strategy had on popular anti-abortion commonsense 
will be considered in what follows. 
Familial Nationhood and the State 
The primary construction of the X case itself, and particularly the High Court 
injunction, was that the familial nation, in the form of X and her parents, had 
been violated by the State. A major consequence of this construction was a 
newly popular condemnation of the anti-abortion lobby. 
State violation of the Family 
The state has created a prison ... 
in which the family of the 14-year- 
old victim of alleged rape, together with the girl herself, have to suffer 
for being the entirely innocent victims of sexual violence of the worst 
kind. (Irish Independent, Editorial, 18th February 1992, p. 10) 
In the immediate aftermath of the High Court decision being published in 
February 1992, national press coverage of popular outrage focused on 
assertions that this was not what the people had intended when they ratified the 
Eighth Amendment in 1983. As various newspaper reports put it, the nation 
had not voted for a child's life to be ruined by enforced pregnancy. Not only 
had this happened, but parental faith in the State and its institutions had been 
damaged, as children and families themselves were now threatened with 
imprisonment. The previous hegemony of an anti-abortion discourse which 
relied on defining national identity in familial terms, and pregnant women in 
domestic maternal terms, was thus apparently thrown into confusion as that 
very lobby's success had resulted in the official violation of a law-abiding 
family. 
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The abuse suffered by X and her family at the hands of the State extended to 
the nation, described as 'the community at large'. 3 For example, the Irish 
Independent reported the following statement from Michael McDowell, the 
chairman of the small centrist Progressive Democrats political party, in 
response to the injunction: 'I believe the court application was an unwarranted 
attack on the constitutional right, privacy and dignity of a wounded but 
innocent family and by extension on the community at large' (Dowling, Brian, 
1992 'Outrage as court bans abortion for girl', 18th February, p. 1,9). This 
report regretted the damaging consequences the injunction would have for 'the 
girl and her family, all girls and women, men, our values, our self-respect, and 
our standing among civilized people'. Thus, Ireland's standing among civilized 
people was defined, as it had been during 1983, in terms of its familial ethos. 
The State's actions in the X case, however, had failed to respect that ethos, and 
had thereby turned the State and its people into 'monsters on the world stage', 
as the Campaign to Separate Church and State reportedly claimed (Dowling, 
Brian 1992 "'Nightmare scenario" warning in ruling fury' Irish Independent 
18th February, p. 9). The State had not only failed to protect vulnerable children 
and their families, it was actively prosecuting and criminalising them. As the 
Irish Press editorial asked, if the family concerned hadn't returned to Ireland on 
3The emphasis on constructing the High Court injunction as an affront to a familial nation 
can be seen, for example, in the layout of the front page of the Irish Press on 18th February. 
The main front page report on the judgment was flanked on the left by a photograph of a 
smiling Kathleen Reynolds, wife of Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, and a short introduction to 
Albert's interview with Hello! magazine about his marriage, and his 'life and times'. On the 
left of the page was a photograph of a smiling nurse holding a three year old, and smelling a 
daffodil, "which the child was giving her. The caption referred to Daffodil Day in aid of 
cancer sufferers. The report itself concentrated on a statement from opposition TD Nuala 
Fennell, who called, in a personal statement, for the amendment to be dropped, since this 
'witch hunt' of young rape victims was not what the people had voted for. The comment also 
characterised the family concerned as law abiding. This combination of factors emphasizing 
marriage, children, family, and indeed 'pro-life' values, in the Daffodil Day reference, while 
reporting critically on the High Court injunction, suggests the particular set of national- 
familial commonsenses which were in play in the newspaper coverage of the case. The 
Taoiseach, leading the party this paper supported, was clearly distinct from the judiciary in 
the coverage (O'Reilly, Emily, and Muldoon, Paul 1992 'Abortion: Dail Moves: TDs plan 
queries on judgment' Irish Press 18th February, p. 1). 
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learning of the injunction against them, would they have been imprisoned? 
(18th February 1992, p. 8). The implication was that such a scenario was both 
possible and unjust. 4 
Central to this national-familial discourse was a particular construction of 
childhood, in the figure of X herself, as sexually innocent and consequently 
vulnerable. For example, the Irish Times reported the reaction of ADAPT, a 
Limerick Women's Support Group, whose spokeswoman insisted that X was 
not a girl, but was rather a child (Cummins, Mary 1992 'Women's Groups warn 
fewer will report rape' 18th February, p. 7). Similarly, a letter writer argued that 
the State was now holding 'girl-children' prisoner, by a judicial action 
equivalent to a violent rape of the 'young girl and her family', as a result of'Irish 
fundamentalism' (Dr. Geraldine Sheridan, Irish Times 18th February 1992, 
p13). 
Following the Supreme Court's decision to lift the injunction on appeal, the 
question of State abuse of children remained prominent. For example, Emily 
O'Reilly, political journalist with the Irish Press, argued that: 
Yesterday's judgment means that a young girl in a similar situation, 
but not deemed suicidal, would lawfully be injuncted from seeking an 
abortion abroad. In effect the State would be forcing that child to have 
a rapist's baby. ('One step forward and two steps back' 6th March 
1992, p. 6) 
4A prominent slogan carried by the press was 'SPUC the State, SPUC the govt., SPUC off. 
The word play here, which associates the State and the government with the anti-abortion 
right wing at the same time as attacking them, demonstrates the way the national press 
participated in the attack on the patriarchal state, while at the same time constructing the 
nation, in the person of X, as mistreated and abused by that state. 
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This draws quite a specific parallel between the State's action in violating the 
autonomy of the family, and the violence and effects of the rape itself. 
The State and the Anti Abortion Lobby 
Press coverage of the apparent betrayal of the familial nation and its children 
through the actions of the State also focused on the anti-abortion lobby, who 
were condemned for their deceptive claims during 1983 that a constitutional 
recognition of a right to life for 'the unborn' would have no effect on abortion 
law as it had previously been administered. 
The new unpopularity of anti-abortion groups was evidenced in the coverage of 
their reaction to the High Court injunction. SPUC, for example, reportedly 
claimed that X and her family were being exploited by the 'pro-abortion lobby', 
that they had been set up by the Gardai and the Attorney General, in order to 
liberalize abortion law. The State, in other words, was portrayed as 
collaborating with what SPUC termed 'the referral trade', namely reproductive 
rights activists. The State should, in SPUC's view, criminalise that trade, rather 
than either criminalising'the girls' who travel for abortions, or changing the law 
to provide for abortion access (Keena, Colm 1992 'SPUC slams "exploitation"' 
Irish Press 18th February, p. 6). However, editorial resistance to this position 
was clearly indicated. In this particular example the article's headline placed the 
word 'exploitation' in inverted commas. The marginalisation of this claim was 
evident across the coverage at this point in time. 5 
Thus, the anti-abortion lobby's reliance on a nationhood discourse of traditional 
familism undermined it's own legitimacy, as the effects of its campaigning 
5For example, the Irish independent's coverage of this claim by SPUC was minimal, placed 
in an article under the headline 'A disaster for women says UK help group'. Another article 
on the SPUC reaction was entitled'SPUC chief "happy"', a construction which could be 
nothing but shocking in the context (Irish Independent, 18th February 1992, p. 9). 
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ultimately led to an official violation of a particular national family, Not only 
had the State infringed parental authority over children, it appeared to have 
endorsed and reinforced the violence of the rapist in so doing. Ultimately, the 
discourse of familial nationhood championed by the anti-abortion lobby had 
produced popular pressure to allow for abortions in situations such as the X 
case. 
National Compassion: Abortion and Sexual Innocence 
The X case coverage highlighted the effects of sexual violence in terms which 
relied on constructing the nation as 'compassionate'. The State was pressurized 
to recognize this national compassion specifically in treating child victims of 
rape. The anti-abortion lobby's view that abortion is never justified, including in 
cases of rape or incest, was marginalised in the coverage. This opened up a 
debate on the treatment of rape victims in general. However, this new element 
in popular abortion discourse did not ultimately translate into a call for abortion 
access in Ireland, as the following discussion will illustrate. 
Compassion for child rape victims 
A major feature of the post-X case rupture in popular morality was that 
abortion in cases involving the rape of young girls, including cases of incest, 6 
was for the first time regarded as morally permissible in the national press. For 
example, the Irish Independent, referring to the X case as the 'child rape' case, 
argued as follows in its editorial: 
Though it is easy to condemn, in blanket terms, abortion in every 
shape and form, there are clearly circumstances - one of which is 
6Incest connoted rape of a child by an adult family member. The close connection between 
the X case and concerns about incest is sugested, for instance, by Edna O'Brien's (1996) 
fictionalized account of the X case, where she transformed it into a story of a 14 year old girl 
who was raped and made pregnant by her father. 
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before us all at the present time - when humanity, the health of the 
pregnant girl, possibly her sanity - are at stake, and where the 
inflexible terms of the amendment and its impact on the law and the 
judges in our courts are far from the intention of many of the 850,000 
voters who supported the admirable but unexplored 'right to life' 
principle, which in practice has turned out to be a potential 
punishment of innocence. (18th February 1992, p. 10) 
The paper took the public/national voice in expressing its rejection of the 
previous anti-abortion commonsense. However, this rejection did not extend to 
justifying legal abortion per se, only legal abortion in exceptional 
circumstances, on compassionate grounds, implicitly those of 'child rape' and 
incest.? The editorial referred to and agreed with the misgivings of the 
Protestant Churches on banning abortion in these exceptional circumstances. 
What was termed the 'vague and narrow moral fervour' of the 'pro-life' 
campaign was blamed for obscuring the serious issues relating to child rape and 
incest (ibid. ). 
The status of X as a child and consequently a sexually innocent victim of rape 
effectively disqualified her from the status of motherhood, which was usually 
central to the construction of pregnant women in the abortion debate. ' The 
7As Mary Banotti reportedly said, special compassionate provisions should be made in 
situations of rape or incest (O'Reilly, Emily 1992 'Opposition in calls for Govt. Clarification' 
Irish Press, 18th February, p. 6). Furthermore, the Irish Press editorial on abortion on 5th 
May 1992 called for legislative action in the following terms: 'So, the inexorable forces of 
logic are forcing us to face the abortion question squarely. We will need great courage - and 
God's kind guidance - to emerge with our decency and our compassion intact' (p. 6). This 
suggests that abortion could be legalised in a decent, compassionate, and even religious way, 
not necessarily at odds with the nation's ethos. However, constructing the issue in these terms 
seems problematic as a political strategy, since it is not necessarily consonant with pluralist 
egalitarian principles. 
8Although this was contested, for example, by the dissenting judgment of Justice Hederman 
in the Supreme Court decision on the X case appeal. He argued that 'The state must, in 
principle, act in accordance with the mother's duty to carry out the pregnancy and, in 
principle, must also outlaw termination of pregnancy' (Irish Press'Hcderman backs High 
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very description 'pregnant child' seemed a contradiction in terms, which only 
the termination of her pregnancy could resolve. The general tone of press 
reports focused on public outrage over the idea that the State was enforcing a 
raped girl/child to carry a pregnancy to term. Emily O'Reilly, writing in the 
Irish Press on the Supreme Court's decision, commented as follows: 
The level of public anger stemmed both from the fact that a raped girl 
was being forced by the State to have the rapist's baby against her will, 
and from the fact that her freedom to travel to perform a lawful act in 
another jurisdiction was removed. ('One step forward and two steps 
back' 6th March 1992, p. 6) 
Although the popular 'commonsense' articulated by O'Reilly on the morality of 
abortion in cases of child rape was absent for the Supreme Court judgments, 
this absence did not provide the focus of newspaper attention, at least in the 
immediate aftermath of the decision. Rather, the tone of reportage was one of 
relief and admiration, as captured in the Irish Times editorial headline praising 
the judgments: 'Enlightened, Scrupulous, Humane, Noble' (6th March 1992, 
p. 19). 
Newspaper treatment of the X case involved a general concern over the 
situation of pregnant raped girls and women of any age, largely through 
reported concerns that the X case injunction presented a barrier to reporting 
rape, as girls and women fearing possible pregnancy would not now risk 
drawing official attention to their situation. 9 For example, politicians such as 
Court Order' 6th March 1992, p. 5). However, this judgment was not quoted prominently in 
the press. For example, although this was the second judgment of the five to be delivered, the 
Irish Press reported it as though it were last, thereby marginalising its significance. 
9 See for example, O'Reilly, Emily (1992) 'Opposition in calls for Govt Clarification' Irish 
Press 18th February, p. 6. 
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Alan Shatter (Fine Gael TD) and Mary Banotti (MEP) were reportedly 
concerned over this, and argued that special provisions should be made to 
allow for abortion in situations of rape or incest. 10 The Irish Family Planning 
Association also reportedly argued that rape victims should not be forced to 
remain pregnant, particularly when their lives were in danger. The State, they 
claimed, had a duty to protect rape victims, and should therefore remove 
deterrents on rape reporting (Irish Press, 'Decision "is inconsistent with 
concept of justice"' 18th February 1992, p. 7). Indeed, an article covering 
feminist reaction in Britain referred to the British Pregnancy Advisory Service's 
warning that back street abortions would rise as a result of fear of reporting 
rape to the police (Irish Independent, 'A disaster for women says UK help 
group' 18th February 1992, p. 9). 
Rape, Pregnancy and the Right to Travel 
Despite the new emphasis on the treatment accorded to rape victims, however, 
the coverage of abortion access during 1992 generally shifted focus towards 
the need to support pregnant rape victims by restoring the right to travel, rather 
than by providing abortion access within Ireland. For example, Des O'Malley, 
leader of the Progressive Democrats political party, was reportedly concerned 
about 'the right to travel of rape victims and others' following the Supreme 
Court judgment (Tynan, Maol Muire, 1992 'Implications need to be faced, say 
politicians' Irish Times 6th March, p. 11). 
This confusion in the national press over the direction abortion discourse 
should take, between allowing rape victims access abortion and reinstating the 
right to travel, can be seen in the Irish Independent's editorial on the Supreme 
Court's decision to lift the injunction: '[t]he Supreme Court yesterday set forth 
10See also Shatter, Alan (1992) 'Difficult issues still remain to be resolved' Irish Times, 6th 
March, p. 13. 
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their reasons for deciding that a young victim of rape, who had become 
pregnant, should be permitted to travel to Britain to have an abortion' (6th 
March 1992, p. 12). The editorial priority given here to the 'pregnant victim of 
rape' aspect wrongly implies that this provided the basis for the court's 
decision, i. e., that X's right to travel had been vindicated because she had been 
raped. The significance of this inflection contrasts with the legal justification 
itself, which was limited solely to the argument that her right to life was 
threatened by the pregnancy, since she was suicidal. The editorial continues, 
'[t]hat [lifting the injunction] was widely anticipated and it is welcome'. The 
distinctly instructive tone here is significant, as the newspaper appears to 
actively construct a new abortion commonsense, based on the idea that child- 
rape victims should be able to avail themselves of abortions, by restoring their 
right to travel. 
There were reported criticisms of this implication that the uncertainty over 
abortion morality produced by the X case should be resolved by reinstating the 
right to travel, rather than by allowing for legal abortion in Ireland. For 
example, the academic lawyer Conor Gearty, in an article in the Irish Times, 
outlined the range of options. Either the State could introduce some form of 
legal abortion, he argued, or, '[w]e can continue to live in a fairyland of moral 
righteousness, relying like moral parasites on English sin to get us off the hook 
when the hard cases come along' ('Ruling means our Victorian legislation on 
abortion could prove unconstitutional' 6th March 1992, p. 18). The 'hard 
cases" he refers to implicitly include the X case. 12 However, this position was 
marginally covered by the national press. 
1I The phrase 'hard cases make bad law' was a major slogan of the 1983 anti-abortion 
campaign. 
12A letter published by the Irish Times on 6th March 1992, following the Supreme Court 
ruling, also took this line, although from the perspective of the English nation addressing the 
Irish nation, in order to request that Ireland deal with its own moral issues. As the writer put 
it: 'It is with sorrow that I write to Ireland ... Please, we have to live with our own grief and 
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The right to travel in order to obtain an abortion was not, however, to be 
confined to pregnant victims of rape. For example, the reports in May 1992 
that a man was attempting to injunct a former girlfriend from travelling to 
Britain for an abortion, a case unconnected to rape, suggested that the right to 
travel had by this stage become disconnected from the need to provide a 
'compassionate' response to rape. There was little public outrage over this case, 
and the government was reluctant to become involved, arguing initially that this 
was a private matter. The case involved a conflict between a woman's right to 
travel and a foetal right to life. The primary definition of the issues involved 
was again provided by feminists and liberals. The Irish Press reported the plea 
from the Well Woman Centre for women with a crisis pregnancy to seek 
professional counselling (English, Bernie 1992 "'It was bound to happen" says 
McDowell' 5th May, p. 4). This appeal was made without any reference to rape. 
For example, the Irish Press editorial argued, '[i]f ... the view prevails that 
termination should be allowed in certain cases, then we must face up to that 
too' (5th May 1992, p. 6). The growing legitimacy of reproductive rights 
discourse can be seen in this consideration of the right to travel independently 
from the treatment of pregnant rape victims. 13 
Reformulation of the Anti-Abortion Position in the Press 
A major moment of media interest in conservative anti-abortion discourse in 
the wake of the X case came when the Bishops issued a statement on the moral 
issues involved in voting in the Maastricht referendum. While it appeared that 
the Bishops had again become primary definers of the issues at stake in 
abortion law, their statement was reported in terms of the disrupted moral 
compromise. It is wrong for us to import more ... Ireland must go through the pain of 
working out its own solution, just as we had to' (J. Ansell, Northampton, England, Letters to 
the Editor, p. 19). 
13The injunction was not pursued by the man in question. 
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climate. Press coverage emphasized the Bishop's recognition of the distinction 
between law and morality, a distinction which the Bishop's statement itself 
actually limited by stressing the impact the law generally has on public 
morality. 14 However, the press interpreted the statement as ultimately 
recommending that individuals must follow their consciences in casting their 
votes, rather than rely on the Bishops for direction. While the press constructed 
the statement as implying that abortion law was morally complex, and that 
voters should follow their consciences on it, in fact the statement condemned 
the idea of legally available abortion, including in circumstances of rape. 
However, the Bishops couched this condemnation in apparently feminist terms: 
'[t]o end this life [conceived through rape] by abortion is a further violation of 
the woman's body and may only increase her distress' (Irish Independent "'The 
abortion dilemma"' 27th May 1992, p. 13). This relied on a contradictory logic, 
which on the one hand emphasized the embodied context of pregnancy in 
claiming that abortion constitutes a violation of women in a way comparable to 
rape, while on the other, asserted the right to life of the foetus by implicitly 
relying on a characterization of 'the unborn' as independent of the pregnant 
woman's body. As the Bishops insisted, '[h]uman life is at its most defenseless 
in the womb, and has a right to receive the protection of the law' (ibid. ). Thus, 
the contradiction, while indicating a degree of vulnerability to feminist 
discourse, was employed precisely in order to reassert a misogynist agenda. 
Press coverage of this statement took a distinctly critical tone, including from 
feminist perspectives. Indeed, the seriousness of the Bishop's call for a new 
14As the statement put it: 'Many actions which are immoral are not prohibited by the State, 
because attempts to prohibit them could lead to an unacceptable infringement of the personal 
liberty of citizens in a free society, and could bring the law into disrepute. Nevertheless, the 
law has a clear influence on moral judgments and a change in the law can lead to a change in 
moral attitudes. The question for legislators and, in the case of the Constitution, for voters, is 
how to frame legislation which does not weaken the principle of respect for unborn human 
life' (Irish Independent "'The abortion dilemma": Bishops call for a new pro-life amendment' 
27th May 1992, p. 13). 
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amendment was questioned by the newspapers themselves. 15 Other than 
welcoming the Bishop's apparent recognition that they should not dictate to the 
electorate in matters concerning the law, the coverage was on the whole 
critical. For example, the Irish Press quoted Proinsias de Rossa, TD, 
(Democratic Left), who argued that the Bishops had learned nothing from the 
X case, pointing out that a new amendment would result in teenage rape 
victims being further humiliated and degraded by being dragged before the 
courts. As he put it: 
The Bishops would once again appear to be out of touch with the 
thinking of the Irish people, a number of recent opinion polls have 
shown substantial majorities in favour of the legalization of abortion in 
certain circumstances. (Carey, Mairead 1992 'Resist pressure, says 
TD' 27th May, p. 5) 
This characterizes the general treatment the statement received, apart from a 
political relief that, as the Irish Independent put it, 'They didn't say Yes ... 
but 
they didn't say No' (Downey, James, 27th May 1992, p. 13). 
Thus, it would seem that the circumstances and coverage of the X case 
highlighted the complexity of abortion decisions, by underlining the situation of 
pregnant rape victims. On the one hand, this produced a demand for official 
recognition of national compassion when dealing with rape victims, which 
sometimes led to demands for legal abortion in Ireland, particularly in cases of 
impossible motherhood, as in the 'child rape' scenario provided by the X case. 
However, on the other hand, the pressure for access to abortion for rape 
victims shifted towards pressure for the restoration of women's right to travel. 
"See for example the Irish Independent's editorial, 'The Bishops', 27th May 1992, p. 14. 
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This significantly confused the direction popular abortion discourse might have 
otherwise taken following the X case. The right to travel would effectively 
provide access to abortion for rape victims, as well as women in general with 
crisis pregnancies. However, the concentration on the issue of rape did provide 
legitimation for a broader emphasis on women's rights, as can be seen, for 
example, in the press attention given to statements from women's 
organizations, as well as in the coverage of the Bishop's inconsistent attempt to 
appropriate feminist discourse for anti-feminist objectives. This would suggest 
that there was a distinct shift towards consideration of women's rights in 
commonsense opinion on abortion law. 
The 'Pro-Life' Nation: Anti-Abortion-on-Demand 
Press coverage of the X case continued to rely on a construction of the nation 
as 'pro-life', although in less absolutist terms than had characterized 1983 
abortion politics. Specifically, the issue of suicide, although not initially central 
to the press coverage of popular outrage over the X case, became increasingly 
so following the Supreme Court's decision that her pregnancy constituted a 
threat to X's right to life, due to causing a risk of self-destruction. 
The Supreme Court argued that if a threat of suicide was deemed 'real and 
substantial', that would be sufficient for the State to vindicate the right to life of 
the'mother'. The response from feminists and 'pro-choice' liberals was generally 
described in the press as a 'cautious welcome', as the possible clash of rights 
between a pregnant woman and a foetus was newly emphasised. 16 For example, 
the Irish Independent printed the phrase 'There is a necessity to apply a priority 
of rights' at the foot of the page carrying the judgment texts (6th March 1992, 
p. 8). However, the limit imposed by the judgment, which allowed for legal 
16Sce for example, Siggins, Lorna (1992) 'Anti-amendment groups react positively' Irish 
Times 6th March, p. 12. 
137 
abortion only where there was a threat to a woman's life, was reported in the 
press as too restrictive. As Emily O'Reilly, for example, pointed out, non- 
suicidal pregnant women could not obtain abortions under the ruling, arguing 
that women would now be increasingly secretive about travelling for abortions 
('One step forward and two steps back' Irish Press, 6th March 1992, p. 6). 
National newspapers carried renewed calls for the Eighth Amendment to be 
repealed, since it would hamper efforts to legislate for legal abortion in cases of 
rape or incest (e. g. Downey, James 1992 'Govt. now must face up squarely to 
crisis' Irish Independent 6th March, p. 13). 
The more widely reported response, however, from an anti-abortion 
perspective, was one of alarm at the possibility that pregnancies might be 
terminated for suicidal women. The press emphasized the major claim that the 
Supreme Court had opened the way for 'abortion on demand'. 17 The anti- 
abortion lobby insisted that women could fraudulently and successfully claim to 
be suicidal, given that the evidence would have to be judged by psychiatrists, 
not regarded, in this view, as properly scientific. As Bernadette Bonar of the 
Responsible Society reportedly argued, 'anyone can be raped or suicidal' 
(Yeates, Padraig 1992 'Opponents claim decision "legalises" abortion' Irish 
Times 6th March, p. 12). '8 Secondly, the anti-abortion lobby asserted that if a 
woman was genuinely suicidal, she could be protected from herself. For 
example, the Irish Press reported Bernadette Bonar's claim that 'a girl ... 
[is] six 
times more likely to commit suicide after an abortion than if she gives birth' 
('Decision Dismays Pro-Life Groups' 6th March 1992, p. 7). 
17See the reported response from Billy Quirke, president of SPUC during the 1983 
referendum campaign, that the judges had 'invented an excuse for abortion on demand in 
Ireland' (Irish Press 'Decision dismays pro-life groups' 6th March 1992, p. 7). 
18William Binchy, also making this assertion, said that the judgment could be used to obtain 
abortion on demand by any woman who 'makes a credible threat of suicide'. As he put it: Is 
there any way of legally controlling the exercise of judgment, medical or otherwise, as to the 
sincerity and seriousness of a threat of suicide? ' ('New abortion regime "has no effective 
limits"' Irish Times 6th March 1992, p. 13) 
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The absence of time limits on when a legal abortion could be performed on a 
suicidal woman provided a major support for the anti-abortion argument that 
Ireland now had an 'abortion on demand' regime, thanks to the Supreme Court 
judgment in the X case. For example, anti-abortion spokesman William Binchy, 
writing in the Irish Times, argued that Irish abortion law was now worse than 
that in operation in England, where there were time limits, and where two 
medical doctors had to be consulted on each particular case: '[w]e all know that 
England's abortion law amounts in practice to abortion on demand, but even in 
England there is a legal requirement that the authorisation be given by 
medically qualified people' ('New abortion regime "has no effective limits"' 6th 
March 1992, p. 13). Thus Ireland now had legal abortion on demand, without 
even the formal restrictions in operation in England. 
This latter anti-abortion interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision was 
reproduced by national press. For example, the Irish Times editorial on the 
decision underlined the papers discomfort in this respect: 
... 
it seems probable that, if the courts were presented with another 
case today in which there was evidence of suicidal desires on the part 
of an expectant mother at eight-and-a-half months, she too would 
have to be given clearance to have an abortion, (6th March 1992, 
p. 19) 
The implication, although not explicitly stated, is that the judgment was 
unacceptably broad, and should be restricted. 19 An article in the Irish 
19Journalist Bruce Arnold, writing in the Irish Independent, also expressed this view, 
arguing that: 'This is probably the most difficult implication of all in the judgment. Ireland 
now has a more flexible abortion ruling than any other European country, with virtually 
uncontrolled parameters in the period during which abortions, if agreed, can be carried out' 
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Independent concurred, in referring to the response from the Church of Ireland 
Bishop of Meath and Kildare, Dr. Walton Empey: '[i]t would seem to allow 
abortion right up to the last weeks of pregnancy if a person [sic] was suicidal 
and he described that as a "horror" which would "open up an appalling vista"' 
(Collins, Geraldine 1992 'Bishops "need time to reflect"' 6th March, p. 13). This 
was the opinion from the Church whose criticism of the Eighth Amendment 
had been central to the 1983 Anti-Amendment Campaign, providing evidence 
of the amendment's sectarian basis. It would seem that this anti-abortion 
response relied on the residual effects of the previously orchestrated moral 
panic, although modified through a reconfiguration of Irishness as anti- 
abortion-on-demand, rather than simply as anti-abortion. Thus, anti-abortion 
discourse recovered some legitimacy as a primary definition of what was at 
stake following the Supreme Court judgment. 
This claim that the Supreme Court judgment had effectively introduced 
'abortion-on-demand' contrary to popular morality informed the Irish Press's 
position in the three November referendums on the rights to travel; to obtain 
abortion information; and what was euphemistically referred to as 'the 
substantive issue', namely the right to obtain an abortion. The latter proposal 
was more restrictive than the Supreme Court's X case judgment, allowing for 
abortion only in cases where the life of the 'mother' was threatened, excluding a 
risk from suicide. The Irish Press urged a'yes' vote on this amendment, arguing 
that inclusion of suicide would allow for'abortion on demand': 
Abortion in any but acceptable cases is abhorrent to most Irish people, 
yet the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court provides for 
abortion on potentially wide grounds, including the threat of suicide. 
('The last judgment of Solomon' 6th March 1992, p. 12). He called on politicians to introduce 
restrictive legislation. 
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The proposed "right to life" amendment seeks to exclude threatened 
suicide ... abortion must not 
become a publicly acceptable option. 
(Editorial, 25th November 1992, p. 8) 
The 'acceptable cases' then would not include the X case, since the pregnancy 
in that case did not pose a risk to the life of X other than through a risk of 
suicide. 
The unease evident in the press coverage with what was seen as an overly 
permissive interpretation of the Eighth Amendment was clearly articulated in 
terms of a distinctly national 'pro-life' anti-abortion-on-demand ethos. Thus, the 
anti-abortion lobby's articulation of familial 'pro-life' nationhood in terms of a 
discourse of subordinate and obedient motherhood, together with their 
construction of women as dishonest and morally erratic, likely to seek 
abortions on false grounds very late in pregnancy, had become commonsensical 
during 1992, in the run-up to the November referendums. 
Republican Democracy: National Sovereignty, Civil Rights, and Pluralism 
Republican democracy was again a key theme of press coverage of the X case 
and its aftermath, as it had been in 1983. However, the specific articulation of 
this theme differed significantly from its earlier formulation, which had 
emphasized the anti-abortion nation at the heart of the democratic Republic, 
based on a total exclusion of any consideration of women's rights. 
In response to the X case, the people's sovereignty was again politicized, as 
press coverage indicated that the Supreme Court's decision resulted from a 
legislative failure to interpret 'the people's' specific intentions in ratifying the 
'pro-life' amendment in 1983. Secondly, in contrast with 1983, the X case had 
underlined how rights generally associated with democratic citizenship, notably 
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travel, information, and bodily integrity, had been denied to women, thereby 
throwing Ireland's democratic status into question. Thirdly, again undermining 
the 1983 construction, secular pluralism was emphasized in the press as 
essential to democracy. 
National Sovereignty 
The initial press coverage of the X case constructed the High Court injunction 
as contrary to the people's wishes in 1983, as discussed above. The anti- 
abortion lobby argued that the judiciary had appropriated the people's 
constitutional sovereignty, by failing to defend the right to life of the 'unborn' . 
20 
However, this view was marginalised in the coverage of the Supreme Court's 
judgment, which was defined rather by a tone of national relief. Popular anger 
was directed through the press not at the judiciary, but at the legislature, who 
had failed, the coverage emphasised, in their democratic duty to provide 
legislation which would have enabled the judiciary to better interpret the 
intended meaning of the 'pro-life' Eighth Amendment. Despite reports of the 
'democratic' concerns of the anti-abortion lobby consistent with their 1983 
position, 21 the people's sovereignty was not at issue in the press coverage of the 
decision to allow X to leave the country in order to terminate her pregnancy. 
However, the coverage did focus on the judicial assertion that elected 
politicians had failed to carry out their duty, as the representatives of the 
people. Justice Niall McCarthy, whose comments were prominently reported, 
had emphasized this in his Supreme Court judgment, arguing that the legislative 
20For example, Senator Des Hanafin was reported as stating that: 'the people of Ireland 
should be asked whether they accept this virtual usurpation of the constitutional supremacy of 
the people' (O'Reilly, Emily 1992 'Abortion now legal: landmark decision sets major problem 
for the Government' Irish Press 6th March, p. 1). 
21For example, Billy Quirke, ex-president of SPUC, made a statement reported in the Irish 
Times, claiming that the decision 'flies in the face of a democratic decision taken nine years 
ago' (Yeates, Padraig 1992 'Opponents claim decision "legalises" abortion' 6th March, p. 12). 
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failure had 'added significantly to the entire problem'. 22 The Irish Press's 
editorial response called the judgment 'a timely chastisement of the legislature 
for its flight from responsibility in the past' (6th March 1992, p. 8). 
However, by November, when the three referendums were due to be held on 
the rights to travel, information, and abortion, the anti-abortion lobby's 
assertion that popular sovereignty was at stake had gained a degree of 
prominence in the press. For example, on the day of the three referendums the 
Irish Press carried a report on the views of women connected to prominent 
anti-abortion activists. The daughter of Dr. Joe McCarroll, secretary of the 
right-wing organization Family Solidarity, was interviewed, and claimed that 
'[if] we could just get a clear wording that people could vote for or against, 
then we could see what the people really want' (O'Hara, Sarah 1992 'Abortion: 
AG's wife speaks out' 25th November, p. 10). This position depended on 
ignoring the complexity of the X case itself, together with accepting the 
assertion that the judgment had introduced abortion on demand. In other 
words, the claim that the people's sovereignty had been eroded was employed 
as a means of attempting to overturn the popularity of the Supreme Court's 
judgment. 
Women's Citizenship 
The implications of Mr. Justice Costello's judgment ... may be little 
short of catastrophic for the health and safety of Irish women, for the 
very concept of individual bodily rights, for the role of the State as a 
22For example, the Irish Times carried Martyn Turner's cartoon representation of the 
judgment on its front page, depicting a judge depositing a baby on the step of a door marked Dail 
. 
Eireann'. See also Kiely, Niall (1992) 'Five wigged men, solemn as sin in black robes' 
Irish Times 6th March, p. 1. 
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protective and benign organism. (Irish Times Editorial, 18th February 
1992, p. 13) 
Explicit concern for women's rights was reported in the coverage of the High 
Court injunction, as the above editorial statement indicates. 23 Indeed, feminist 
statements were explicitly reported. For example, the Irish Independent 
reported on the response from Ailbhe Smyth, representative of Attic Press, a 
feminist publishing house, who called on the government to 'respond with 
humanity and urgency to restore women's rights and civil liberties' (Dowling, 
Brian, 1992 "'Nightmare scenario" warning in ruling fury' 18th February, p. 9). 
The Irish Independent reported on the Dublin Well Woman Centre's reaction 
to the Supreme Court decision, arguing that it represented an initial 
confirmation of women's rights, and that they hoped it was 'a prelude to 
realistic debate on the issues relating to crisis pregnancies' ('Women leaders 
qualify welcome' 6th March 1992, p. 14), Mainstream politicians were also 
reportedly employing feminist language in their reactions. For example, Alan 
Dukes, former leader of Fine Gael, referred to the injunction as 'this deadly 
piece of misogyny' (Kennedy, Geraldine 1992 'Opposition TDs to seek debate 
on judgment' Irish Times 18th February, p. 7). 
Responses to the publication of the Bishop's statement on Maastricht were also 
constructed in the press in terms of feminist reproductive rights discourse, as 
already mentioned. For example, the Repeal the Eighth Amendment Campaign 
(REAC) reportedly argued that the Bishops had disregarded the life and rights 
of pregnant women in Ireland (O'Regan, Eilish 1992 'Bishops accused of 
23The Irish Independent's editorial made a similar statement of concern for the effects of 
women, although not expressly using the language of rights: '... the over-riding consideration 
can no longer be a theoretical interpretation of the sanctity of life when women are being 
submitted to terrible moral constraints over their most fundamental needs' ('Tragedy of our 
times' 18th February 1992, p. 10). The Irish Press's response was more concerned with the 
rights of families (18th February 1992, p. 8). 
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"disregard for women"' Irish Independent 27th May, p. 12). 24 Furthermore, the 
proposed wording on the Twelfth Amendment, on the 'substantive issue' of the 
right to abortion, was also criticised in the press from the perspective of 
women's rights. As the Irish Council for Civil Liberties argued, the proposal 
should be rejected, since it would 'roll back the advances of the X case and was 
deeply flawed from a human rights point of view'. They called for a complete 
overhaul of Article 40 of the Constitution, in order to provide explicit 
protection for women's right to reproductive 'choice', as they put it, and to 
guarantee against discrimination on grounds of gender, sexual orientation, or 
any other prejudice (Lavery, Don 1992 'Abortion view 'foisted on all', Irish 
Independent 25th November, p. 15). The Irish Times editorial on the day of the 
referendum called for the electorate to vote with women's rights in mind: '... it 
is in the best interests of women that everyone who feels deeply about this 
imprecise amendment should turn out [to vote]' (Editorial, 25th November 
1992, p, 15). Whether or not the paper was implicitly urging people to reject the 
amendment is unclear, although the emphasis on women's rights suggests that it 
was. 
The particular rights which were emphasised in the reporting were those of 
bodily integrity, travel and information. Women's right to bodily integrity 
informed the focus on the possible implications of the High Court injunction, as 
reports raised the possibility that women could now face physical examination 
at air and sea ports, as they tried to leave the country. 25 The implication was 
24Feminist opposition to the Maastricht Treaty was prominently reported. For example, the 
Irish Independent reported that Ruth Riddick, a leading pro-choice campaigner, advised a No 
vote in the Maastricht referendum, because the Protocol restricted women's rights (Lavery, 
Don 1992 'Andrews confident on EC role' 5th May, p. 11). 
25 See for example the Irish Press report 'Decision "is inconsistent with concept of justice"' 
18th February 1992, p. 7, which quotes Maxine Brady, President of the Union of Students in 
Ireland, making this comment. 
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that women now embodied the moral-legal boundary of the nation-state, an 
unacceptable situation from the perspective of democratic citizenship. 
The second focus of attention in the denial of women's right to bodily integrity 
was on the State's treatment of rape victims. As already mentioned, the X case 
coverage focused on the claim that the injunction presented a serious barrier to 
rape reporting. Indeed, there was a suggestion in an Irish Times report that the 
Gardai were moving very slowly in investigating the X case rape (Kiely, Niall, 
and Cusack, Jim 1992 'Garda file on alleged rape incomplete', 18th February, 
p. 7). Not only would the State's actions serve to deter women from reporting 
rape, the report implied, the State would also not investigate alleged rapes with 
any enthusiasm, not even in very high profile cases such as the X case, in which 
it had already taken a strong interest. 
Press coverage also focused on women's right to receive information and to 
travel. An Irish Independent report, for instance, referred to a demonstration 
outside the Däil where protesters chanted a banned abortion information 
telephone number, which was also reportedly printed on banners (Moloney, 
Eugene 1992 'Rally chants banned number' 18th February, p. 9). Coverage of 
women's right to travel repeatedly drew an analogy with internment, as in the 
following Irish Times editorial comment: 
But if it emerges that pregnant women who wish to travel abroad for 
abortion may be effectively interned in the State and if the Maastricht 
protocol has the effect of blocking off an appeal to Europe in this 
regard, it is certain that a great many people who would otherwise 
support the process of European integration will instead vote against 
it in the coming referendum. (6th March 1992, p. 19) 
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The parallel with internment implied that the Irish State had, implicitly, become 
indistinguishable from the British State, whose policy of internment without 
trial for the nationalist population in the north of Ireland only led to an 
intensification of violence, not least since it violated the democratic principle of 
respect for human rights. 26 Internment was introduced by the Stormont 
administration at 4 a. m. on 9th August 1971, in a terrifying and random raid, 
the effects of which not only hugely increased support for the IRA in the 
Republic and in the United States, but also within the north itself, and 
recruitment increased dramatically in consequence. Interns were tortured by the 
British Army, and Britain was later found guilty of 'inhuman and degrading' 
treatment of prisoners by the European Court of Human Rights, in a case 
brought by Ireland. Rather than abating, violence actually escalated 
significantly in response to internment, and the British state finally dissolved the 
Stormont administration and introduced direct rule in 1972 (Lee 1989: 437- 
439). 
Employing the idea of internment captured the unpopularity of the injunction 
against X by drawing on republican and democratic concern with civil rights 
and justice. 27 It also effectively reversed the construction of Ireland as 'pro-life 
in contrast to Britain, since now the anti-abortion lobby were equated with 
261nternment had also been practiced by the Irish state in its formative period in the early 
1920s, against republican activists whose refusal to accept the dominion status of the Irish 
Free State, established following the war of independence with Britain, resulted in civil war. 
However, internment more readily evokes the British practice in the north of Ireland, a more 
recent episode, and more easily connected to injustice, in the colonial context, than the Free 
State policy. For example, the British internment policy is commemorated annually in 
republican areas of the north by the banging of bin lids, since this was the method used by 
women at the time to warn men that British soldiers were approaching. 
27Internment was also evoked, for instance, by New Agenda MEP Des Geraghty, who 
reportedly tabled a resolution seeking to withdraw the Protocol from the Maastricht Treaty. 
He was quoted in the Irish Independent: 'Any of the other thousands of Irish women who go 
to England for terminations could find themselves the subject of an "internment order" 
despite the belief that the EC Treaties provided them with the right to move freely between 
Member States' (Downing, John, and O'Reagan, Eilish 1992 'Court's ruling has serious 
implications for EC Treaty' Irish Independent 6th March, p. 14). 
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'anti-life' policy, whereas British abortion law provided an opportunity to 
vindicate X's right to life. 
Equality and Secular Pluralism 
The third aspect of press thematization of republican democracy was a newly 
popular emphasis on secular pluralism, a major shift from the 1983 emphasis on 
national moral unity. For example, the Irish Press editorial, entitled 'Pluralism', 
in response to the Bishops' Maastricht statement, characterized the role of the 
legislature as follows: '[t]heir job is to legislate, not for the teaching of a 
particular Church, but for all the people of this State, people of all religions and 
none' (27th May 1992, p. 8). 
A strong argument in favour of an impartial law on abortion was made by 
Fintan O'Toole, a well-known left-wing journalist, in an article published on 
referendum day in the Irish Times, arguing that the issue at stake was not 
whether abortion in certain circumstances could be morally acceptable, but 
rather, 'who has the right to decide on abortion in certain circumstances? ' As he 
argued: 
... if we give other people the right to make decisions that will shape 
our lives, why do we not give them the right to make decisions that 
will shape their own? If we are humble enough to accept democracy, 
why not have the moral humility to accept that there are choices 
which other people have to make for themselves ... 
The right to travel 
and the right to know are aspects of the moral and political 
sovereignty of the individual in a democracy. And that sovereignty, for 
Irish women, is defined much more by Article 40.3.3 than it is by 
Articles 2 and 3. ('Today is the day that Ireland must grow up' 25th 
November 1992, p. 14) 
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O'Toole linked national independence and sovereignty with women's 
independence and citizenship, implying not only that women's citizenship was 
defined more by the Eighth Amendment than by the controversial republican 
claim over the island as a whole as the 'national territory' contained in Articles 2 
and 3 of the Constitution, 28 but also, in consequence, that the nation's position 
as an independent republic could be measured in terms of whether women had 
full citizenship rights, rather than in terms of territorial unity. 
The implications of the press treatment of abortion, through thematising 
republican democracy in these ways, indicates the disarray in the previously 
constructed national anti-abortion commonsense. 29 Could the press now be 
characterised as assisting in democratic control over the exercise of political 
power, thereby producing a more open and accountable political culture? The 
media's tendency to produce consensus, and the evidence that the press was 
engaged in reconstructing a national anti-abortion-on-demand discourse, would 
seem to limit the press's potential in this direction. However, emergent national 
abortion discourse was characterised by a new emphasis on women's rights, 
political pluralism and legal impartiality. The tension here provided the space to 
articulate the arguments expressed, for example, by O'Toole, discussed above. 
28Prior to popular ratification of an amendment to these Articles as part of the peace process, 
they stated the following: 
Article 2: 'The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands 
and the territorial seas. ' 
Article 3: 'Pending the re-integration of the national territory, and without 
prejudice to the right of Parliament and Government established by the 
Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that territory, the laws 
enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the 
laws of Saorstdt Eireann and the like extra-territorial of ect. ' 
29See Hug for a description of the way Albert Reynolds, Taoiseach at the time of the X case, 
distanced the government from the anti-abortion lobby. The President of the High Court, 
Rory O'Hanlon, was dismissed from his position as President of the Law Reform Commission 
for making political statements on abortion law, and Senator Des Hanafin was expelled from 
the Fianna Fail parliamentary party for breaking party discipline over the Maastricht Treaty, 
because of his anti-abortion views (1999: 176). 
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The media's participation in what was referred to as McCarthyism during 1983 
appeared to be at an end. Indeed, it seemed that, in the confusion over abortion 
commonsense that dominated Irish political culture during 1992, the media 
became, at least to a greater extent than before, defenders of democratic 
pluralism. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined how anti-abortion hegemony, established in 1983 
through a moral panic linking a ban on abortion with national survival, was 
destabilised in the popular reaction to the X case. The contradictions at work in 
that construction undermined the legitimacy of the anti-abortion lobby; the 
hegemonic discourse of nationhood which that lobby had relied on; and the 
legal regime that had consequently been established during the 1980s. Ireland 
could no longer be simply portrayed as a distinctively traditional, familial, and 
Catholic/Christian nation on the one hand, and a modern democracy on the 
other. The shock-waves of the X case resulted in feminist reproductive rights 
discourse gaining some definitional standing in the national press for the first 
time, as the 'pro-life' familial nation was now depicted as threatened by a 
repressive state, under the influence of the anti-abortion lobby. The State's 
actions against X and her parents were reported in terms akin to those of the 
rapist in the case. 
The hegemonic construction of nationhood in anti-abortion familial terms 
during the coverage of the 1983 campaign, specifically relying on a gendered 
and sexualized discourse of maternal subordination, was significantly 
reconfigured through the coverage of the X case and its aftermath. As this 
chapter has indicated, the intense criticism of the State evident in the press 
focused particularly on the perception of official violation of familial autonomy, 
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a key national value. This shifted the locus of control over pregnancy and 
abortion from the State, under the influence of the anti-abortion lobby, to the 
'traditional' family, an ironic outcome, given the status of that family in right- 
wing discourse. Although this was not a shift towards official recognition of 
women's moral agency, and did not significantly reconfigure the construction of 
nationhood in 'traditional' familial terms, it did provide some significant latitude 
wherein the possibility that reproductive decisions might now be made by 
women emerged. 
This explicit criticism of the State's actions in the X case also politicized the 
connection between the State and the anti-abortion lobby. Thus, the press's 
relationship with the anti-abortion nation-state was also problematized, 
although in neither explicit nor unambiguous terms, given the construction of 
nationhood as anti-abortion-on-demand. This repositioned the relative positions 
of both anti-abortion and reproductive rights lobbies in popular political 
culture, an effect which will be discussed in more detail in Part Three, as well 
as the relationship between the national media, the anti-abortion lobby, and the 
State. 
The coverage of abortion politics during 1992, in contrast with that of the 1983 
campaign discussed in Chapter Three, illustrates the emergence of a debate 
following the X case, as a more complex and morally contingent set of 
positions were reported. The 'primary definition' of the X case and its impact 
were now in question in the press, as they had not been during 1983. Thus, 
anti-abortion moral absolutism no longer held the status of a national 
commonsense, as the tension between popular concerns with democratic 
politics on the one hand and authoritarian morality on the other were exposed. 
While this new morally contingent popular political context may not have 
translated into providing abortion access within Ireland for girls and women, it 
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did democratize the poltical debate to a significant degree, allowing for the 
articulation of reproductive rights positions within the terms of familial 
nationhood in ways previously not possible. 
Despite the national press's role in facilitating what can be described as a 'moral 
panic' in 1983, the coverage of the X case, and its subsequent legal-political 
effects, were not reported in terms which problematized the historic role of the 
press itself in producing a morally absolutist anti-abortion national 'consensus'. 
The press's democratic status, not least as a key site of criticism of the State, 
was not thrown into question in reporting on the popular reaction to the X 
case. Rather, that democratic status was affirmed by the intensity of criticism 
aimed at the State through press coverage of abortion politics during the year. 
This illustrates the power of the media to define not only the terms of specific 
debates, but the very concept of a debate itself, in a democratic context. The 
key position of the press and the mass media in general within the political 
sphere is both recognized, through the insistence on the centrality of mass 
media to the maintenance of a democratic order, and repudiated, by excluding 
any consideration of the press's own political role in facilitating the limitation of 
democratic principles, in this instance by constructing the campaign to obtain 
official recognition of absolutist morality as democratic. 
What effect did press treatment of the events of 1992 have in terms of a classic 
moral panic trajectory? As already outlined, the third stage of a moral panic, 
when state control is dramatically increased, could be said to have been in 
process throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, when the State, together with 
the anti-abortion lobby, were concerned with ensuring that the fatal threshold 
of legal abortion would not be crossed. However, the popular response to the 
High Court injunction issued against X and her parents ruptured the moral 
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certainties which had been so carefully constructed during the previous decade. 
While the logic of the High Court injunction could not be faulted in legal terms, 
the morality informing that logic was popularly rejected. The apparent political 
stability of the anti-abortion regime was thereby undermined. 
Thus, the apparently inevitable trajectory which the moral panic seemed to have 
established was redirected as hegemonic discourses shifted. The reproduction 
of the anti-abortion social order was clearly not guaranteed by the 1983 panic, 
as a functionalist teleology would entail, although there were significant 
continuities, as well as ruptures, between pre- and post-X case abortion 
commonsenses. The post-X case reformulation of popular abortion morality 
suggests that the success of a moral panic in securing a particular set of legal 
and cultural consequences is always open to potential reversal. As outlined in 
the Introduction, hegemonies are produced through antagonism, necessarily 
involving struggle against counter-hegemonic forces (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: 134-145). The occurrence of popular'panics' about morality, while often 
serving to reinforce already existing attitudes and legal penalties, also indicates 
the inherent instability of any assumed moral 'consensus'. 
The next Part will consider the effects of the X case on key activists in abortion 
politics, themselves primary definers of the issues at stake. Of specific interest 
in Chapters Five and Six is the ways in which the shifting hegemonies outlined 
here, from 1983 to 1992, affected the competing political subjectivity and 
participation of these campaigners and workers, whose position in relation to 
national abortion politics was expressed in specifically personal terms. 
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PART THREE 
THE X CASE AND ABORTION ACTIVISM: 
POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY AND HEGEMONIC IRISHNESS 
INTRODUCTION 
Popular abortion discourse, constructed through a process of anti-abortion 
panic during the early 1980s, was ruptured by the events of the X case, as Part 
Two has demonstrated. The effect was to reconfigure commonsense positions 
on abortion away from hegemonic moral absolutism towards a more morally 
contingent and democratic debate. This gave some definitional standing to 
feminist perspectives on abortion access for the first time, as well as 
destabilizing the hegemonic status of the anti-abortion lobby. 
This Part is concerned with the impact of the X case on competing articulations 
of political subjectivity from the perspectives of activists concerned with 
influencing abortion law. Specifically of interest is how anti-abortion and 
reproductive rights activists articulated different subject positions within the 
discursive field of Irishness. The competing subjectivities of political activists 
provide the focus for this Part because they were key definers of the terms 
within which abortion law was debated, both in the press and in the Oireachtas 
(legislature), albeit in relatively unequal and shifting ways. Activist investments 
in discourses of gender, sexuality and nationhood were articulated through 
interviews at a specifically personal level. Considering how the connections 
between these discourses were formulated in terms which provided the 
motivations and justifications for activists' commitments to abortion politics 
will indicate not only the broad parameters of the debate, particularly in terms 
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of its post-X case formulation, but also why abortion politics in Ireland has had 
such long-term political and cultural significance. 
Chapters Five and Six are concerned specifically with how the categories of 
national 'insider' and 'outsider' were constructed through abortion politics. This 
entails considering how these categories were produced from the perspective of 
activists, both in relation to pregnant women and foetuses, and in relation to 
the 'public' character of the research process itself, where political subjectivity 
came into play in the negotiation and conduct of interviews. The following two 
chapters will specifically consider competing articulations of the links between 
abortion and Irishness, particularly in terms of how this connection was 
perceived by activists in response to the X case. Before considering these in 
detail, I will firstly introduce the analytic tools and material to be discussed, 
particularly in the context of theoretical and methodological issues raised in the 
course of the research process. 
Hegemonic Crises: From 'Popular' to 'Democratic' Political Subjectivity 
The analysis of post-X case political subjectivities contained in the following 
Chapters relies on the concept of hegemony in its poststructural reformulation. 
As outlined in Part One, a hegemonie formation refers to a relatively unified 
social and political space, produced through a set of purposively related 
identities, or chain of equivalences and differences, which defines what is 
beyond its limits as that which it is not: 'It is only through negativity, division 
and antagonism that a formation can constitute itself as a totalizing horizon' 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 144). Identities, therefore, are hegemonically 
produced through articulatory practices that relate and distinguish elements in 
such a way as to modify their significance (ibid.: 105). As Laclau and Mouffe 
put it: 'to be something is always not to be something else', although never in a 
fully achieved sense (ibid.: 128). Thus, there is no precise or essential 
155 
articulation of any particular subject position. This provides a way of theorizing 
identity, and particularly political identity, in non-essentialist and relational 
terms. 
The centrality and contingency of a hegemonic subjectivity is always open to 
disruption, such that a break in the chain of equivalences and differences will 
dissolve or reconstitute the specific formation. It is at such points of crisis or 
instability in a chain of equivalences, when the relevant unity of socio-political 
space is ruptured, such as that effected by the X case with regard to Irishness, 
that a proliferation of antagonisms and equivalences emerge. Laclau and 
Mouffe argue that at such points, the abundance of antagonisms allows for the 
multiplication of democratic struggles. During 'stable' periods, what they term 
'popular' subject positions prevail, namely positions which are derived from a 
dualistic and polarized division of political space. A crisis which ruptures the 
centrality of such a primary antagonism produces a multiplicity of divisions and 
identities. They describe the politics which emerges in these two very different 
contexts as follows: 
We will [... ] speak of democratic struggles where these imply a 
plurality of political spaces, and of popular struggles where certain 
discourses tendentially construct the division of a single political 
space into two opposed fields. (ibid.: 137) 
In this framework, 'democratic' subject positions emerge in a complex political 
space, which makes the production of unified chains of equivalence difficult. 
Thus, 'democratic' struggles tend not to be unified as 'popular', in the sense of 
relying on a primary opposition, such as 'us' versus 'them'. 
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This characterization of the effect of a rupture in a primary political antagonism 
organizing political identities provides the theoretical background to this Part. 
Chapter Five will consider the effect of the X case rupture on anti-abortion 
political subjectivity, and Chapter Six on feminist political subjectivity. ' Firstly, 
however, I will outline the research process through which the material for this 
Part was produced, a process which is integral to the forthcoming analysis, not 
least because the focus here is on the discursive constructions limiting what 
could be said or done, in what terms, by whom. The next section will consider 
that process in order to set the context for analysis. 
Methodology 
The Research Process 
A set of thirteen semi-structured interviews were carried out in Ireland in 
December 1996 and May 1997 with six anti-abortion and seven reproductive 
rights3 activists and workers, belonging to or associated with groups ranging 
from well-established umbrella organisations to grassroots networks and 
service providers. Participants were recruited in two main ways. Reproductive 
rights activists were recruited largely through the help provided by personal 
contacts. This meant that I was often able to talk to activists who worked in 
relative anonymity, women who were not always experienced at talking to 
researchers, unlike those public figures who participated from the anti-abortion 
lobby. 
1Thus, I am assuming that anti-abortion activists and feminists are mutually exclusive. 
2The 'pro-life' activists who spoke to me were members of the following organisations: the 
Pro-Life Campaign; the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign (from early 1980s); the Society for 
the Protection of Unborn Children; Life Pregnancy Care; Family and Life; and Human Life 
International, Ireland. See Chapter Five for more detail. 
3Feminists who spoke to me were active in the following organisations, and often more than 
one: Women's Information Network; Irish Women United; Galway Repeal the Eighth 
Amendment Campaign; Women's Information Network Galway; the Pro-Choice Alliance; 
Dublin Abortion Information Campaign; and Irish Women's Abortion Support Group. For 
more detail see Chapter Six. 
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This latter group of participants were approached in a more formal manner. I 
initially wrote to individuals and organizations who were currently or had been 
active in the debate since the early 1980s. 4 A total of seventeen letters were 
sent, on University headed paper, to eleven anti-abortion organizations and 
well-known associated individuals. Five reproductive rights organizations and 
campaigners for whom I had no less formal introduction were also contacted in 
this way. 
In these initial letters, I introduced myself as an Irish Ph. D. sociology student, 
working on the abortion debate in Ireland, and its relationship to contemporary 
debates about national identity. I assumed that presenting myself as a national 
'insider' would improve possible participants' willingness to discuss their views 
on Irishness and abortion with me. I was concerned that not to do so would 
imply that I was an 'outsider', indeed a significant 'other' from England, an 
assumption which might prejudice possible participants against the project. In 
letters to reproductive rights activists whom I did not know personally, I 
usually mentioned my own marginal political activities, either with the Galway 
Repeal the Eighth Amendment Campaign following the X case in 1992, or with 
the London-based Irish Women's Abortion Support Group. Thus, I explicitly 
positioned myself as a political 'insider', who broadly shared the values of these 
potential interviewees, not only in order to gain access to groups who generally 
worked in relative anonymity, but also because of the feminist perspective and 
purpose of the research project itself. In addition to writing 'cold' in this way, I 
4Letters were sent to the following organizations during August and September 1996: 
Students for Life in Cork; Women Hurt by Abortion; Family Solidarity; Pro-Life Amendment 
Campaign; Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child; Pro-Life Campaign; Life 
Pregnancy Care; Youth Defence; Women's Information Network; Irish Family Planning 
Association. A number of individuals were also contacted, who were publicly associated with 
the following organizations: Trinity Student's Union; Galway Appeal the Eighth Amendment 
Campaign; the Association of Lawyers for the Defence of the Unborn. 
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tried to 'snowball', i. e., generate further participants from initial contacts and 
replies. 
The overall response included two letters returned unopened, as the 
organizations had either ceased to exist or had moved; one written refusal to 
talk to me, on the grounds of work pressure, although this contact wished me 
success and provided me with a further contact; seven positive responses, of 
which only two interviews eventually resulted; and six unanswered letters. Of 
the latter, I sent follow up letters, and telephoned when I arrived in Ireland. 
Of those initially positive replies, most requested that I call when I was in town 
to arrange a convenient meeting time. This proved quite a difficult task, for a 
number of reasons. I did not have a base in Ireland with a telephone and 
answering machine from which to work during office hours. Most of my calls 
were made from public telephone boxes. In one case, the number I had been 
given by letter had been disconnected when I called, and the organization's 
address had changed. Often, the person who had replied to my letter was no 
longer available, whether because of ill health, work pressures, or holidays. 5 
However, in some cases I was referred to another member of the same 
organization who was available and willing to speak to me. 
Thus a set of thirteen interviews were eventually produced, most of which were 
arranged by telephone once I was on site, conducted with the help of a semi- 
structured guide, an open-ended method adopted in order to maximize the 
opportunity for participants to elaborate their position without being overly 
directed. My intention was to establish a space where participants could 
5Whenever I failed to make contact by telephone during my first trip in December 1996, I 
wrote again on my return to London, expressing my regret at not having been able to arrange 
a meeting, indicating when I would next be in town, and that I would call again at that stage. 
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express their positions in a context as free as possible from explicit constraints 
on what it might be possible to say. As Reinharz explains: 'Open-ended 
interview research produces nonstandardized information that allows 
researchers to make full use of differences among people' (1992: 19). The 
interviews were structured in the sense that I tried to focus participants' 
attention on a range of question areas which I was concerned to address, a 
strategy which did not always work, for significant reasons that I will consider 
in the forthcoming chapters. 6 
Interviewing Elites: Power and Methodology 
My strategic and ambiguous self-presentation both as a national 'insider' and as 
politically 'neutral' when approaching anti-abortion activists raises a number of 
interconnected questions about the relative positions of researcher and 
researched. Firstly, what obligations do researchers have towards participants, 
specifically when researching powerful groups? Secondly, does the approach I 
adopted have implications for the quality of research produced? 
Discussions of these sorts of questions are central to much of the methodology 
literature, which generally assumes that social research focuses on relatively 
powerless groups. Thus, a major preoccupation in this literature is with 
developing ways of making researchers accountable to those they study. For 
instance, the British Sociological Association advocates that researchers obtain 
'informed consent' from participants,? and feminist literature on these questions 
recommends the development of'rapport' with participants. 8 
6See Appendix A for the Interview Guide that I used. 
7See British Sociological Association (1992). As some commentators have pointed out, 
however, obtaining an initial formal consent does not guarantee the ethical soundness of 
research. Rather, informed consent should be thought of both as an ongoing process of 
negotiation, as the project changes, as well as to some extent as an impossibility, since 
complete openness about the research is never possible, given that conclusions can never be 
entirely predicted. As Homan (1992) points out, researchers usually devise a 'cover story' for 
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A major consequence of these normative recommendations is the implication 
that the quality and credibility of research depends on observing these 
principles of accountability. Underlying this implication is the assumption that 
the presence of unequal power in research contexts compromises the material 
that is thereby produced. While the association between a strong principle of 
accountability and standards of research quality has emerged from a general 
concern with avoiding a construction of social research as an technocratic tool 
for administering or controlling objectified populations, (hence the insistence 
that participants should not be treated instrumentally) this seems to have 
fostered a problematic normative assumption that researchers should always try 
to work with and on behalf of participants. In other words, the literature tends 
to implicitly recommend a position of sympathetic identification with 
participants, usually assumed to be socially powerless groups. A major feminist 
example of this is 'action' research, where the researcher works alongside the 
group being researched, and participates in the group's projects (e. g. Reinharz 
1992). 
While the principle of 'informed consent' can be interpreted as a minimal 
standard for ensuring researcher accountability, more substantial principles, 
specifically the advocacy of 'rapport' in interview-based research, do not 
address situations where research is directed towards providing a critique of 
hegemonic groups and discourses. The advocacy of rapport or sympathy here 
would seem to undermine any general attempt to make powerful groups 
themselves accountable. For example, in these terms, the interviews I carried 
out with anti-abortion activists would be viewed as seriously compromised not 
their project, viewing the consent issue as a site of probable conflict requiring persuasive 
skills, as well as strategies such as the exploitation of apparent friendships. 
8See, for example, Oakley 1981; McRobbie 1982; Stanley and Wise 1990; Ramazanoglu 
1992; Reinharz 1992. 
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only by my failure to elicit 'informed consent' in its strong form, or to foster an 
atmosphere of 'rapport', but also by my non-sympathetic, indeed instrumental 
approach to this particular group. This research project is explicitly not aimed 
at strengthening their general position. 
An example of the contradictions in these related assumptions and 
recommendations can be found in Sasha Roseneil's (1993) discussion of her 
experience of researching her fellow Greenham Common activists. She 
discusses the advantages of 'insider' research, namely that she had a large 
amount of background knowledge on which to draw for interesting ideas, 
which, she argues, adds to the validity of her research. She was aware of the 
intense rapport she had with most of her interviewees. As she put it: 
In some ways interviewing Greenham women was like having a large, 
diverse research team with whom to mull over findings and hunches, 
and the final analysis I developed draws heavily on the theoretical 
contributions of the women I interviewed. (p. 202) 
Roseneil appears to value rapport both as a commitment to accountability and 
as a means of ensuring the credibility of her interpretation. The implication is 
that by minimizing the power imbalance between researcher and researched, 
through drawing participants into the process of analysis, a more accurate 
account of events at Greenham will be provided. The inconsistency arises, 
however, when she discusses the hostility she encountered from two anti- 
feminist Greenham women whom she interviewed. While personally unpleasant 
for her, she admits that these interviews did provide important material for her 
research, despite the distinct lack of rapport. This indicates that lack of 
sympathy between researcher and researched does not preclude the ability to 
understand or comment on opposing perspectives. 
162 
Thus there are a range of issues in the literature, the connections between 
which are problematic. Firstly, methodological discussions tend to be 
concerned with promoting researcher accountability, primarily as a means of 
avoiding the objectification of research participants. However, this has 
problematically produced an implicit preference for 'insider' research, which 
relies on the assumption that accurate and credible interpretation depends on 
the absence of power inequality. In other words, the methodological research 
depends on the 'repressive hypothesis', which sees power as a force which will 
obstruct interpretation. From a Foucauldian perspective, however, the 
production of knowledge depends on the operation of power, which in turn 
depends on the production of knowledge. In this framework, the idea of 
minimizing power in order to better acquire knowledge in interview contexts is 
based on a problematic theory of power as something unitary which can be 
possessed or diminished (Barrett 1991: 135), rather than, in Foucauldian terms, 
as a set of complex phenomena through which power-knowledges are 
discursively produced (Sheridan 1980: 169-79). 
A reconsideration of the range of power contexts of social research, which 
includes researching hegemonic as well as relatively oppressed groups, would 
require a reevaluation of these general methodological recommendations. 
Firstly, the concern to promote researcher accountability would not necessarily 
require sympathetic research relationships. Secondly, this shift away from 
recommending 'insider' research would require reconsidering the relationship 
between the possibility of interpretation and the operations of power in 
research contexts. 
In the present context, I adopted a stance towards anti-abortion participants 
which could be described as akin to empathy rather than sympathy, namely a 
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commitment to take their position seriously in an attempt to grasp its 
distinctiveness. This relied on an assumption that comprehensible exchange 
across differences of power and political outlook was possible. In other words, 
my position in relation to participants with whom I differed, whether in terms 
of political position or social power, did not assume that understanding 
depends on being in sympathy or agreement with their views. Not only would 
such an assumption fail to take political differences seriously, but it also 
assumes that the presence of conflict precludes the possibility of understanding. 
I would argue that questions concerning the obligations of researchers to 
participants should be considered primarily at the level of the broad political 
context of the research, an issue which does have implications for judging the 
quality of particular projects, although not necessarily because understanding 
would be impaired by the operation of power. This is not to argue that power 
should not be considered as significant. Rather, its effects should be considered 
and negotiated in relation to the project's general ethical-political aims. 9 
However, the problem of researcher/researched relationships remains difficult, 
particularly in contexts of hostility, such as those in which I was involved. 
These sorts of problems do not have any simple answers. For example, my 
'cover story' was to present myself to the anti-abortion right-wing as a 
politically impartial student of the abortion debate. Although I do not think this 
strategy was particularly convincing, for reasons which I will discuss in Chapter 
9Clearly, research relationships are always to some extent necessarily instrumental, since 
they are primarily aimed at producing research material. For example, Janet Finch raises 
ethical concerns over the unaccountability of researchers in relation to women they might 
interview. As she puts it: 'I have ... emerged from interviews with the feeling that my interviewees need to know how to protect themselves from people like me. They have often 
revealed very private parts of their lives in return for what must be, in the last resort, a very 
flimsy guarantee of confidentiality' (1984: 80). Cotterill's (1992) response to this problem, 
produced by an emphasis on interview rapport, recommends instead that interviewers should 
simply play the role of 'friendly stranger', as a means of protecting interviewees from the 
dangers presented by blurring a research relationship with a friendship. 
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Five, it was the only possible 'story' I could tell, in order to indicate that I 
would take participants seriously. I was caught in an insoluble tension between 
attempting to obtain some level of'informed consent', while at the same time 
approaching these participants instrumentally, for purposes opposed to their 
own. However, I would argue that while this approach may sometimes raise 
questions of accountability, it does not compromise my interpretation. What I 
offered participants was simply the opportunity to have their positions taken 
into account in the research, to which they agreed, not least because, as 
political activists, they are committed to speaking to and attempting to 
persuade as many audiences as possible. I explicitly informed participants that I 
was talking to activists on both sides, and that I was interested in the possible 
connection between the abortion issue and national identity. 1° I also indicated 
that I was interested in their personal motivations for becoming politically 
active. Given the open-ended nature of my questions, participants were free to 
refuse to discuss any particular questions I raised; to raise issues themselves; or 
to expand on any issue in particular. 
I was a little reassured by my awareness that this group firmly believed that 
dissenters and opponents could be converted once exposed to their views, 
although this also made me feel defensive. In addition, I felt that I had betrayed 
my feminist principles, the ethical impulse behind the project as a whole, when I 
did not challenge their views. " However, to have done so would have been 
impossible, because I was obliged to honour the agreement on which the 
10Fiona, a veteran anti-abortion campaigner, for example, accepted the legitimacy of this 
research strategy. As she said, I would have to get the 'other crowd's' views, meaning 
reproductive rights activists, whom she otherwise referred to as the 'anti-lifers' (note recorded 
in my research diary). 
"While, While, in contexts of researcher power silence can operate as a controlling mechanism 
(Macpherson and Fine 1995: 182-183), in researching 'up' silence can be taken as implicit 
agreement, and can reinforce the views of the interviewee, as Carol Smart (1984) has 
commented. 
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interviews were based, and to which participants had consented, namely that I 
would listen openly to their accounts of their views and motives. 
Thus, questions about the conduct of research relationships and the impact of 
unequal power on the possibility of interpretation are connected, and have been 
dealt with in the relevant literature generally only through an assumption that 
research participants are relatively less powerful than researchers. This has 
produced a general assumption that informed consent or rapport are necessary 
to the production of good quality, credible interpretation. In the context of this 
project, it seems to me, firstly, that adopting a sympathetic attitude towards the 
anti-abortion lobby, in the sense of accepting the truth of their views and 
producing research aimed at improving their position, is not necessary in order 
to produce a credible interpretation of their views. Furthermore, as Carol Smart 
(1984) has argued, if feminist research is to have any impact at all, if it is to 
even proceed beyond the initial design stage, then surely feminist researchers 
should not make themselves any more vulnerable than they already are to the 
powerful anti-feminist lobby. At the very least we should not adopt an 
uncritical approach to these particular views. 
Interviewing Peers: Relational Subjectivity and Methodology 
By contrast, my position as a feminist researcher interviewing other feminists 
raises a number of questions concerning the relationship between the 
construction of subjectivity and the research process. What effect does the 
primarily instrumental character of such relationships have in 'insider' peer 
research? In what ways do such research contexts affect what can be said in an 
interview? 
These questions have been considered in the methodological literature on 
interviewing peers, and illustrate further problems with the normative emphasis 
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on sympathetic research, and consequently competing tensions in feminist 
research recommendations. Feminist attempts to minimize the effects of power 
when interviewing relatively powerless groups, for example through 
recommending an explicit investment of the researcher's identity in the research 
process itself, as a means of avoiding the adoption of a patronising attitude 
towards participants (Oakley 1981, McRobbie 1982), is in tension with some of 
the problems identified with researching peers. 
Firstly, in peer interviewing contexts the primarily instrumental character of the 
encounter is exposed, not least because interviews are not typical everyday 
peer interactions. My interviews with feminist activists took place in precisely 
this context, where the academic rather than political focus of the exchanges 
was explicit. My consequent discomfort was to some extent alleviated by the 
fact that a number of participants were or had themselves been students and 
academics, and were as a result supportive of feminist research. However, the 
overtly 'public' character of peer research (Ribbens 1989: 579), where what is 
said does not remain at a personal level, but rather is recorded, interpreted, and 
made publicly available, albeit selectively and anonymously (Platt 1981: 78), is 
in tension with the recommendation that feminist research in particular should 
in effect adopt an 'insider' position (e. g., Oakley 1981). The explicitly 
instrumental character of peer research repositions the 'insider' by emphasizing 
the primarily public purpose of the encounter. In effect, the 'insider' becomes 
realigned with an anonymous and critical public 'outside' context through the 
research process. The prescription that feminist research in particular should 
strive to overcome the hierarchical subject/object dualism structuring research 
encounters through attempting to adopt an 'insider' position ignores the 'public' 
position of researchers relative to participants (Ribbens 1989: 587), even in peer 
contexts. As Cotterill insists, the distinction between research and other 
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encounters should be acknowledged (1992: 595), a difference which becomes 
explicit in peer interview contexts. 
The second major issue which peer interviewing underlines is that in 'insider' 
contexts, participants, whose 'expertise' is at least equal to that of the 
researcher, are in a strong position to judge the research project, the research 
process, and the 'insider' status of the researcher (Platt 1981: 77). Thus, the 
research is open to judgment even as it is being conducted, in ways which the 
researcher is not only aware of but is particularly vulnerable to, since her 
identity is already invested both in affiliation to the specific peer group, and in 
the research project itself, This makes it difficult both to control the interview 
(Platt 1981: 88), and to explore uncertainties that arise during the interview, 
since asking for clarification may further place the interviewer's 'insider' status 
in question. Thus, the instability of insider/outsider categories comes into play 
not only in the very act of interviewing, but more particularly where 
explanations are requested, which raise particularly questions about how much 
of an 'insider' the interviewer really is (Platt 1981: 82; Song and Parker 
1995: 243). Thus, 'insider' peer research can significantly affect what questions 
are asked, as well as what participants might say, given the circulation of 
informal knowledge and assumptions among the peer group concerning what 
the research is interested in (Platt 1981: 77). 
My 'insider' status as an Irish feminist interviewing other Irish feminists was in 
tension not only with my position as a researcher, but also with the fact that I 
had not lived in Ireland for a number of years prior to the interviews. Thus, my 
national political subjectivity was not necessarily shared with those I 
interviewed. This unstable 'insider' position affected what questions I was 
prepared to ask. I was concerned about the judgments of these participants on 
a range of issues, including the focus of the research, how I conducted the 
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interview, and to what extent they regarded me as an Irish feminist. For 
example, during the interview with 'Aileen', I inquired as to the effects of the X 
case on the 'pro-choice movement' in Ireland, to which she responded that she 
would love to think that there was such a thing. My application of this 
inappropriate description underlined, at least to myself, my position as 'outside' 
Irish feminism. This uneasiness was reinforced by my primary position as a 
commentator rather than an activist, whose competency was now in question in 
the light of my misdescription. I ended this interview quite quickly, feeling 
uncomfortably exposed as an inadequate feminist, as well as an inadequate 
researcher, since my questions concerning the nature of the abortion conflict 
appeared to be the concerns of an'outsider' who no longer actually understand 
Irish political culture. 
Thus, the problems associated with the recommendation that feminists should 
commit themselves in personal ways to research and effectively adopt an 
'insider' position are exposed when considering actual 'insider' peer research, 
not least by underlining the primarily 'public' character of research relationships, 
as well as by indicating how the instability of the researcher's 'insider' position 
can make it difficult for the researcher to control the interview. 
The following two Chapters will discuss in detail the articulation of competing 
political subjectivities within the discursive field of Irishness, considering in 
particular the significance of the X case to these articulations by active citizens. 
Chapter Five will concentrate on anti-abortion, and Chapter Six on feminist 
reproductive rights subjectivities in relation to discourses of nationhood, in the 
context of a post-X case shift from 'popular' to more 'democratic' abortion 
politics. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE X CASE AND ANTI-ABORTION POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY 
Introduction 
The X case ruptured hegemonic attitudes to abortion access, and consequently 
repositioned anti-abortion and reproductive rights perspectives in relation to 
the nation and citizenship, as Parts One and Two have demonstrated. This 
Chapter is concerned with how anti-abortion political subjectivity was 
articulated in response to this new context. In considering this, I will draw on 
the discussion from Part One on the hegemonic construction of Irishness as 
not-English, which produced an articulation of nationhood in terms of 
community, religiosity, and traditional familism. What follows is specifically 
concerned with the impact of the X case on this chain of equivalences, through 
which anti-abortion campaigners and workers had produced a hegemonic 
popular discourse of Irishness as 'pro-life' during the early 1980s. 
The interviews which provide the focus for discussion in this chapter took 
place during a period of time when anti-abortion moral-political hegemony had 
been destabilized, as already discussed. Thus, anti-abortion discourse during 
this period was characterized by a defensiveness not so apparent prior to the X 
case. That case had specifically undermined the construction of national 
'insiders' in terms which justified anti-abortion authority over women's bodies, 
in consequence of a national concern with the protection of'the unborn'. 
The Chapter is divided into five sections. Firstly I will briefly describe who 
participated in the research, including a sketch of the relevant organizations, 
and a consideration of the power dynamics structuring the interview contexts. I 
will then discuss anti-abortion articulations of political subjectivity, in the light 
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of the rupture in hegemonic 'pro-life' Irishness produced by the X case. The 
way the anti-abortion position was aligned with democratic, republican, and 
even feminist politics will be discussed in turn, before finally considering the 
ways in which anti-abortion discourse attempted to reproduce a popular 'pro- 
life' politics, through a rearticulation of anti-colonial discourse. 
Interview Participants 
As discussed in the Introduction, this Chapter draws on interviews with a set of 
six anti-abortion campaigners. Five of these interviewees lived in Dublin, and 
one in Galway. They were each involved in one or more of the following 
organizations: the Pro Life Amendment Campaign (PLAC), which lobbied 
successfully for constitutional foetal rights during the early 1980s; the Irish 
Branch of the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC), also 
established during the early 1980s; Human Life International, Ireland (HLII), 
which was established in Ireland in 1993 following the X case; the professional 
association Lawyers in Defense of the Unborn; the Pro-Life Campaign (PLC), 
established after the X case with the aim of overturning that ruling through a 
constitutional amendment; Life Pregnancy Care Service Ireland, a non- 
denominational anti-abortion counselling organization; Family and Life, an anti- 
abortion organization incorporated as part of the Pro Life Movement Limited; 
and Youth Defence, a youth association set up in 1992 in response to the X 
case, which adopted new radical tactics, such as picketing politicians homes, 
and staging dramatic street demonstrations (Hug 1999: 179). 
The first participant, 'Eoin', is a retired senior academic and medical 
practitioner in the field of obstetrics and gynecology. I He had trained in 
'All interviewees are referred to by pseudonyms in these chapters. 
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England during the early 1960s, an experience which he articulated as the 
primary motivation for his subsequent anti-abortion political activity in Ireland. 
'James' is a young public relations consultant who began his involvement in 
anti-abortion politics as a student, during the period when student unions were 
illegally providing abortion information. 
'Helen' became involved in the abortion debate as a result of her interest in 
counselling rather than campaigning, combined with her general 'pro-life ethos', 
as she put it. 
'Fiona' is a retired general medical practitioner (GP) who had also trained in 
England before returning to Ireland. She became involved in anti-abortion 
politics through her experiences as a GP, dealing with women's requests for 
assistance in obtaining abortions in Britain, following the introduction of the 
1967 Abortion Act. She was instrumental in prosecuting information providers 
through the courts, thereby making abortion information illegal. 
'Jane', a young Canadian woman, was working in Ireland on a short term basis 
for an anti-abortion charity. She became involved in anti-abortion work by 
chance, but said that it had become very important to her, particularly because 
of her Catholic identity. 
'Paul' spoke to me as a representative of a 'pro-life pro-family organization', as 
he described it, but was unwilling to discuss in any detail his personal 
background, including how and why he became involved in anti-abortion 
politics. He did, however, say that he first got involved in the early 1990s, and 
mentioned that his family played a part in that. He has been publicly associated 
with anti-abortion direct action, although he made no mention of this, since the 
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interview had not been negotiated to include such a discussion. Since the 
interview took place, he has been involved in the C case, when the anti- 
abortion lobby attempted to prevent another young rape victim, this time a 
thirteen year old, from obtaining an abortion in Britain. 2 
Interview Contexts and Power Dynamics 
The interviews analysed both in this Chapter and Chapter Six took place during 
December 1996 and May 1997, approximately five years subsequent to the X 
case. Thus, the immediate rupture in anti-abortion national hegemony had 
receded somewhat, as Chapter Four has indicated, and activist discourse would 
have reformulated its terms in order to reassert its legitimacy, not least by 
incorporating defenses against the major problems with this political discourse 
which the X case had exposed. 
Most of these interviews took place either in offices or in participants' homes. 
One took place in a hotel lobby, since the interviewee was in the process of an 
office move. As the Introduction has indicated, the process of recruiting 
participants who were both available and willing to speak to me was difficult, 
and ongoing during the concentrated period when I was actively interviewing. 
One effect was that interviews were held in a context where I was not entirely 
in control, not only because I was working in unfamiliar surroundings, but also 
because I had presented myself as a national 'insider', in a context where 
political and national alignments were the explicit focus of interest, and where I 
was actually an 'outsider' in political terms. Thus, the problem of relative 
situation was central to the negotiation of the interviews. This, combined with 
the difficulty of arranging the interviews resulted in an often defensive and 
deferential interviewing style. My focus of interest in discussions with anti- 
2For details, see the Introduction. 
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abortion participants involved questioning what should, from their perspective, 
have been 'commonsense' to any actual 'insider'. In other words, the very fact 
that I was puzzled about the significance of abortion to the nation raised 
questions about my'insider' status. In addition, as I noted earlier, I felt that the 
process of interviewing anti-abortion activists and workers, inviting them to 
clarify their position in a non judgmental interview context, compromised my 
feminist identity. In order to persuade interviewees to talk to me, I necessarily 
presented myself as an impartial academic, which left me feeling both dishonest 
and complicit, since my openness to listening to this perspective meant that I 
could not challenge their point of view. The only anti-abortion interview where 
my national subjectivity did not come into question was with Jane, who seemed 
uncomfortable discussing, from her own perspective of a national 'outsider' 
(Canadian), the dynamics of abortion politics in Ireland with a national 'insider' 
(Irish), a reaction which indicates the significance both of nationhood to the 
abortion debate, and vice versa. 
A number of these participants overtly attempted to control the interview, 
indicating an uncertainty over what arguments they anticipated I was interested 
in making. Some attempted to solicit this information from me indirectly, for 
instance, by asking whether I had any children, particularly by those 
participants who noticed, to their apparent surprise, that I was married. 3 Others 
treated me with guarded suspicion, and attempted to control both what 
questions I could ask, and what I was allowed to hear, and particularly to 
record. For example, Paul, who spoke to me from his office where another 
person was working, suddenly asked that I switch off my recorder when a call 
came through to his colleague, saying that there was 'sensitive information' at 
3For example, Fiona's husband, who arrived during the interview, asked whether or not I was 
'pro-life'. My response, saying at first 'yes' (justified to myself by not considering myself 'anti- 
life' or 'pro-death) and then claiming that my interest in the debate was purely academic 
(intended to signify a detachment from politics), was fumbled and unconvincing. 
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stake. He was extremely cautious about what questions he would answer, 
refusing to elaborate in any detail about his general position. The interview 
lasted little more than twenty minutes. Another interviewee seemed very 
relieved when I said the interview was over, exclaiming 'It's over? ', and 
laughing in relief, suggesting at least his uncertainty over where I stood. It was, 
interestingly, after this that he seemed to relax and speak more openly and 
generally about his position, even though the recorder was still running. 
One interview in particular illustrates both the general power dynamics of these 
situations, and the role discourses of gender and nationhood played in the 
production of research material. Fiona attempted explicitly to limit what 
questions I could raise, define how I could relate to her, and ensure a 
favourable interpretation of her position, through overtly performing hospitality 
rituals, as well as by articulating her political subjectivity through a maternalist 
nationalist discourse. 
Fiona's explicit evocation of the reciprocity entailed in accepting hospitality was 
a major aspect of her efforts to control the interview. For instance, I got lost on 
the way to her house, in a rural area without road signs, and had called her 
when I found a phone-box. She came and picked me up in her car, and showed 
me around her house and garden on arrival, before taking me into her front 
room, quite a formal setting, to 'have a little chat', as she put it. She then spoke 
continuously, giving the impression that she was being very generous in 
speaking to me, and apparently providing me with a lot of detailed information. 
The transcript shows, however, that I was able to ask only five questions in 
total during what was a relatively long interview, and only when prompted by 
her saying, for instance, 'And now you can ask me a few more questions'. Fiona 
explicitly ended the interview by getting up to make tea. Her self-positioning as 
generous and open-minded was continuously underlined. For example, she 
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discussed how she feared for her personal safety, claiming that she had received 
a death threat because of her anti-abortion politics, while also telling me how 
she often gave lifts to her political opponents following meetings. She 
discussed at length, after she had ended the interview and was serving tea and 
biscuits, how she had been continuously mistreated by interviewers who had, 
for example, accepted her hospitality and then written very unsympathetic 
articles about her. She was particularly affronted by the fact that she had rarely 
received a thank-you note or card from any interviewer. In this way, she 
solicited a thank-you note from me, as a way of formally obtaining my 
recognition of and gratitude for her generosity. 4 This seemed to me to be a 
strategy aimed at preventing me from treating her position in a less than 
sympathetic way, simply by evoking the reciprocal rules of hospitality. 
Fiona also attempted to position me in explicitly national and gendered terms, 
in a number of ways. Firstly, she said that she had only agreed to the interview 
because she thought I sounded like a'nice girl' on the phone, positioning herself 
in contrast as a mother, for example by discussing, off the record and 
unprompted, her children's life choices with me, and what she felt about them. 
Secondly, she emphasized what a small country Ireland was, how impossible it 
was to remain anonymous, and how many people she knew from my home 
town, a comment which I interpreted as a warning that my family might not be 
immune to the effects of the position that I take up through my research. These 
comments again constructed me primarily in daughterly familial terms. 
Furthermore, she noticed that I wore a Claddagh ring, a piece of national 
jewelry, typically signifying monogamy and tradition, although also associated 
with the Claddagh area of Galway city. s She discussed the tradition of 
4Indeed, I sent her a University of Warwick post-card to thank her for her assistance with my 
research. 
5The Claddagh ring usually has two hands holding a crowned heart. The direction in which 
the heart points indicates the monogamous status of the wearer. 
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Claddagh ring-wearing in her family, particularly her mother's large collection. 
In this way, she spoke to me through a discourse of gendered nationality, 
constructing me primarily as a young wife and potential mother, rather than as 
a student or professional researcher. As she said to me, I would have to stop 
doing degrees. She didn't indicate why, but I interpreted her comment has 
implying that I should start having babies. 6 Again, this strategy of constructing 
me in familial terms, through a traditionalist gendered national discourse, to the 
extent of giving me 'motherly' advice about how I should live, suggests an 
attempt to construct her own position as authoritative. To criticise her position 
in these terms would entail betraying my nationality, by rejecting the traditional 
gender roles through which she'recognised' me. 
Thus, the material produced through these interviews is the result of a complex 
negotiation between political subjectivities. Interviewees attempted either to 
discover precisely what position I was committed to, or to control the outcome 
of the interviews simply by positioning me as a subordinate, in gendered 
familial terms. Indeed, these participants were often public figures who would 
have been accustomed to such defensive strategies in interview situations. The 
difficulty of these interview situations was compounded by my explicit 
questioning about the political subjectivities of participants themselves, while 
often refusing to reciprocate, feigning 'objectivity'. The next sections will 
consider how interviewees constructed their political position in relation to the 
rupture of hegemonic anti-abortion discourse which the X case effected. 
Post-X Case Anti-Abortion Political Subjectivity 
Four key themes structured post-X case anti-abortion discourse, Firstly, the 
concern to defend foetal rights was justified as a democratic strategy to 
6She had already openly discussed my married and childless status with her husband, who 
had arrived during the interview, while she was introducing him to me, 
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enhance, rather than weaken, citizenship rights. Secondly, anti-abortion 
political subjectivity was articulated in republican terms, particularly through an 
emphasis on the 'common good'. Thirdly, anti-abortion discourse expressed a 
major concern for the cultural as well as legal position of women, in apparently 
feminist terms. Finally, a concern to resist cultural colonialism was articulated 
as central to anti-abortion politics. The articulation of each of these themes in 
the interviews with anti-abortion activists will be discussed in turn below. 
Anti-Abortion Politics as Democratic 
... the struggle 
[over abortion law] is really really really about, it's 
about how far do we go, do you know? What are rights, what is 
democracy? You know, democracy is based on fundamental rights, so 
when you interfere with these fundamental rights you don't have 
democracy. You know that's just [... ] a reality. (Interview with Paul, 
20th May 1997, Dublin) 
The anti-abortion position articulated by interviewees relied explicitly on 
democratic discourse, and particularly on an expressed concern with the 
protection of 'fundamental rights'. Although this was not a new aspect of anti- 
abortion political discourse, as Chapter Three indicates, the questions raised in 
the aftermath of the X case, particularly concerning whether women had a right 
to travel outside the state boundaries for purposes not legal within the state, 
namely to obtain abortions in Britain, drew attention to the possibility that 
women's citizenship had been seriously compromised by the 1983 Amendment. 
Thus, the democratic credentials of both the state and the anti-abortion lobby 
had been explicitly brought into question following the X case. The assertion of 
an insistently democratic anti-abortion position, defined primarily with the 
protection of 'fundamental rights', indicates the need for anti-abortion activists 
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to reassert their legitimacy by articulating precisely the principles they were 
accused of undermining through the events of the X case, albeit in anti-abortion 
terms. 
Furthermore, anti-abortion discourse responded to the rupture caused by the X 
Case on the perceived legitimacy of their position by asserting their concern, as 
democrats, to defend women's right to travel. For example, Eoin, a seasoned 
anti-abortion campaigner, expressed this position as follows: 
... the 
difference between our state and Soviet Russia was that every 
citizen of this state is free to come and go as he or she chooses. 
Nobody can stop you leaving the state or coming back, unlike Soviet 
Russia, where you have to ask permission of the Executive to leave. 
Now she [X] had that permission to leave. But the ... pro-abortion 
side as it were wanted to make a contest of it, saying that she wasn't 
entitled to go, and that she was being denied entitlement to leave. She 
was injuncted and brought back into court. (Interview, 9th December, 
1996, Galway) 
While this is a confusing and inaccurate account of the events which produced 
the X case, as well as of the status of competing rights claims, Eoin does insist 
that the democratic nature of the Constitution and the state, specifically in 
contrast with Soviet Russia, guarantees against any compromise of women's 
right to travel. By aligning the anti-abortion position with democratic 
principles, he thereby asserts the democratic credentials of the anti-abortion 
lobby. This was a significant defensive retreat, which specifically rejected the 
pre-X case anti-abortion position. This revision is intended to absolve the anti- 
abortion lobby from responsibility as anti-democratic, and a danger to children's 
lives and welfare. 
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The impact that the question raised by the X case with regard to women's right 
to travel made on the anti-abortion position can be seen more specifically in a 
comment on the issue made by James: 
while I don't think that it [the Eighth Amendment] enshrined a right to 
abortion in a foreign country, I don't think it enshrined a right to stop 
somebody going abroad on suspicion that they might be about to have 
an abortion, which as you know, [... ] raises all sorts of legal questions 
about internment and civil liberties and suspicion and onus of proof 
and so on. So I don't think the case should have been taken in the first 
place, but the case having been taken in the first place, I feel that the 
judgment should have reflected the legal issues, rather than [... ] the 
emotional issues. (Interview, 12th December 1996, Dublin) 
This reaction to the judgment, and particularly the issues it raised about 
women's citizenship, seems to have pre-empted any questions about the 
democratic status of the anti-abortion project by recognizing the legitimacy of 
such objections, while also rejecting the logic of the X case judgment itself, by 
claiming that women's right to travel was not in competition with the foetal 
right to life. In making this statement, James expressed a democratic concern 
with civil liberty and procedural legal justice. 
He explicitly referred to the parallel publicly drawn between the State's actions 
in the X case and official policies of internment.? Official policies of interning 
7For example, the cartoon by Martin Turner published on the front page of the Irish Times 
when the story was initially reported, was influential in establishing the parameters of the 
consequent debate, and is often reproduced in discussions of the case. This pictured a visibly 
pregnant young girl clutching a teddy bear, standing on the territory of the Republic, 
surrounded by barbed wire. The caption reads: '17th February 1992: The Introduction of 
Internment in Ireland for 14 year-old girls' (Irish Times, 19th February 1992). 
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or incarcerating suspected lawbreakers without a trial, are generally regarded 
as anti-democratic. In Ireland in particular such official internment policies 
recall the actions of the British government in the north of Ireland in response 
to the violence of the early 1970s, outlined in Chapter Four. The parallel drawn 
between the Irish State's actions in the X case and policies of internment 
signified official brutality and totalitarianism. James's response to this publicly 
drawn parallel attempted to distance the anti-abortion position from association 
with any compromise of civil liberties, in this instance by asserting that the final 
legal decision was a reaction to the emotional connection made between the 
injunction against X travelling abroad and the historical significance attached to 
internment. 
These two statements demonstrate anti-abortion activists' insistence, following 
the X case, that they were not claiming jurisdiction over women's bodies. To 
do so would, as Eoin explains, require the unacceptable levels of state power 
over citizens. The concentration of power in the state is particularly 
unacceptable from the point of view of Catholic doctrine, which favours the 
corporate state structure characterised by the principle of subsidiarity described 
in Chapter One, designed to protect spheres of religious influence, particularly 
the family, from State interference. Furthermore, the association between 
official internment policies and denial of the right to travel to women, already 
mentioned, indicate the extent to which the legitimacy of anti-abortion 
discourse had been popularly ruptured. This assertion that women's freedom of 
movement had never been compromised by the official duty to protect 'the 
unborn' indicates how anti-abortion discourse was necessarily rearticulated in 
this new context. However, this denial that foetal rights would affect in any 
significant way women's embodied autonomy and citizenship rights conflicts 
with the necessary anti-abortion assertion of authority over women's 
reproductive capacity and hence women's embodiment. In other words, this 
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claim that women's embodied autonomy was not at stake in the recognition of 
foetal rights continued to rely on a discourse which constructed anti-abortion 
activists as internal to the sphere of legitimate authority over foetal life and 
consequently women's embodiment, on the basis of their position within the 
nation. From this perspective, women seeking abortions, together with feminist 
advocates of reproductive freedom, continued to be necessarily constructed as 
beyond the sphere of legitimate authority over foetal life and consequently 
women's embodiment, by virtue of their non-national perspective. However, 
this post-X case insistence that women's freedom of movement was explicitly 
not compromised by the official recognition of a foetal right to life indicates a 
significant shift in anti-abortion discourse, as a degree of explicit recognition 
that women's embodied autonomy was actually at stake in abortion law was in 
effect introduced through the assertion that women's right to travel should be 
upheld. 
Anti-Abortion Politics as Republican 
The abortion issue is a very divisive one in Ireland and it has sort of 
riven the community, if you like, apart, in all sorts of ways. And the X 
case has only just added fuel to the fire. (Interview with Eoin, 9th 
December 1996, Galway) 
The second major theme constructing post-X case political subjectivity 
involved a concern with defending what could be described, in republican 
terms, as the 'common good'. In particular, as Eoin's statement above 
demonstrates, the X case was criticized on the basis that it was divisive. In this 
view, the judgment had facilitated the emergence of extremism in the nation, in 
the form of 'pro-abortion' feminism. As Paul, a high profile young anti-abortion 
organizer, commented: 
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... the 
X Case seemed to unify all those groups and persons who 
wanted ... abortion introduced 
into Ireland. And it was the extreme 
wing of things and it seemed to take control, for about two or three 
months... (Interview, 20th May 1997, Dublin) 
These 'pro-abortion' extremists were constructed as operating against 'the 
people'. One major strategy was that they could exert control over powerful 
forces such as the media. As Paul went on to say: 
... we 
don't have their [reproductive rights campaigners] ways we 
don't have the amount of people in the media that they have in the 
media. So we gave up that struggle [against the reproductive rights 
campaign]. We created our own media, you know? We said we'll 
bypass the media and go directly for the people. (Interview, 20th May 
1997, Dublin) 
Again, what is evident in this statement is a distinctively republican concern 
with avoiding divisive argument. In republican terms, the 'common good' is 
only served through the promotion of harmony between the putative national 
character and the law. However, the 'common good' is a construction which 
necessarily depends on the production of cultural uniformity. 8 Thus, the 
production of a coherent 'national character' was precisely what is at stake in 
this conflict, as Paul went on to demonstrate. On the one hand he asserted an 
equivalence between 'pro-life' politics and popular morality, while on the other 
8Whelan (1996) describes the importance of avoiding divisive issues to the eighteenth 
century republicanism of the United Irishmen: 'In the United Irish view, divisions within 
Irish society were artificial, deliberately exacerbated by the junta (or faction) to maintain 
their own corrupt regime. '(p, 61) See also Viroli (1995) for a discussion of the centrality of 
the idea of the 'common good' to republican politics. 
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hand he discussed the anti-abortion lobby's extensive persuasive work, designed 
to produce that very equivalence. As he commented, public opinion is subject 
to constant change, in response to public debate. The anti-abortion lobby 
exerted themselves to a considerable degree in an effort to influence public 
debate and opinion. To quote Paul again: 
... we 
haven't been campaigning since last year for a referendum, 
we've been campaigning since 1992 for a referendum. So all that 
work, conferences, rallies, leaflet drops, video drop, door to door, 
everything, like it's a weekly, daily occurrence, and that has been 
going on, since 1992. And that's the reason why we've been able to 
keep public opinion, despite all that, we've managed to keep, I would 
say, the majority of people on our side. And if it gets to a referendum 
stage the only reason we will win is because four weeks or five weeks 
or six weeks prior to that referendum we will put in as good as a 
campaign as the government will push, or whoever our opponents are 
that day. (Interview, 20th May 1997, Dublin) 
Here it is clear that producing an alignment between the anti-abortion position 
and popular morality or the 'national character' is a daily struggle, not a taken 
for granted assumption. In this view, divisive politics can only be avoided by 
asserting a homogeneous culture, and insisting that dissent be treated as foreign 
and necessarily divisive. 
Thus, the republican articulation of anti-abortion political subjectivity in the 
wake of the X case focused primarily on 'culture' and 'social policy'. The law 
was necessarily viewed, from this position, as an essential tool for reproducing 
collective culture, rather than, for example, a means of promoting individual 
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autonomy. This can be seen, for instance, in a comment on the relationship 
between law and society from James: 
... we 
have to reach out and convince people that that there is a, I 
won't say a legal solution because the legal aspect is not the solution 
to abortion, but certainly there is [... ] a role for the law ... 
in reducing 
the number of abortions, in reducing the culture that creates abortion, 
and so on in this whole debate, and that I suppose that's the very the 
counter to the right to choose argument that people feel uneasy or 
might feel uneasy about abortion, but believe that the law has no role 
in the matter. I suppose what we're trying to do is saying abortion is 
not a matter of personal conscience, it's a matter of, it's a matter of a 
lot of things, but among those things, it's a matter of a country's social 
policy... (Interview, 12th December 1996, Dublin) 
Here, James constructs the 'right to choose' position as an inadequately 
individualist response to a complex moral and social problem, and counters it 
with an explicitly communitarian position, articulated in terms which draw on 
the traditional republican view of the relationship between law and culture. The 
law is seen here as a guarantor of a social order, rather than primarily as a 
mechanism for arbitrating between competing rights claims. The work of the 
anti-abortion lobby, in this view, lies not in persuading people of the 
undesirability of abortion, but rather in persuading people that there is a role 
for the law in 'reducing the culture that creates abortion'. Again, this positions 
women seeking abortions and feminist reproductive rights advocacy as beyond 
the parameters of the society or community, which is characterized as the 
victim of abortion. Thus, anti-abortion campaigners are concerned with the fate 
both of the foetus and of the society itself, in contrast with reproductive rights 
advocates, who, from this perspective, have no interest in the cultural or social 
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level of abortion provision. In other words, the failure of abortion rights 
activists to be concerned with the society's character and future disqualifies 
them from a position of legitimacy in producing abortion laws. Again, anti- 
abortion activists are constructed, by virtue of their national concerns and 
interests, as having legitimate authority over abortion provision, and hence over 
women's bodies, despite their claim that they are simply concerned with the 
protection of 'unborn' life. Their post-X case articulation of concern with the 
'common good', in republican terms, simply reinforces their assertion of a 
national 'insider' position in contrast to 'outsider' feminism. 
Thus, anti-abortion activists expressed an interest not simply in outlawing 
abortion but in a much broader project concerned with the 'social fabric', 
through which a gendered and sexualized definition of nationhood could be 
constructed and maintained. As James said: 
When something is entrenched ... the whole social culture grows up 
around it, the industry grows up around it, the people accept it, you 
have abortion clinics in towns you know, it's part of the fabric of 
society, it becomes I think part of the economic fabric, small families 
and, you know, and so on and so forth. It's just very, you start, once 
you have it you start having to tackle all sorts of issues. (Interview, 
12th December 1996, Dublin) 
What James views is at stake here is more than the protection of foetal life 
from abortion. The entire culture is at risk, notably defined in terms of family 
size. The aim of preserving large families epitomizes the general agenda of the 
anti-abortion position, suggesting a concern with a 'traditional' family 
formation, including the centrality of that formation for the production of 
specifically 'traditional' discourses of gender and sexuality. In particular, 
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outlawing abortion was viewed as a means of guaranteeing the stability of 
gender discourses which would construct women primarily in traditionally 
maternal and domestic terms, and consequently, men in traditionally paternal 
and authoritative terms. This articulation of political subjectivity relies on the 
well-established and constitutionally recognised Irish republican discourse 
which defines the 'common good' in terms of women's domestic duties in the 
home. 9 
Thus, it would seem that anti-abortion political discourse articulated its 
position in the aftermath of the X case as traditionally republican, although not 
simply through a claim to the transparency of the 'people's will', as in 1983. The 
construction of the 'common good' in anti-abortion terms provided a strategy 
for reproducing particular articulations of gender and sexuality, through 
promoting the idea of a homogeneous national culture beyond political debate 
which legitimated anti-abortion authority over women's reproductive freedom. 
Anti-Abortion Politics as Feminist 
The third aspect of anti-abortion articulations of political subjectivity in 
response to the X case involved an explicit alignment of that position with a 
concern for women and girls, without any prompting from me. Helen, for 
example, indicated that her organisation opposed the practice of abortion on 
the grounds that it is 'anti-woman', as well as 'anti-child', as she put it. She 
claimed, for example, that abortion posed a huge risk to women's emotional 
stability. As she said: 
9Article 41 recognizes 'the family' as 'the natural primary and fundamental unit group of 
Society', which the State guarantees to protect: 
41.2.1° 'In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives to 
the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved. ' 
41.2.20 'The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by 
economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home' (Bunreacht 
na hEireann). 
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... 
[abortion] is quite quite destructive to the woman, to relationships 
in general, and to society, because society actually can suffer the after 
effects, you know, through people's work or relationship breaking 
down, [there are] actually quite wide-reaching repercussions to [... ] 
the abortion. (Interview, 13th December 1996, Dublin) 
This particular statement connects an anti-abortion position with a republican 
'common good' discourse, together with a narrowly feminist 'woman-centred' 
discourse as a means of justifying the legitimacy of this position in the wake of 
the rupture effected by the X case, where anti-abortion discourse was explicitly 
constructed as damaging the rights of girls and women. 
This anti-abortion woman-centred discourse was not unusual in comments 
made by anti-abortion interviewees. A number of anti-abortion activists 
claimed, for example, to have become politically involved specifically because 
of their concern for women: 
People like me, we're accused of being only interested in babies. No 
feelings for girls in these predicaments. Well for my own part anyway, 
it was women, it was the women that got me in it, I mean it was these 
girls coming to me, [... ] I don't think abortion is good, even leaving 
out the morals, leaving out all that, it doesn't do any good to girls, I 
mean, one of the things I'm quite proud of is that even when they 
didn't take my advice and went off and had the abortions, they always 
came back to me, for their sore throats and their other things, they 
didn't fall out with me. (Interview, with Fiona, medical practitioner, 
17th May 1997, County Dublin) 
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Although this is a clear attempt to position anti-abortion politics in 'feminist' 
terms, the evident slippage between 'women' and 'girls' suggests that this 
particular articulation of a discourse concerned with the position of women is 
instead invested in an attempt to exert power over women, justified through a 
gendered discourse which generally constructs women as lacking moral agency, 
precisely by employing an equivalence between the categories 'woman' and 
'girl'. 
This attempt to articulate an alliance between anti-abortion politics and 
feminism would seem to provide a means of justifying the 'pro-life' project in 
the wake of the X case, Legal abortion was now opposed in 'feminist' terms, for 
instance by arguing that men should be held responsible for their attitudes 
towards and relationships with women. In this formulation, support for the 
legalization of abortion was actually an anti-feminist position, since it entailed 
facilitating the construction of women in sexualized terms. 10 James expressed 
what he viewed as the impact legal abortion would have in precisely these 
terms: 
James: You'd wonder did the English 30 years ago think, well what's 
going to be the common sense thing if abortion becomes a method of 
family planning? How does this affect people, you know, how does it 
affect young men how does it affect any men who get a woman 
pregnant and abortion is the standard way to deal with it? How does it 
affect the woman, how does it affect the man? How does it affect his 
view of himself, how does it affect his view of his responsibilities? 
Lisa: So, what would you say? 
10This resonates with feminist concerns, expressed for instance by Petchesky, that feminists 
should be wary of campaigning wholeheartedly for abortion rights for women, because such a 
position 'lets men and society neatly off the hook' (1986: 7). 
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James: I'd say it removes responsibilities, it takes all the pressure off, 
and the result is you've more young men, or men generally now ... 
who don't see getting a woman pregnant as an issue of personal 
responsibility any more. ... 
You've had a massive series of knock-on 
effects in other areas, which, you wonder, did people ever think 
about? And I wonder did the feminist movement, when it took 
abortion and reproductive rights on as a core value, .. .I think 
it's been 
a disaster for women and for the feminist movement because its ... 
shifted women totally into disposable objects, and it's shifted 
responsibility off men. (Interview, 12th December 1996, Dublin) 
This apparent alignment between anti-abortion and 'feminist' concerns both 
relies on, and reproduces, through a traditional heterosexist discourse, a 
maternal and explicitly dependent construction of women, and a paternal and 
'responsible' construction of men. This does not accord with a broad feminist 
politics concerned primarily with transforming gender relations. 
Furthermore, while James's articulation of a cooperative attitude towards 
feminism, on the basis of a shared concern to avoid the construction of women 
primarily as subordinate sexual objects, indicates a degree of recognition of me 
as a feminist, he nevertheless positioned feminism, and thereby myself, with 'the 
English', in opposition to Irish national concerns. In other words, James 
articulates his anti-abortion position as national, in contrast to my possibly 
feminist position as not-national. In this way, the anti-abortion concern with 
defending the 'unborn' against abortion, through exercising a necessary control 
over women, is justified in national 'insider' terms. 
The contradictions involved in this 'feminist' anti-abortion discourse produced a 
tension which can be seen, for instance in a comment from Helen, '... the saying 
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that was used, [... ] in the pro-life organisation[s] [was] that if wombs had 
windows, would there be any abortion? ' (Interview, 13th December 1996, 
Dublin). Despite her expressed concern with the personal impact abortion 
might have on women, Helen here rearticulates a discourse which constructs 
women not only as incidental to pregnancy, but as barriers to obtaining true 
knowledge about the nature of pregnancy. How centrally concerned with 
women is this? 
However, it would seem, from the range of statements made by anti-abortion 
interviewees, that the X case had decisively positioned pregnant women within 
the hegemonic discourse of pregnancy and abortion. This recognition that 
women were not simply incidental to pregnancy would appear to undermine the 
anti-abortion assertion of a national anti-abortion culture, and hence the 
legitimacy of anti-abortion assertions of authority over women. 
Anti-Abortion Politics as Anti-Colonial 
I think that they fought to be Catholic for so long, in some ways, 
through history, that they are [... ] stronger Catholics because of it, and 
so they are not willing to let go of their Catholic pride. (Interview 
with Jane, an anti-abortion Canadian, 14th May 1997, Dublin) 
A key aspect of the interviewees' articulations of political subjectivity involved 
an attempt to re-employ the anti-colonial antagonism which had hegemonically 
constructed the significance of abortion in Ireland prior to the X case. This 
involved constructing Ireland primarily as not-England, as already mentioned, 
translating specifically into a construction of the nation in terms of the Catholic 
patriarchal family and its moral sophistication, expressed in 'pro-life' anti- 
abortion terms. Even from Jane's nationally 'outsider' perspective the abortion 
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issue is constructed as an issue of religious identity, defined, in anti-colonial 
terms, as politically resistant. 
The first aspect of this anti-colonial anti-abortion discourse, constructing the 
nation in terms of the patriarchal Catholic family, was expressed, for instance, 
by Eoin, as he discussed his motivation for becoming involved in 'pro-life' 
politics: 
... 
I read, somewhere, [about] a case in the ... Appeal 
Courts in 
England where it had held that the father had no rights at all, that the 
unborn child had no right to life, that he [sic] had no right to life until 
he was born ... that 
it was the mother who was the person who had all 
the rights. The child had no rights, and the father had no right to 
assert the child's right. And that was a case where a father had 
challenged the mother, the mother's right to have an abortion and 
lost. Now Ireland as you know has a written Constitution, and citizens 
have rights under Article 40. A citizen is, to be a citizen you had to be 
born, prior to 1983. So some of us felt that the unborn should be 
given citizen's rights. (Interview, 9th December 1996, Galway) 
Here Eoin constructs the significance of the abortion issue precisely in terms of 
an antagonism between Ireland and England, played out through competing 
claims to authority over children between mothers and fathers. In his own view, 
Eoin began campaigning for foetal rights on the basis that he wished to prevent 
the State recognising women ('mothers') as authoritative over pregnancy, a 
situation which he associated specifically with England, and which he rejected. 
He justifies this in explicitly national anti-colonial terms, '[n]ow Ireland as you 
know has a written Constitution... '. His focus on the Constitution is significant 
in two ways. Firstly, Ireland is referred to as having a written Constitution, 
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implicitly in contrast to England, signifying a more democratic state structure, 
allowing citizens such as himself to campaign to produce a change in the basic 
law governing the state. Secondly, the Constitution is the site of recognition of 
national sovereignty. Thus, focusing on the Constitution in particular, rather 
than, for instance on legislation or judicial decisions, already constructs 
abortion in nationally significant terms. In other words, this particular statement 
positions the speaker on the terrain of nationhood, in anti-colonial terms, 
through a specific reference to the Constitution, while also constructing anti- 
colonial opposition in terms of defending the gendered familial nation. Thus, 
the abortion issue is constructed by Eoin as a major site of resistance to 
colonial culture, through providing a means of defending the gendered family. 
This apparently serves to justify the anti-abortion project of removing 
decisional authority over pregnancy and consequently over women's 
embodiment from women themselves. 
James elaborates on this anti-colonial construction of national religious 
morality as a major factor inspiring the politicization of abortion: 
I've just been surprised talking to English people, how ignorant they 
are about abortion. I think Irish people are much more tuned in 
because it's been a raging debate here, and it's ... 
in the, it's, foreign 
journalists have said it to me, that the Irish debate takes place on an 
unusually high level, you never hear, you're talking about public 
debates on the rights and wrongs of ectopic pregnancies and double 
effects and morning after pills and all this kind of stuff I mean that 
simply is at a different level to, I mean I know a pro life organisations 
abroad who wouldn't, simply wouldn't know what those issues were, 
because they never have to address them, because it's at an entirely 
different level. And I've heard people at bus stops arguing the 
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difference between medical intervention and abortion, or taxi drivers 
argue it or discuss it, and that's because it's been discussed, and it's 
part of the political jargon, it's part of the public debate. (Interview, 
12th December 1996, Dublin) 
The sophistication of the debate in Ireland is contrasted with the simplicity of 
public concern about abortion specifically in England, where control over 
abortion decisions is assumed to rest with women, implicitly constructing 
Ireland as a morally literate, because religious, popular culture. Eoin explicitly 
characterised the nation as follows: 'I think Irish people, way down the 
centuries, they have been fundamental believers, and they had simple faith that 
carried them through the difficulties ... 
' (Interview, 9th December 1996, 
Galway). 
This construction of Irish culture, through religion, as morally superior to 
English culture was also expressed through a discourse of class. Eoin, for 
instance, explained the centrality of class distinctions to English culture as an 
effect of secularization, claiming that '[y]ou can't serve God and manna [sic]'. 
In commenting on social change in Ireland, he argued that: 
... 
[social changes] come from, I suppose, [a] secular sort of society, 
and the world we live in, where money is the god, money seems to 
rule everything now, and in the old days people were happy when they 
had enough to live on and they weren't crying about poverty. I mean 
look at the scandals we have now, [... ] we used to read in the 
newspapers here about the sleaze in the United Kingdom, sleaze in 
Parliament we'd read, and we read about our own Dail here, and sure 
we're only hypocrites, and we're only scratching the surface of it. 
(Interview, 9th December 1996, Galway) 
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Materialist attitudes, which he argues are derived from secularism, epitomized 
by England, are becoming increasingly evident in Ireland, in this view, as 
religious authority is replaced by a concern with money. Eoin went on to 
lament the increase in street crime and drug use, as a result of this new secular 
culture, as well as an increased expectation of class privilege from the wealthier 
and better educated groups. Clearly, a return to poverty and religiosity would 
restore national morality. " A ban on abortion is viewed from this perspective 
as a means of guarding against the further encroachment of secular materialism, 
since it would constitutionally secure religious morality as definitive of the 
national will. In these terms, the anti-abortion lobby articulates a distinctively 
anti-colonial discourse, from an explicitly 'insider' position which is concerned 
to resist the encroachment of 'outside' culture and values. 
From this perspective Ireland was at risk from a form of cultural imperialism 
which sees the control of population as the answer to the world's problems. 
Such population control policies pose a threat to the survival of the Irish 
family, and consequently Irish morality and Irish culture generally: 
I mean, when you look at our government, ... and see what they're 
doing to the family, the family must be broken down, and we must 
adopt the United Nations formula for the family, which is any two 
people who agree to live together constitutes a family [... ] I see it as 
[a consequence of] the hold of what you might call the world 
population programme, which again is largely accommodated by the 
United Nations, and to which the British government contributes 
significantly. And Irish International Planned Parenthood Federation. 
11The peculiarity of this position was emphasized by the affluence of Eoin's home, where the 
interview took place. 
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The answer to everything is ... population 
limitation in a word, and 
abortion is the ultimate way of limiting the population. This is what 
they've been telling people at Beijing, and Cairo, and Istanbul, this is 
the answer to the world's problems. (Interview, 9th December 1996, 
Galway) 
Abortion access is equated here with 'outsider' concerns to limit the 
reproductive capacities of the nation, through affecting the reproductive 
capacities of national women. Thus, women's bodies are constructed here as 
the site of a neo-colonial struggle which places the survival of the nation itself 
at risk. Only by asserting official control over women's bodies can the 
republican project, concerned with representing the morally defined nation, 
survive. 
This articulation of Irish culture as morally opposed to and indeed vulnerable to 
'population control' policies was elaborated as a specifically anti-eugenic 
position by James: 
I can't understand how in English hospitals Down's Syndrome babies 
are let die! I can't understand how in Holland, you don't see too many 
people in wheelchairs in Holland and there's no secret about that .... 
I 
can't understand how in Holland again, they have quite low healthcare 
costs because they don't have serious costs for the elderly, because 
people get badly ill and long term illnesses and, the euthanasia thing 
kicks in and the problem is solved! And, ... you walk through 
Amsterdam and it's this fabulous city and its fantastic lifestyle and all 
the rest and then you think hang on a minute what's this, what's this 
based on? This is based on a social policy [... ] that was contrary to the 
idea of certain freedoms... (Interview, 12th December 1996, Dublin) 
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Here James constructs Irish anti-abortion morality as opposed specifically to a 
eugenic culture which necessarily compromises human freedoms, The 
equivalence articulated here is between wealth, lifestyle, and a eugenic 
morality, in opposition to Irish concern with human freedom, expressed 
through anti-abortion morality. Thus, the anti-abortion lobby is specifically 
aligned with concerns to defend human diversity and imperfection, and 
opposed to what is implicitly constructed as a quasi-fascistic culture which is 
primarily concerned with consumption and wealth at the cost of human 
freedom. The anti-abortion position is thereby established as a resistant politics, 
in distinctly national terms, specifically concerned with defending human frailty 
and weakness against domination. 
Thus, this anti-abortion view draws on the anti-colonial tradition to construct 
its project as one of resistance to cultural domination. In this specific context, 
feminism represents a major threat of cultural imperialism. Eoin explained the 
increasingly liberal culture in Ireland in these terms: 
I think that the Women's Liberation Movement must have had a part 
in it [liberalisation], and you know in the same way as they have had in 
America, and in America I think they're regretting it now, they're 
trying to pull back from all of this. We haven't gone that far yet here... 
(Interview, 9th December 1996, Galway) 
Feminism, or the Women's Liberation Movement, is constructed here as an 
alien threat to Irish culture. Its distinctly non-national character is emphasised 
in Eoin's reference to its impact in the U. S. A. This strategy again justifies the 
anti-abortion aim to secure control over women's bodies in national 'insider' 
terms by characterizing its opponents as 'outsiders'. Eoin's articulation of this 
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perspective on the impact of feminism in Ireland, against which he positioned 
his anti-abortion activism, signifies an explicitly defensive attack, in the light of 
his suspicions concerning my own perspective on abortion. For example, when 
I asked for his opinion on Mary Robinson's presidency he replied that the 
question wasn't fair, because if he said that he didn't like her, I would accuse 
him of being anti-feminist. Thus, his attack on the impact of the Women's 
Liberation Movement was an overtly confrontational comment from a 
participant who suspected that his interlocutor was in fact his political 
opponent. His desire not to be labeled anti-feminist, however, was strangely 
inconsistent with his attack on the Women's Liberation Movement, suggesting 
a defensiveness in the context of a perceived rupture in anti-abortion hegemony 
in the wake of the X case, where feminism was no longer constructed as a 
threat to national survival. 
In discussing the agenda of the 'pro-choice' lobby in Ireland, James did not 
simply construct that lobby as a threat to national culture. Rather, he 
constructed reproductive rights politics as a native, if anomalous, legalistic 
response to a complex problem: 
I'd say there [... ] are very few, very small percentage which would ... 
go all the way, with pro-choice, and even a lot of them I think would 
do so on legal grounds, rather than, you'd find very few people in 
Ireland who would say that abortion, you know, who would say that 
abortion in Ireland is not a human life, and ... who take the position 
that is much more common abroad. The majority of people in Ireland 
are very uneasy with it, and I think even people on the other side to 
the Pro Life Campaign are very, are uneasy with abortion, they don't 
like abortion, and even if they think it should be a right, that doesn't 
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mean they personally support it themselves ... (Interview, 12th 
December 1996, Dublin) 
Given that the X case had effectively produced a limited accommodation 
between feminism and the nation, in the sense that advocacy for abortion 
access in that case became a means of defending family integrity against the 
infringement of rape, James's comment above could be viewed as a limited 
recognition of the 'insider' status of feminism, although only in not-quite 'pro- 
choice' terms. The X case had made the construction of feminist reproductive 
rights discourse as an 'outsider' politics more difficult. However, at the same 
time, anti-abortion discourse remained committed to producing an opposition 
between national morality and reproductive rights politics. Hence, feminist 
politics could only be recognised in 'insider' national terms if its commitment to 
women's reproductive rights was constructed as inconsistent with its more 
basic 'Irish' concerns, namely with the protection of human life. 
Thus, anti-abortion discourse attempted to 'suture' Irish political space in the 
wake of the X case by articulating an anti-colonial position which re-employed 
a primary antagonism between national 'pro-life' morality, derived from 
religious culture, and foreign secular 'anti-life' morality, whose materialist logic 
produced an imperialist and eugenic population control agenda which 
threatened national survival. However, the general parameters of this discourse 
relied on ignoring the complexity of political debate produced by the X case, In 
particular, this aspect of post-X case anti-abortion discourse does not speak to 
the events of, or public response to, the X case, referring instead to 
mythologies of nationhood which had both produced and legitimated a national 
anti-abortion political subjectivity prior to 1992. Furthermore, a necessary 
aspect of anti-colonial anti-abortion discourse, namely the construction of 
feminist reproductive rights politics in alignment with 'outsider' secular 'anti-life' 
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morality, could no longer be simply assumed. Rather, the tensions evident in 
the instrumental reproduction of anti-colonial discourse as a populist anti- 
abortion strategy indicates the difficulty of any effort to overcome the 
'democratization' of political space which resulted from the X case. 
Conclusion 
The rupture in political space produced by the X case, and the consequent 
pluralisation of antagonisms, destabilizing the primary opposition which had 
constructed Ireland as not-England, required that anti-abortion discourse 
rearticulate its position as national in broader terms than had been previously 
been necessary, as a means of recovering popular legitimacy. Hence, statements 
from anti-abortion campaigners articulated their position in democratic, 
republican, and even 'feminist' terms, as the forgoing discussion has 
demonstrated. 
Nevertheless, there was a clear effort to reproduce an anti-abortion position in 
narrowly 'popular' terms, by rearticulating the primary antagonism which had 
operated hegemonically to produce 'pro-life' national identity prior to the X 
case. Thus, there was an attempt to reunify political space specifically through 
employing an anti-colonial discourse which constructed Irishness in religious 
and traditionally familial gendered terms, in contrast to 'outsider' culture, 
characterized by secularism, individualism, materialism, and feminism. 
This latter strategy could not, however, simply ignore the political effects of the 
X case, and particularly the way that case repositioned women as central to 
pregnancy, and feminism as not necessarily a threat to the Irish family and 
hence to Irish nationhood, as constructed in the very terms favoured by anti- 
abortion activists themselves. The interviews reveal a range of strategies aimed 
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at obstructing criticism precisely by incorporating opponents' concerns within 
the anti-abortion project's defences. 
The assertion that women's right to travel should not be compromised in the 
interests of the right to life of the 'unborn' can be interpreted as a recognition 
that anti-abortion forces could not legitimately claim authority over women's 
bodies in the wake of the X case. However, anti-abortion activists were 
unwilling to discuss the significance of the X case in any detail, other than to 
insist that women's right to travel should not be infringed by a foetal right to 
life. Furthermore, the major focus of much anti-abortion work during the 
period when these interviews took place was aimed at securing another anti- 
abortion referendum, in order to insert an unambiguous abortion ban in the 
Constitution. Thus, while activists insisted on their concern for democratic 
principles such as citizen's freedom to leave the state, and articulated their 
project in terms of a republican concern for the 'common good', as well as an 
anti-colonial concern to resist cultural colonialism, they were nevertheless 
actively engaged in attempting to reassert the pre-X case legal and popular 
political anti-abortion regime. 
The next chapter will consider the ways in which feminist political subjectivity 
responded to the rupture produced by the X case in articulating its position in 
relation to shifting hegemonic discourses of nationhood and abortion. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE X CASE AND FEMINIST POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY 
Introduction 
As with anti-abortion political subjectivity, the X case had a significant impact 
on the national position of feminism, ' as demonstrated particularly in Chapter 
Four. The rupture in the anti-abortion construction of nationhood destabilized 
the hegemonic construction of feminism as an external aggressor in relation to 
the nation. 
This Chapter is concerned with how the X case rupture in hegemonic 
nationhood shifted discourses of feminist political subjectivity in national terms, 
a change which is suggested, for example, by the evident articulation of an anti- 
abortion 'feminist' position discussed in Chapter Five. Thus, the period during 
which the interviews to be considered in this Chapter took place saw feminism 
occupying a newly legitimate national position, particularly in the context of 
abortion politics. 
The Chapter is divided into three sections, considering in turn the contexts 
within which the material was produced; the continuity of a national 'outsider' 
feminist discourse; and the emergence of 'insider' feminism. These latter two 
sections will specifically consider competing appraisals of the impact of the X 
case on the relative national positions on anti-abortion and reproductive rights 
perspectives. I will first discuss the context for the discussion by briefly 
introducing the participants, and the circumstances of the interviews. 
'The term 'feminist', as it is employed in this chapter, defines a position which supports 
women's reproductive freedom. Thus, the chapter does not include analysis of anti-abortion 
'feminism'. 
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Interview Participants 
As outlined in the Introduction to this Part, this Chapter draws on a set of 
seven semi-structured interviews with feminist reproductive rights activists. 
Most interviewees were recruited through their membership of the Women's 
Information Network (WIN) in Dublin, and WING, the sister group in Galway, 
although many were also involved in a range of other groups and organizations. 
WIN was established in the late 1980s, to provide abortion information 
following judicial prosecution of information providers in 1986, and the 
consequent censoring of all sources of information (Barry 1988b: 60). WING 
was set up later, with support and training from WIN. The network operated 
anonymously as a telephone service, providing practical information and 
support for women seeking abortions in Britain. The telephone number was 
illegally advertised, for example by putting stickers in women's toilets, The 
Galway group raised funds largely through running benefits, as well as from 
individual donations. The Dublin group was financed in a number of ways, 
receiving donations from individuals and groups. An important source of 
funding was provided by the Scottish Abortion Campaign, whose members ran 
the Dublin mini-marathon annually to raise funds, obtaining sponsorship, for 
instance, from Scottish trade unions. WIN also received financial support from 
Dublin student unions, usually in return for providing telephone counselling 
training. The group collaborated with the London-based Irish Women's 
Abortion Support Group (IWASG), which provided support to women on 
arrival in London. 2 WIN members also worked closely with the British 
2IWASG members would meet women travelling alone and offer accommodation in their 
homes, when needed. Financial assistance was also offered, largely in the form of negotiating 
reduced rates, staged payment, and a number of free beds with the clinics. Although still in 
existence, the group was relatively inactive by the time these interviews were carried out, 
given the changing legal context. See Irish Women's Abortion Support Group (1988) for a 
description of how the group operated. 
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Pregnancy Advisory Service (BPAS), who provided training for the group, as 
well as financing and managing the publication of WIN's information booklet. 
Following the X case in 1992, and the subsequent Constitutional recognition of 
women's right to receive information on abortion services available abroad, 
these groups, which had been primarily information and support services 
operating illegally, disbanded, particularly since well established organizations 
such as the Irish Family Planning Association could now offer abortion 
information and support legitimately. 
Other groups to which participants had belonged had also ceased to operate by 
the time the interviews took place. The Anti-Amendment Campaign had been 
established to counter the PLAC in the run-up to the 1983 referendum. 
Subsequent associated campaigns to have the Eighth Amendment repealed 
gained strength in the immediate aftermath of the X case injunction, particularly 
in the context of the Maastricht Treaty referendum. However, these campaigns 
have subsequently declined, in the light of the Supreme Court's decision that 
the Eighth Amendment allows for a right to abortion in particular 
circumstances. Thus, the X case had a major effect on feminist activism in the 
field of reproductive rights, not least by ending the previously illegal activities 
of information and support providers. 
Of those who participated in the interviews, two, 'Sinead' and 'Marie', lived in 
Galway, and the other five in Dublin. Sinead' worked in a book shop, and had 
been involved in WING, as well as the Galway Repeal the Eighth Amendment 
Campaign. 
'Marie' an academic, had also been active in both WING and the Galway 
Repeal the Eighth Amendment Campaign. She had previously also been active 
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in the IWASG in London. During 1992, she had campaigned against the 
Maastricht Treaty from a reproductive rights position. 
Of the five Dublin interviewees, 'Jo' was a member of WIN as well as a student 
activist. At the time of the interview, she had just completed a doctorate, and 
was about to emigrate to the United States. 
'Catherine', a development worker, had done some work for the Anti- 
Amendment Campaign in the early 1980s before emigrating to Britain. She had 
been briefly involved in IWASG while she was in London, and had been 
involved in WIN since her return to Ireland in 1987. 
'Ruth', an ex journalist and trade unionist, had also been involved in WIN, as 
well as in its forerunner, the Defend the Clinics Campaign, which had been set 
up in response to the prosecution of pregnancy advisory organizations offering 
abortion information and support during the 1980s. 
'Susan', an academic, had been an active feminist since the mid 1970s, when she 
had been involved with Irish Women United during her undergraduate years. 3 
She had emigrated to the US, but returned to Ireland in 1984. She became 
active in reproductive rights politics specifically following the X case in 1992, 
when she joined the Repeat the Eighth Amendment Campaign. 
'Aileen', also an academic, became involved in the abortion conflict as a student 
union activist, and was prosecuted by SPUC for disseminating abortion 
information during the 1980s. She had emigrated to London where she was 
active in IWASG, before returning to Ireland in the mid 1990s. At the time of 
3For details on this group and its relationship to the women's movement in Ireland see 
Mahon, 1987: 61. 
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the interview, she was involved in setting up the Alliance for Choice, a 
campaigning organization aimed at publicizing the 'pro-choice' position, in 
order to underline the lack of anti-abortion consensus. 
Interview Contexts and Power Dynamics 
The interviews were held in participant's offices, as well as in coffee shops and 
one case in a pub. As already mentioned, I had explicitly presented myself to 
this group as a political 'insider', a member of IWASG, who had also been 
marginally and briefly involved with the Galway Repeal the Eighth Amendment 
Campaign after the X Case, before emigrating. The interviews were largely 
characterized by an atmosphere of friendly helpfulness, despite my nervous 
interviewing manner and awkward presentation of myself and my research. I 
was sharply aware of my inexperience at interviewing, particularly when talking 
to academics and journalists, and was also impressed by the courage and 
conviction of the women I met. Thus, the instability of my 'insider' claims were 
in play, at least from my own perspective. 
On the whole, however, these participants were supportive of the research, 
although some did express disagreements with my arguments. Participants did 
not attempt to limit what questions I could ask, and spoke to me primarily as a 
feminist researcher, rather than, for example, through a discourse of familial 
identity or professional authority. Thus, the material to be discussed in this 
Chapter was produced in a context of shared political subjectivity, although 
there were some differences, for example, over whether or not national 
discourses were particularly significant, or in what ways they came into play. 
This was particularly the case in the interview with Ruth, who argued that it 
was the Catholic Church rather than ideas of nationhood, which she defined in 
republican anti-authoritarian terms, that was responsible for the popularity of 
anti-abortion politics. Furthermore, as already mentioned, my unease in relation 
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to the 'insider'Ioutsider' tension meant that I concluded some of the interviews 
quite quickly, and was sometimes reluctant to ask too many questions which 
might position me emphatically as a political 'outsider'. 
The next sections will consider alternative interpretations of the political 
significance of the X case from reproductive rights activists. Specifically of 
interest is the construction of this feminist political position in the context of 
the rupture in hegemonic anti-abortion nationhood discourse. 
Post-X Case Feminist Political Subjectivity 
Competing appraisals of the connections between nationhood, abortion, 
women's citizenship, and feminism characterize post X case feminist political 
subjectivity. A residual discursive construction of feminism as not-national was 
evident, a perspective which viewed the X case as irrelevant to the position of 
women with crisis pregnancies. 4 However, the major reformulation of feminist 
political subjectivity following the rupture in anti-abortion hegemony 
positioned feminism, to varying extents, more decisively 'inside' the nation, as 
the following discussion will demonstrate. 
Residual 'Outsider' National Political Subjectivity 
A residual discursive construction of feminism and nationhood in exclusive and 
opposed terms was evident in the perspectives of some interviewees, 
particularly in considering the impact and political significance of the X case 
itself. 
4Although I employ Raymond William's Marxist scheme distinguishing the residual and the 
emergent, this is not intended to suggest an eventual dialectical transformation into 
domination, as Williams's scheme does (1981: 204). Rather, the terms are applied in post- 
structural terms, which take for granted that these relative positions are neither mutually 
exclusive nor necessarily stable. In other words, the residual can both become, and contain 
elements of, the emergent, and vice versa. 
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From this perspective, popular attitudes to abortion were not particularly 
transformed in response to the events of the X case. Rather, the popular 
response remained at the level of shock and sympathy with a particular set of 
circumstances. For example, Marie argued that the failure of the X case to 
make any broad political impact was due precisely to a disjunction between 
feminist and national-popular political discourses. As she explained: 
... 
because of the [... ] lack of [... ] articulation of the feminist argument 
consistently all the time [during the 1980s and early 1990s] [... ] we 
had no reservoir to draw on [when the X case occurred] and as well 
as that we were exhausted, and [... ] there was no centralized cohesive 
sort of centre to this. We were awash with all this emotion, and the 
women TDs [politicians] kind of finding it possible to talk together, 
you know, talk in one group, on the subject and stuff. And again it 
just became, a huge [... ] personal tragedy for this woman, as opposed 
to the politics of what put this particular woman [in this particular 
situation]. And that's the way the thing was handled - we feel sorry 
for this particular woman and this is a terrible thing [... ] everybody 
was bleating and beating their hearts [... ] but the whole thing that put 
the damn thing in place got ignored. (Interview, 9th December 1996, 
Galway) 
In other words, feminism was unable to make any impact on popular attitudes 
to abortion through the X case because it was unable to articulate a response in 
national-popular terms, not least because it lacked the energy to attempt to do 
so after the long struggle since the Eighth Amendment had been ratified in 
1983. Thus, Marie insisted that popular outrage at the circumstances of the X 
case remained at the level of compassion and sympathy, and did not transform 
political attitudes to abortion. 
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This interpretation of the X case in terms of a discourse of feminist political 
subjectivity as 'outside' the nation can be seen, for instance, in a comment made 
by Susan on the continued silence over the practice of abortion access in post- 
X case Ireland: 
There was a Late Late Show [television talk show] about a month ago 
on people whose children commit suicide. It was very moving and [... ] 
everybody admired it and they admired Gay Byrne [host] for the way 
he handled it and the courage of people who were all parents, to talk 
about their children. And a lot of us were thinking actually [... ] they'd 
never do a bloody Late Late Show on women who'd had abortions, 
and have them on to talk about it, and the dilemma, and the horror 
and the misery and [... ] the negative parts of it. And also on the other 
hand the reason why they had to do it and why they got the decision in 
the end and how they got on with their lives, which is all part of the 
picture. (Interview, 15th May 1997, Dublin)5 
In this view, not only is there a public silence surrounding abortion access, but 
the implication in Susan's comment is that popular abortion discourse has 
remained at a level which is primarily unconcerned with the situations of 
5The Late Late Show has run since 1962, and has been a significant forum of public debate. 
It has been credited as a catalyst for liberalization, challenging the taken-for-granted 
authority of the church in particular. The Show's adaptation of traditional oral culture has 
been key to its success. The host, Gay Byrne, informally interviews guests, including 
representatives of the church and the State, on the basis of a minimum of information, 
combined with a significant amount of audience participation. Thus, powerful figures have 
been challenged face-to-face in an informal 'domestic' setting. The issues raised by the Show, 
including those of sexuality, Traveller's Rights, feminism and republicanism, and indeed 
abortion, have provoked debate in the press and across other broadcast media, as well as in 
the Dail. The famous 'Bishop and the nightie' incident highlighted the controversial status of 
the show in the 1960s, when a game about what women wear on their wedding nights 
provoked a Bishop to call the Show in disapproval, provoking a critical national media 
debate on the church's attempts to control sexuality within marriage (Pettit 2000: 166-170). 
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women who have had abortions. In other words, the X case had not shifted the 
terms of popular discourse from a primary interest in the moral status of the 
foetus towards a consideration of the complexity of circumstances within which 
women obtain abortions. However, in Marie's view, highlighting the conditions 
under which women obtained abortions would not in itself undermine anti- 
abortion hegemony: 
... the 
harrowing process that one goes through when you have a crisis 
pregnancy and you're trying to get the information, you go to England 
and you come back and all that sort of thing, that's been obscured, 
and, if we can start to talk about that, I think, Irish people will still be 
able to shut it out, and say fair enough, you know, you can go to 
England, we're not going to have it here. (Interview, 9th December 
1996, Galway) 
Marie compared the response to the X case with popular attitudes towards 
reports of famines in Africa, pointing out that while sympathy and support may 
have been expressed towards X and her family, as it usually is towards famine 
victims, this did not lead to a politicization of the issues involved. 6 The 
construction of this parallel illustrates the tension between 'inside' and 'outside', 
from this residual feminist position. First, it parallels popular attitudes to girls 
and women experiencing crisis pregnancies, such as X herself, with popular 
attitudes to 'foreign' disasters, such as famine in Africa. Feminism is positioned 
here within the terrain of advocacy for women's reproductive self- 
determination. Thus, feminism is aligned with girls and women seeking 
abortions. However, this does not simply construct attitudes to abortion and 
6As Marie said: 'maybe it's like famine in Africa, when you're presented with this enormous 
personal tragedy [... J what comes back is amazing sympathy and support and everything, and 
all of those really really important things, but the politics gets lost in it. I'm not certain that 
the politics were addressed at all' (Interview, 9th December 1996, Galway) 
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advocates for abortion access as though these were simply 'foreign' concerns, 
since popular responses in Ireland to famines abroad tend to be particularly 
sympathetic, as a result of the resonances with the Irish potato famine of the 
mid-nineteenth century. Indeed, public commemoration of the 150th 
anniversary of the famine of 1845-49 was in progress during the period when 
the interviews took place. Thus, the perception that abortion and abortion 
advocacy were popularly viewed as 'foreign' issues was tempered by the 
specific parallel with famines, which carry a distinctly national inflection. 
However, the overall impact of the X case, in this view, nevertheless did not 
transform popular attitudes to abortion, not least since, in Marie's opinion, the 
case had made no difference to those women who continued to travel abroad in 
secret for abortions. 
Other effects of the residual construction of feminist politics as not-national can 
be seen, for example, in Marie's view that abortion law would never shift in 
response to feminist politics. Her position depended both on the idea that, as 
she put it, 'the Irish psyche has a special place for abortion', and that feminism 
in Ireland did not have the energy to campaign for change, largely as a 
consequence of always having to resist its 'outsider' construction: 
I find it difficult to see where the momentum would come for a 
renewed [reproductive rights] campaign, given that we've lost the best 
part of sixteen years in terms of presenting the feminist arguments. 
It['s] almost like starting in 1979 when the pregnancy counselling 
groups got going, it seems to me, so there isn't a huge motivation, or 
energy, or space within the women's movement, and it certainly won't 
come from anywhere else. (Interview, 9th December 1996, Galway) 
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As Marie sees it, the 'outsider' position of feminism provided it with an already 
onerous task in trying to establish a national legitimacy for its general position, 
before it might make any significant impact on attitudes to abortion. 
Specifically, Marie characterized feminist campaigning during the 1980s, which 
tried to circumvent its own political marginality by articulating arguments 
within the terms of debate established by the anti-abortion lobby, as naive: 
I really really though that if we galvanized the middle of the road, 
that the so-called sort of decent person could see that you can't do 
this. I really believed that, [... ] and at the beginning of the nineties to 
look back and say well, damn it to hell, why was I so naive, to have 
thought that we could shift the ground to that extent? [I] regret taking 
part in a middle of the road campaign that banished and silenced the 
feminist politics. (Interview, 9th December 1996, Galway) 
The 'insider'toutsider' tension was also central to Marie's discussion of her own 
abortion, at a number of levels. Not only did this disclosure during the 
interview contest hegemonic constructions of nationhood in terms of abortion, 
it also produced an 'insider' construction of feminist political subjectivity in 
terms of women's reproductive decisions. The feminist 'insider'/'outsider' 
dimension of the research context itself also came into play. As she said, 
[I have] gone through the experience now of having a crisis 
pregnancy, and choosing to terminate that pregnancy, and just again at 
the level of my own existence I found that an immense decision. And I 
was, I suppose, overwhelmed that I was giving myself the right to end 
a life. And I didn't actually understand the power of the other 
arguments until such time as I found myself in the position. [... ] I 
never doubted that I had the right to do this, but what it brought 
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home to me was the enormity of responsibility I was putting on 
myself. And because of my politics, the extraordinary freedom of 
choice I was giving to women in general to make these decisions, and 
I subsequently went on, I became pregnant again and I now have two 
children and I also had miscarriages, so I've had a number of different 
relationships to the whole thing about pregnancy, and the ending of 
pregnancies and having babies and things. And I wonder [... ] whether 
it strikes at the heart of relations between women and men, because 
the feminist position which argues a right to choose is giving 
enormous, is trusting women, with life and death issues. [... ] [W]hy 
would patriarchy give that right to women when it denies them an 
awful lot of more basic kind of rights? [... ] [I]t's such a radical power 
[... ] to give to women, because its sidelining men completely. 
(Interview, 9th December 1996, Galway) 
First, Marie explicitly contextualised the discussion of her abortion experience 
as a feminist political strategy aimed at breaking the silence surrounding Irish 
women's abortions, although she underlined that this was an extremely difficult 
burden to carry on an individual level. Thus, discussing her abortion experience 
in the interview was intended to undermine the construction of Irishness as 
anti-abortion, and consequently contest the construction of feminist abortion 
advocacy as 'outside' national commonsense. 
Second, Marie's discussion of her abortion underlined her female feminist 
identity, and placed her political activism in an 'insider' context in relation to 
reproduction. This construction of pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, and birth 
clearly views women's bodies as the moral territories of women and feminists, 
albeit not in distinctively 'national' terms, in direct opposition to the 
construction of women's bodies as the moral terrain of the anti-abortion 
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national political subject discussed in Chapter Five. Thus, while Marie's 
reproductive history did not of itself motivate her feminist politics, it underlined 
to her, on a personal level, the significance of feminist politics. Her feminism 
was situated 'inside' women's complex decision making in relation to 
reproduction, in contrast to the 'outside' situation of anti-abortion discourse, 
characterized here as a patriarchal interest in denying women any power over 
what she describes as life and death issues. 
Third, Marie's discussion of her feminist subjectivity in the context of a 
research interview explicitly articulated that context in 'insider'/'outsider' terms. 
Her explicit effort to make an impact on the public silence surrounding Irish 
women's abortions through the interview involved a deliberate employment of 
the 'public' character of the interview. Thus, my position as researcher was 
aligned with the 'public' audience, and thereby constructed as 'outside' feminist 
politics, although sympathetic, at least for purposes of the interview itself. 
Thus, this articulation of a national 'outsider' feminist subjectivity nevertheless 
resisted that construction, and at the same re-employed an 'insider'/'outsider' 
tension both in positioning feminist politics within the terrain of women's 
reproductive moral dilemmas, in contrast to anti-abortion patriarchal politics, 
and in situating 'insider' feminist political subjectivity in opposition to 'public' 
attitudes to abortion, particularly through strategies adopted in the interview 
itself. 
Emergent Discourse: Feminism and Shifting Nationhood 
However, the more generally articulated discourse of feminist political 
subjectivity following the X case did not construct nationhood as necessarily 
anti-abortion and consequently anti-feminist. From this emergent perspective, 
the X case had underlined, in unequivocally national terms, the moral 
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complexity of abortion decisions. Thus, the anti-abortion boundaries of 
Irishness had been destabilized. 
The X Case, Abortion and the Familial Nation 
... that was what was really good about 
the X case, people knew the 
detail of one individual's story, [... ] it was a story that you couldn't but 
be sympathetic to, I mean it wasn't a hard story, like some of the 
harder ones that we would have come across in Women's Information 
Network, so, young people especially were able to put themselves in 
the shoes of that girl, and say, well, if this happened to me, what 
would I do? And parents who had teenage kids were able to say, if 
this happened my daughter what would I do? And they weren't able to 
say anymore I'm either for abortion or I'm against abortion, they had 
to think about it through a set of circumstances that were [... ] real, 
[... ] nobody was making it up [... ], nobody was saying, theoretically 
you know, at so many months, or, you know. It was a real situation, a 
real family, and the whole issue of child sexual abuse as well was so 
[... ] at the front of people's minds, that it, it just really brought it home 
to people I think, the [X] case. (Interview with Ruth, 13th December 
1996, Dublin) 
The particular circumstances of the X case drew popular attention to the 
complexities of abortion decisions, in specifically national terms, through the 
familial context of the case. As Ruth suggests, the specific position of X as a 
daughter allowed a popular identification either with X herself, or with her 
parents. The case underlined how crisis pregnancy situations might arise 'at 
home', in the family, and hence within the terms of nationhood. As Jo 
commented 'if she'd have been twenty now, it would have been very different, 
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but I mean the fact she was fourteen ... ' 
(Interview, 11th December 1996, 
Dublin). Thus, abortions might be not only morally legitimate 'at home', but 
actually necessary in order to maintain the integrity of the family, and hence the 
boundaries of the familial nation, particularly in response to sexual violation. 
As Ruth pointed out, a major issue which the case politicized was that of sexual 
violence, particularly against children. This was connected to popular and 
official concerns over the right to travel, as Part Two has indicated. In Jo's 
words 'the Irish State could not be seen to [... ] be imprisoning children on the 
island', and particularly not in a context where the particular imprisoned child 
was a victim of sexual violence, and her efforts to leave the island to seek an 
abortion were part of her struggle with the effects of that violence. Thus, the 
'pro-life' nation's action in defending the right to life of the 'unborn', effectively 
supporting the action of the rapist, was popularly considered to be illegitimate. 
As Jo commented, 
I remember a lot of people saying at the time, "God we can't be seen 
to be this you know sort of Banana Republic", you know, sort of 
attitude, again, "God! what must the rest of the world think of us, this 
last bastion of, these archaic [attitudes)". (Interview, 11th December 
1996, Dublin) 
The moral complexity which the X case highlighted, by drawing public 
attention to familial contexts wherein abortion might be perceived as necessary, 
aligned feminist advocacy of abortion access with a concern to maintain the 
integrity of families, and the decisional authority of parents over their 
daughters. Thus, feminist advocacy of abortion access could not, in this view, 
continue to be constructed as 'outside' of the concerns of the 'pro-life' familial 
nation. 
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Feminism as Nationally Heroic 
The X case provided a moment of popularity for reproductive rights activists, 
who had previously hidden their activities because of fear of prosecution. In the 
context of popular protest over the State's actions against X, reproductive 
rights activism became, at least momentarily, distinctively national and even 
heroic. Catherine illustrated the transformation in the popular status of 
feminism in the context of the X case: 
[T]here was an awful lot of support for us round the time of the X 
case. I remember [... ] giving a public speech at a huge march in 
Dublin, the biggest reproductive rights march that was on in Dublin 
and they'd a whole load of people, and I mean it was crowded, but we 
got down to O'Connell Street and there was a huge van, a high van, 
and those of us who were speaking had to get up on top of the van 
and speak to everybody. [... ) it was mobbed like, really mobbed. And I 
remember [... ] just saying who I was and who I was from [sic] and all 
this kind of thing, and there was a huge cheer, just an absolutely huge 
amount of support. [... ] people came up to me afterwards [... ] who I 
know through my work and everything else [... ] and said, you know, 
"fair dues", and "well done" and "that's great" and "I'm delighted that 
it's the likes of you doing it", and, [... ] I think, cause we always kept 
ourselves very confidential and never publicized it and that sort of 
thing, you know, it was always like, "who's going to go public? " and 
all that kind of thing. So I think for some people it was a matter of 
sort of finally seeing somebody that they knew who was part of it, so 
that you could put a face to this group that was existing ... 
(Interview, 
10th December 1996, Dublin) 
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Thus, feminist political subjectivity was not only, at this moment, not 
constructed as a threat to national identity, it was publicly celebrated on the 
main streets of the nation-state's capital city. As Catherine pointed out, people 
who knew her from other contexts congratulated her, saying 'I'm delighted that 
it's the likes of you doing it', an effect, in her view, of making this previously 
criminalized and faceless group familiar. It could also be interpreted as an 
indication of the repositioning of the political identity of that group in relation 
to the nation, as a consequence of the X case. 
Ruth explained the position of reproductive rights activism during the 1980s 
and early 1990s: 
... when we 
decided to set up the help-line, I mean at the time, the 
pro-life movement, I don't think young people today understand, even 
though it's not that long ago, but they really were on the offensive, 
and they were prepared to chase after individuals and groups, and take 
them through the courts, right up the line [... ]. They had enough 
public support, and they also had the capacity, the organizational and 
financial capacity [... ] so we had to decide when we set up Women's 
Information Network are we prepared to go to jail, and one of the 
questions around that was, are we prepared therefore to say publicly 
that we're doing this work... (Interview, 11th December 1996, Dublin) 
Thus, prior to the X case, feminist political activism was not only constructed 
as 'outside' the nation's anti-abortion morality, it was criminalized. The X case 
dramatically transformed that criminalized political identity into one of national 
heroism, distinctly 'inside' national morality. The perception among feminists of 
a dramatic transformation of their position in the nation was articulated by Jo: 
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Normally now for example I wouldn't have told people you know that 
I was involved with WIN, [I] would have told younger female friends 
but not older ones, and certainly not guys, but, at the time, suddenly 
this was "You do! oh that's marvelous, oh that's great! " like you 
know, all of a sudden, this was like so much more okay. It dragged 
the real fundamentalists out of the closet as well at the time, it was 
certainly a much more hotly debated issue, rather than something that 
wasn't talked [about] before that you know, but, it certainly brought it 
out into the open, and got everybody talking about it. (Interview, 11th 
December 1996, Dublin) 
In Jo's view, the sudden shift in attitudes towards feminism did not decisively 
transform attitudes towards abortion. Rather, the X case politicized abortion 
law in a new way, which involved taking reproductive rights discourse 
seriously for the first time. Thus, the polarization which had characterized 
abortion positions prior to the X case had been undermined. In this newly 
democratized context, a greater range of perspectives could be publicly 
expressed. This meant, for instance, that it became much easier to do 
reproductive rights work, even before the law on information provision had 
actually changed. Catherine explicitly made this point: 
... there was 
definitely a change after the X case. I mean, one, it was 
much easier, we were practically legal, [... ] everything was easier. In 
the early days we used to be worried about going to jail, that kind of 
thing, we used to wonder you know, well, who'd do it, who'd go 
public, etc, etc. [... ] After the X case things were much easier. 
(Interview, 10th December 1996, Dublin) 
219 
One significant indicator of this change in the debate, as Ruth, herself a former 
journalist, saw it, was the treatment of the X case by the national media: 
... the media will never run with something that's contrary to public 
opinion. They'll always go with the safest bet, and I think when people 
in big numbers started to come out on the streets around the X case, 
they then realized they have the freedom to be a bit fairer about the 
issue I think than they had been. (Interview, 13th December 1996, 
Dublin) 
The media, in this view, gauge the 'insider' status of particular political 
positions. Thus, the 'fairer' coverage of feminist perspectives in the wake of the 
X case indicates a shift in their popular status in Ruth's view. 
Anti Abortion Politics as Fundamentalist 
I think, now, they [the anti-abortion lobby] are a minority voice, and I 
think that [... ] they've not only lost support but they've actually 
alienated themselves from a lot of people who would have been their 
bedrock, a long time ago. (Interview with Ruth, 13th December 1996, 
Dublin) 
A major effect of the newly popular position of feminism in national terms 
following the X case was the consequential repositioning of the anti-abortion 
lobby to the margins of the nation, from a feminist perspective. Jo, for example, 
commented that the transformation in the terms of the debate on abortion law 
saw the explicit articulation of'real fundamentalism' for the first time. 
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The emergence of one particularly aggressive 'direct action' anti-abortion group 
at the time of the X case, Youth Defence, was emphasized by interviewees as 
an indication of the newly marginal position of anti-abortion politics, as it now 
adopted overtly 'extremist' tactics: 
Youth Defence embarrassed a lot of people [with] their extremism. I 
think that helped to sort of make that less popular, you know, that you 
would not, even if you were pro-life, you would not want to be seen 
to be associated with these sort of lunatics ... (Interview with Jo, 11th 
December 1996, Dublin) 
Thus, the authoritarian political style of this group served to entrench their 
marginal position. As Catherine commented: 
Youth Defence, they were vicious, vicious, vicious [... j on TV a 
couple of them just came out as [... ] really manic and, not humane, 
and [... ) not able to listen, not able to have a discussion basically, [... ] 
I think they're just able to kind of toe the line. (Interview, 10th 
December 1996, Dublin) 
Thus, the new configuration of nationhood in relation to abortion politics 
following the X case excluded overtly authoritarian politics, from this 
perspective, which characterized newly democratized political culture in terms 
of engaged debate rather than assertions and attacks. Catherine articulated her 
perspective on this group in popular terms, constructing both Youth Defence 
and anti-abortion politics in general as 'outside' the new national abortion 
consensus.? 
70ther less controversial anti-abortion groups were also constructed as marginal to the newly 
hegemonic abortion debate from this perspective. For example, Catherine commented on the 
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Thus, post-X case feminist perspectives viewed the anti-abortion lobby as 
newly marginal, largely because it had failed to coherently address the new 
moral complexity of abortion politics, instead reiterating a fundamentalist 
position that was no longer hegemonic. This can be interpreted as an effect of 
shifting national-political categories of'insider'/'outsider' following the X case. 
Nationhood, Feminism, and Womens Rights 
Emergent feminist perceptions of a rupture in the discourse of anti-abortion 
nationhood were based on an interpretation of the X case as particularly 
significant for women seeking abortions, since it produced a newly popular 
discourse of women's rights. As Jo explained: 
... 
it became so much more [... ] acceptable to talk about these things 
out loud, and it [... ] had [a] phenomenal affect from the point of view 
of changing people's attitudes. [... ] [T]hings really loosened up a lot, 
and women were far more open about talking to each other about 
things, and about ringing us. It was [.. ] I think a lot easier for one 
woman to go to another and say "Do you know the number of 
[WIN]? ". It was less [secretive] especially down the country, it 
seemed to have a big effect. (Interview, 11th December 1996, Dublin) 
According to this perspective, the culture of secrecy surrounding abortion 
access was seriously eroded by the X case itself, making it much easier for 
women to obtain information, and to talk more openly about pregnancy and 
establishment of a'Women Hurt by Abortion' group, saying that it had little impact because: 
'... people realized, well of course women are hurt by abortion, but its not because abortion in 
itself is wrong but because she's suffering loss, one way or another' (Interview, 10th 
December 1996, Dublin) 
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abortion. Thus, the newly legitimate position of feminist advocacy of abortion 
access facilitated women's self-determination over their reproductive capacities. 
Significantly, Jo argues that this transformation in women's sense of entitlement 
to make such decisions was particularly marked 'down the country', namely 
outside Dublin, in rural Ireland, a construction which is usually associated with 
the traditionalism and conservatism of the 'real' nation. 8 The destabilization of a 
discourse of nationhood as opposed to, and threatened by, abortion and 
feminism had a major impact in concrete national terms in this view. This made 
a significant difference particularly to reproductive freedom in the heart of the 
'real' (rural) nation. 
Nationhood and Feminism: The Limits of Political Belonging 
However, emergent post-X case feminist political subjectivity was not 
unambiguously resituated within the boundaries of nationhood. The possibility 
of articulating a feminist reproductive rights position within a consistently 
national idiom was compromised, both by the new indeterminacy over the 
meaning of nationhood, and by residual feminist constructions of nationhood in 
anti-abortion terms, discussed above. 
The shifting boundaries of Irishness produced some highly contradictory 
feminist positions. For example, Sinead, from her position in the west of 
Ireland, the apparent source of 'real Ireland', was a politically active feminist, 
who had been involved in breaking the law and personally getting into debt in 
her efforts to assist women in obtaining abortions abroad. However, she 
viewed the impact of the X case in terms of a successfully popularized anti- 
national narrative. As she argued: 
SAs discussed in Chapter One, the idea of the west in particular signified the traditional 
nation in cultural nationalism, 
223 
... 
it [media coverage of the X case] was just, a way of painting us 
[the nation], [... ] [as] backward [... ], [and] woman hating [... ]. It's 
self-congratulatory as well, kind of saying look, aren't we great and 
look and this, these crowd over here they're still, you know [... J I 
mean at the time [... ] everyone was going crazy, [... ] everyone was 
very besotted with it. (Interview, 10th December 1996, Galway) 
Here Sinead constructs the attention the X case received as a consequence of a 
hegemonic anti-national politics within the national media, itself already 
constructed as an urban liberal force, effectively 'outside' the national rural 
conservative consensus. She explicitly associates shocked reactions to the case 
with a perspective, akin to racism, which views the Irish nation as backward 
and misogynist. As she argued, the reaction of 'foreigners' to the X case was 
similar to 'our' attitudes to Muslim women. This perspective, comparing a 
critical attitude to the X case with a racist attitude towards apparently 
patriarchal Muslim culture, appears to depend on a contradiction between 
constructing nationhood and feminism as mutually exclusive political identities, 
while at the same time identifying with both. She explained her position as 
follows: 
I'm quite in between both [feminism and national traditionalism] 
actually in a way, that I'm not an extreme kind of like, [... ] I mean I'm 
definitely an extreme feminist, but it's just that in every other way [... ] 
I wouldn't have been mad for divorce, [... ] all these ideas you know 
that we have to be really modern you know, it just drives me, I hate it 
like, do you know what I mean? I think there's a lot, you know, that 
we have to hang onto, I think it's very important... (Interview, 10th 
December 1996, Galway) 
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One expression of the shifting boundaries of 'insider'/'outsider' which Sinead is 
attempting to negotiate in the context of national and feminist identity was her 
dislike of sending women to London for abortions. She preferred to send them 
to Brighton when she could, despite the extra expense, because it was a 'nicer 
place' than London, since, as she said, it was smaller, and had a harbour. This 
seems to be an attempt to make women feel 'at home' in England, while at the 
same time obtaining abortions not available at home precisely because of the 
construction of'home' as an anti-abortion domain. 
A second major limit to the perception of political belonging by feminists in the 
wake of the X case was the articulation of the rural/urban opposition through 
which internal 'outsiders' are hegemonically constructed in traditionalist 
national discourse. The primary construction of national identity in opposition 
to England through the abortion debate had been ruptured by the X case. The 
nation could no longer be simply defined as anti-abortion, and as essentially 
opposed to and threatened by reproductive rights feminism. Feminists 
perceived that national identity was now defined in relation to an internal 
outsider, signified by Dublin, incidentally the location of much feminist politics. 
Thus, the popular response to the X case was viewed by feminists themselves 
as not truly national, but rather as a product of not-quite national Dublin 
(urban) opinion. 
For instance, Catherine advised me not to concentrate my research only on the 
national press. Instead, I should look also at local and regional newspapers in 
order to get a better sense of the nation's attitudes. As she said 
... I think you should have a look at the provincial papers as well, and 
see what are they saying, locally, [... ] cause it would have been very 
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very different from what the national papers would have been saying, 
you know. (Interview, 10th December 1996, Dublin) 
In other words, Catherine believed that the discursive construction of the 
abortion debate was significantly different in Dublin and rural newspaper 
contexts. 9 The Dublin-based (national) media was not perceived as addressing 
the same audience as the provincial media. 10 Thus, the continuity of an 
'insider'/'outsider' opposition, expressed in terms of (rural) nationhood and 
(urban) feminism, was also applied to the research process. However, in this 
context the researcher and the interviewee were positioned on one (feminist, 
urban) side of the opposition, while the nation was placed on the other. This 
was further complicated by Catherine's position as advisor on sources of 'really' 
national attitudes to abortion in the aftermath of the X case, which was 
relatively more 'at home' than my own researcher position. 
However, the sense of disconnection between Dublin-based feminism and the 
nation which Catherine articulated was also modified by a rejection of the 
absolute dichotomy between Dublin and the nation: 
Whenever I go home alright, I get a bit of a takeback you know, how 
conservative it all is, you know, they're very conservative down in 
rural Ireland still, there's no doubt about that, you know, like, the 
liberals are over on the east coast. I mean if you analyse the results of 
all the last referendums, the liberals are all on this end, you know, 
anywhere down the east coast, that's where the liberals are in the 
9As discussed in the Introduction to Part Two, this study has focused on the national level of 
debate, and consequently on the national daily press, rather than local weeklies or monthlies, 
'°As Aileen commented, discussing criticisms of the media coverage of the X case, '... it's 
also used against the Dublin-based media, the fact that they aren't reflecting the views of the 
majority around the country, and this is something that the campaigners on the right are 
always throwing [at the media]' (Interview, 19th May 1997, Dublin). 
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counties, and the further west you go and the further south you go, 
the more entrenched you get. [... ] but then again of course one third 
of the population lives over on this side anyway. (Interview, 10th 
December 1996, Dublin)" 
Thus, while this position accepts the construction of urban/rural in terms of 
liberal/conservative, it does resist the construction of nationhood in rural 
conservative terms, simply on the basis of population size. In other words, the 
'insider'/'outsider' construction of nationhood in relation to rural/urban is 
contested here. Nevertheless, the perceived association between 'Dublin' 
opinion and feminist politics served, importantly, to compromise the possibility 
for reproductive rights discourse to consistently articulate its position within a 
national idiom. 
Conclusion 
Post-X case feminist political subjectivity articulated competing perceptions of 
the extent to which the X case had shifted the hegemonic construction of 
nationhood in relation to abortion, and consequently in relation to feminism 
itself. A residual discourse was evident, which did not perceive any significant 
shift in popular national attitudes either to abortion or to feminism. While this 
perspective continued to construct feminism and Irishness as mutually 
antagonistic, it did contain a degree of ambiguity concerning the 'outsider' 
status of feminism and abortion access, expressed particularly by Marie's 
resistant discussion of her own abortion experience both as a feminist and as an 
Irish woman. 
11This opposition between Dublin/the east coast, and the nation can be traced to the medieval 
and early modern division between the colonised area around Dublin, referred to as 'the Pale', 
and Gaelic Ireland. This division provides the origins of the phrase 'beyond the Pale'. 
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However, post-X case feminist subjectivity was more consistently characterized 
by interviewees within the ruptured and consequently unstable boundaries of 
nationhood. The newly legitimate national position of feminism was perceived 
by feminists themselves as an effect of the particular familial situation of the X 
case. Nevertheless the connection between feminism and abortion politics was 
reconfigured in nationally heroic terms, at least in the immediate context of the 
X case. Feminist advocacy of women's decisional autonomy could now be 
publicly expressed in terms which were not constructed as necessarily 
threatening to national survival. 
However, the X case did not decisively transform insider/outsider categories in 
the context of abortion politics, at least from the perspective of feminist 
activists. Feminism continued to be associated with the internal 'outsider' 
politics associated with Dublin liberalism, an association which was both 
accepted and resisted by feminists to greater and lesser extents. 12 This was, as 
already noted, because the familial construction of nationhood was key to the 
ironic unravelling of the right's hegemony. 
Interviews with both anti-abortion and feminist political activists have indicated 
the impact of the X case on the political identities of moral entrepreneurs in the 
12This changing relationship between the nation and feminism is demonstrated, for instance, 
in the explanation provided by John Waters, a prominent right-wing commentator, for Mary 
Robinson's election to the Presidency in 1991: 'Yet Mary Robinson said one thing that stuck 
in my brain. If she could succeed in communicating it to the people of Ireland, I knew that it 
would win her the presidency. It made sense of all the seemingly contradictory things she had 
said elsewhere, about Catholicism, about socialism, about progressive politics, about the view 
the Irish people needed to have of themselves. "I'm a Catholic from Mayo, " she said. "There's 
nothing about that Ireland that I don't know. So it's me. I understand it from within and I 
want to develop on it, but in the way that one would want to develop oneself, almost. I don't 
repudiate so much as want to coax along into a different mould. " In this statement, I was 
convinced, lay the key not just to Mary Robinson's chances of being elected president, but to 
the future of Irish politics' (1991: 9). Mayo is a western county associated with the famine and 
emigration. As such, it signifies the traditional Ireland usually constructed in opposition to 
the feminism and liberalism defended by Mary Robinson. 
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field of abortion politics, in relation to national identity. While anti-abortion 
activism evidently articulated its position in highly contradictory ways, through 
democratic, republican, and feminist discourses, in an attempt to reproduce a 
construction of nationhood as a resistant anti-abortion political identity, 
feminist activists expressed a perception of shifting boundaries of nationhood in 
relation to abortion access which suggests both the instability of anti-abortion 
hegemony and a democratization of the political context, as feminist 
perspectives could, for the first time, be expressed in terms which were not 
already constructed as anti-national. 
The next Part will consider the impact of the X case on competing positions on 
abortion law in the Oireachtas (legislature). Chapters Seven and Eight are 
specifically concerned with how the hegemonic terms of the official debate 
were both transformed and reproduced from 1983 to 1992, in the wake of the 
X case. 
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PART FOUR 
OFFICIAL NATIONHOOD AND GENDERED CITIZENSHIP 
THE X CASE AND ABORTION IN THE OIREACIHTAS 
INTRODUCTION 
The disruption caused by the X case to popular political culture and activist 
subjectivity in relation to the nation also significantly unsettled the official view 
of the nation, and consequently the legitimacy of constitutional abortion law, as 
Part One has outlined. This Part is concerned with the terms within which 
lawmakers themselves saw what was at stake, both during the debate on the 
Eighth Amendment in 1983, and on the series of constitutional debates 
concerning abortion and women's rights during 1992. 
Official constructions of abortion politics provides the focus in what follows 
since the legislative debate not only provided an official construction of 'the 
people's' position in relation to abortion, but actually defined the proposed 
constitutional changes. Thus, an analysis of the legislative debate specifically 
indicates the terms within which the proposed constitutional changes were 
constructed, in ways not possible in press or activist discourses given their 
different positions relative to the law, although of course the debates in these 
three sites were not mutually exclusive. Thus, Chapters Seven and Eight are 
specifically concerned with shifting and interdependent constructions of 
republican democracy, republican citizenship, and nationhood, through the 
constitutional abortion debates in the legislature. 
The following section will briefly outline the political structure within which the 
debates occurred, and introduce the distinctive character of the republican 
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Constitution, particularly as it connects with the idea of the nation. I will then 
consider the significance of states for gender and sexuality politics, and discuss 
the methods adopted in collecting and analyzing material for this Part. 
The Democratic Republican Nation-State 
The abortion debate in Ireland has been a constitutional rather than a legislative 
struggle. As such it has focused much more substantially than legislative 
debates generally do on constructions of the nation and the 'people's will', the 
source of republican sovereignty. The purpose of a constitution, defined as 'the 
conscious formulation by a people of its fundamental law' which establishes the 
principles upon which the state is based (McIlwain 1947: 3), is, ostensibly, to 
prevent arbitrary government, by limiting and counterbalancing the power of 
each particular branch of the state. Thus, republican constitutions specify a 
division of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of 
the state, in order to limit the authority of each. Judicial review, for example, is 
a central aspect of such a system of power division, as legislation can be 
examined by the judiciary to test whether any constitutional principles have 
been infringed. 
Furthermore, republican constitutions invest political sovereignty in the 
'people', rather than, for example, in any branch of the state apparatus. Central 
to this political strategy is the concept of the 'common good', which requires 
that divisive issues should be avoided in the interests of political unity (Whelan 
1996). This necessarily relies on a homogeneous conception of'the people', and 
views political corruption and injustice as a governmental failure to adequately 
represent that people. ' 
'Whelan describes the historic articulation of this idea in Ireland as follows: '... for the late 
eighteenth-century bearers of the European Enlightenment in Ireland, reform of the laws and 
system of government, not reform of the people, became the preferred option, as projected by 
the United Irishmen. These reforms would create a natural consonance between cultural 
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The debates discussed in the following Chapters took place in the two Houses 
of the Oireachtas (legislature): the Dail, which is the first House; and the 
Seanad, which is the second, subordinate House. 2 Members of the Dail (TDs) 
are publicly elected, whereas members of the Seanad (Senators) are chosen by 
two electoral colleges, and some are nominated by the Taoiseach (Prime 
Minister) described below. The Dail nominates the Taoiseach and approves the 
Government or Cabinet, which controls the introduction of legislation, largely 
through its control over Oireachtas timetables. As Chubb argues, the Dail is 
entirely dominated by the Government, its members playing little part in law- 
making in contrast, for instance, to the United States Congress (1982: 208). 3 
Most Bills are introduced by the Government and passed in the Dail before 
going to the Seanad for approval. 4 The passage of Bills is normally assured by 
the Governing party's majority representation in both Houses. 
The Seanad's power is largely that of delaying and amending Bills that have 
already been passed by the Dail, although in so doing, it can attract public 
attention to particular issues. Financial Bills and international agreements are 
not debated in the Seanad, which was originally established under the 1921 
Treaty of Independence, in order to guarantee strong representation for 
Unionists. It was abolished in 1936, but was re-established in 1937 through the 
identity and government practice, generating a harmony which would allow for the 
unimpeded expression of beauty, benevolence and civic virtue. Without this consonance, only 
a disjointed, corrupt, unrepresentative politics could operate' (1996: 60). 
2The Oireachtas also includes the office of the President, whose role is largely confined to 
signing Bills into law. The President can also refer bills which have been passed by both 
houses of the Oireachtas to the Supreme Court to test their Constitutionality (Chubb 
1982: 199-200; 207). 
31n the US Congess members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate are directly 
elected. The passage of legislation requires a majority vote in both Houses. Although the 
President has the power to veto legislation, the Congress can over-ride that veto with a two- 
thirds majority in both Houses (Craig and O'Brien, 1993: xiv). Thus, both Houses operate 
independently of the President. 
4Private Members Bills can also be introduced, that is, non-Government sponsored bills, as 
in the UK. 
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enactment of the new Constitution, which defined its composition in vocational 
terms, in line with the already mentioned papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno. 
Its members are chosen in three ways. University graduates select six members. 
Elected politicians at local council and national level select forty-seven 
members from five panels, representing the interests of education and culture; 
agriculture; industry and commerce; labour; and public administration and 
social services. Finally, the Taoiseach selects eleven candidates. Despite this 
apparent diversity, political parties nevertheless dominate the Seanad, including 
the election of its members (Chubb 1982: 207-214). 
Gender, Sexuality and the State 
The constitutional debates on abortion discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight 
raise questions concerning the gendered construction of the nation and the 
nation-state in formal political terms, particularly given that these are primarily 
debates concerned with citizenship. In other words, the constitutional debates 
on foetal and women's rights raise questions about the significance of the state 
for gender and sexuality politics. 
As Yuval-Davis and Anthias point out, the state is not a unified entity with 
autonomous interests and intentions. Nor does it simply and effectively act on 
behalf of specific economic or social forces, such as particular social classes or 
gender hierarchies. State practices do not have unitary intentions or effects 
(1989: 4-5). Thus, the state cannot be thought of simply as a patriarchal 
institution, since such a view necessarily ignores competing gender interests in 
the state, as well as the differential gender effects of state activities. 
Furthermore, such a characterization fails to explain why feminism has focused 
on the state as a significant resource for progressive gender politics (Connell 
1990: 519). Connell characterizes the state not as a unity or coherent agency, 
but rather as a process specifically located within gender relations, and a key 
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site of gender production. He argues that the state is necessarily a major stake 
in gender politics, given that it is the locus of considerable power to regulate 
gender and sexual relations. As he puts it, '... the exercise of that power is a 
constant incitement to claim that stake' (1990: 530). The location of the state 
within a gendered context produces what he terms a 'gender regime', which can 
be observed, for instance, in the gender division of labour and hierarchy of 
power in the state, as well as in the gendered structures of emotional 
attachment to the state, expressed particularly through nationalism (1990: 526). 
Thus, the effects of the hegemonic gender regime on women's citizenship are 
not necessarily stable and enduring, but shift in response to changing dynamics 
in the broader gender order. As Yuvai-Davis and Werbner argue, democratic 
citizenship is 
... a 
historically contingent social formation, a particular negotiated 
compromise between forces of normalisation and differentiation. It is 
therefore always inflected by power and by the commonsense 
assumptions of hegemonic cultural and political elites. (1999: 3) 
It is, they argue, consequently possible to recast citizenship in feminist and 
plural terms, particularly by resisting exclusionary and essentialist identity 
discourses (1993: 28). Shifting official constructions of women's citizenship in 
the context of competing gendered nation-state projects will be examined in 
what follows, in terms which do not assume a necessary or enduring 
relationship between the state and patriarchal forces. 
Methods 
Three constitutional debates on abortion will be considered in addressing the 
major concerns of this Part, as outlined above. Chapter Seven discusses the 
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1983 debate on the proposal to officially recognise the right to life of the 
'unborn'. This sets the context for Chapter Eight's focus on two sets of 
constitutional debates in the wake of the X case: those on the proposed 
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution held during May 1992, concerning 
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty; and those held during October of that 
year on the proposed Twelfth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
concerning women's rights to abortion, travel and information, outlined in Part 
One. The focus in what follows is on a number of key speeches made at the 
second stage of debate, when general principles rather than technical or 
practical problems were at issue. The speeches discussed illustrate shifting 
constructions of the issues at stake from 1983 to 1992, and were made by 
prominent politicians whose positions on abortion, as well as other issues, were 
well known. 
In order to consider the hegemonic terms of debate during 1983, Chapter 
Seven focuses on the Minister for Justice Michael Noonan's second stage 
speech sponsoring the proposed 'pro-life' amendment. Noonan's position as 
representative of the Government, as well as of his party, is key to his 
presentation of the proposal in distinctly national republican terms. The 
Minister articulates a national 'pro-life' discourse not in the terms of the 
committed activist, but rather aimed at winning broad mainstream electoral 
support. 
Chapter Seven will also look at marginal opposition to the Bill by examining 
Labour Senator Mary Robinson's second stage anti-amendment speech, which 
explicitly articulates the political perspective of a national republican feminist, 
as well as a legal expert and elected politician. This was a peripheral speech, 
both in terms of Senator Robinson's female, feminist and morally pluralist 
position, and in terms of its delivery in the second House, rather than in the 
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Dail. This speech illustrates the interplay between official conceptions of 'pro- 
life' nationhood on the one hand, and liberal/left and feminist political 
discourses concerning abortion on the other, at a time when hegemonic 
Irishness was being defended against threat from precisely these quarters. 5 
Chapter Eight focuses on six speeches made during 1992, broadly illustrative of 
the emergence of a range of different positions in the Oireachtas following the 
X case rupture. Two speeches in the Maastricht Treaty debate (the Eleventh 
Amendment to the Constitution), which provided the first opportunity for 
members of the Oireachtas to debate abortion law since the X case, will be 
discussed. 6 The strongest anti-abortion perspective at this point was articulated 
in the Seanad by Des Hanafin, a prominent pro-life activist and key figure in the 
Pro-Life Campaign, who was subsequently expelled from his party, Fianna Fail, 
for voting against the Eleventh Amendment (Hug 1999: 176). 7 Feminist 
arguments had, by contrast, achieved a degree of legitimacy at this point, and 
could be expressed in the Dail, as Deputy Nuala Fennell did, without inviting 
excessive hostility. 
The remaining four speeches were chosen from the October 1992 debates on 
the Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, which were debated 
together. The two Dail speeches discussed in Chapter Eight were made by 
prominent members of the two major parties, Fianna Fail Minister for Justice 
5By the time abortion was again debated in the Oireachtas in constitutional terms in response 
to the X case, Senator Robinson had been elected to the Presidency, and was actively 
transforming that formal dignitary position, that had involved appearances at state occasions 
and withdrawal from everyday life, into a high profile popular public role. This indicates the 
degree of cultural change that occurred over the period from the early 1980s to the 1990s, 
Her marginal feminist and pluralist perspective had become more acceptable in the nation- 
state context by 1992. 
'While statements had been made in the Oireachtas following the X case, these were not 
made in the context of a legislative debate (see for example, Dail $ireann, 18th February 
1992, Ban on Termination of Young Girl's Pregnancy: Statements. Vol. 415 Col. 2203- 
2223). 
7He subsequently lost his Scanad seat (Hug 1999: 187). 
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Pädraig Flynn, sponsoring the Amendments, and Fine Gael Deputy Alan 
Shatter, opposing them. Both parties had been centrally involved in inserting 
the 'pro-life' amendment in 1983, and hence both were eager to limit the 
damage the X case had done to their reputations. The two Seanad speeches to 
be discussed are Senator Avril Doyle's speech, approximating a reproductive 
rights position, and Senator Eamon Ö'Cüiv's explicitly anti-abortion speech. 
The constitutional focus of the Oireachtas debates discussed in Chapters Seven 
and Eight involve consideration both of the significance of national sovereignty 
in debating abortion law, and the impact official constructions of nationhood 
had on womens citizenship. Chapter Eight will specifically consider the 
apparently dramatic shifts and reconfigurations of the discourses in play in the 
Oireachtas following the X case. The form of the debates concerning the 
constitutional status of 'unborn' and women's rights in the Oireachtas indicate 
shifting official constructions of national sovereignty and citizenship in the 
wake of the X case. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
OFFICIAL NATIONHOOD AND GENDERED CITIZENSHIP: 
OIREACHTAS DEBATES ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
Introduction 
This Chapter will consider the Oireachtas debates on the proposed Eighth 
Amendment in 1983, aimed at recognizing citizenship rights for 'the unborn'. 
As Chapter Three in particular has demonstrated, popular political culture 
during this period was characterized by a moral panic concerning the possible 
effects a failure to ratify the proposed amendment might have, not just for 'the 
unborn', but for the very survival of the nation. The primary definition of the 
issue had constructed national identity in distinctly moral and gendered terms, 
and had articulated the demand for this construction to achieve official 
recognition through an appeal to the constitutional principles of the democratic 
Republic, specifically the investment of political sovereignty in 'the people'. 
This Chapter will examine the ways in which this demand that the 'people's will' 
should be authoritative on the issue of foetal rights was constructed by 
members of both Houses of the Oireachtas. 
Political Context 
The debates on the Eighth Amendment took place at a time of political 
instability characterized by rapid changes in government, which the anti- 
abortion lobby successfully exploited in extracting support for their amendment 
from party leaders'. The wording of the proposed amendment had been 
formulated by the populist Fianna Fail party while they were in Government. 
'See Girvin (1986) for more detailed discussion of this background. 
238 
However, by the time the amendment was tabled for debate in the Dail, Fianna 
Fail were no longer in power, and the more centrist Fine Gael party were now 
sponsoring it. Support from this governing party, whose leader Garret 
FitzGerald had declared a 'Constitutional crusade' to make the Republic more 
pluralist and hence more attractive to Northern Ireland Protestants, was deeply 
ambiguous. On the introduction of the Bill in the Dail, FitzGerald said that the 
proposal did have Government support, but that Fine Gael deputies could vote 
individually on it. The major problem with the Bill, as far as this party would 
explicitly acknowledge, was not, however, that it belied the idea of pluralism, 
but rather that the wording was ambiguous. 2 It might be interpreted by the 
Courts in a way that could, as Minister for Justice Michael Noonan pointed out 
in the Dail, 'positively facilitate the introduction of abortion on a very wide 
scale' (Dail Eireann, 9th February 1983, Vol. 339, Col. 1357), since it failed to 
indicate which right to life, that of the 'unborn', itself a term left unspecified, or 
that of the'mother', would take precedence in the event of a conflict. 3 
The major criticism of the proposed amendment in the Oireachtas was its 
possibly sectarian nature, given that it had been publicly rejected by all the 
major Churches in the Republic other than the Catholic Church. Some members 
of the Oireachtas argued that the proposal was intended to amend the 
2The proposed wording, 'The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due 
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as 
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right', was finally incorporated into the 
Constitution, as mentioned in the Introduction. 
3However, Fine Gael attempts to overcome this ambiguity by introducing an alternative form 
of words in April 1983 failed, as it was rejected in Dail. The newly proposed wording simply 
stated: 'Nothing in this Constitution shall be invoked to invalidate, or to deprive of force or 
effect, any provision of a law on the ground that it prohibits abortion' (Dail Debates, 27th 
April 1983, Vol. 341: 2001). This was rejected by the anti-abortion lobby on the basis that it 
was simply a negative provision to protect existing legislation. Although ostensibly this was 
their objective in amending the constitution, they argued that they wanted a positive 
affirmation of the constitutional right to life of the 'unborn', in other words, they wanted 
citizenship rights to be accorded to foetuses (see for example Dr. Woods's speech against this 
form of words on the basis that 'the unborn' should be granted citizenship rights, Dail 
Debates, 27th April 1983, Vol. 341, Col. 2015). 
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Constitution along confessional lines, thereby redefining the nation-state and 
the rights of citizens in relation to religious affiliation. This would infringe the 
guarantee of religious pluralism contained in Article 44 of the Constitution, by 
giving constitutional status to the beliefs of one specific religion. 4 A number 
also argued that a divisive issue such as abortion was not an appropriate issue 
to be incorporated into the Constitution, which should only include general 
principles on which all citizens could agree. A morally contentious issue on 
which citizens took positions explicitly in relation either to their membership of 
religious groups, or their secular views, should not be treated as a fundamental 
principle of the republican State. 
Key Themes 
Of particular interest in what follows is the way discourses of nationhood and 
gender are drawn on to rationalize opposing positions on the Bill, in the 
context of law-making, The following discussion is concerned with two 
thematic strands that run through the speeches. First, official constructions of 
national sovereignty will be considered. Second, legal-political constructions of 
citizenship in gendered terms will be discussed. The terms within which 
opposition to official discourses of national sovereignty and citizenship were 
constructed will also be considered. 
4In contrast to the established status of the Anglican Church in Britain, and contrary to 
popular British assumptions concerning the status of the Catholic Church in Ireland, 
Bunreacht na Eireann (Constitution of Ireland) contains the following guarantees: 
'Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion are, subject 
to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen' (Article 44.2.1°). 
'The State guarantees not to endow any religion' (Article 44.2.2°). 
The article also guarantees that State support for schools shall not discriminate on the basis 
of religion, and that children attending State supported religious schools shall not be obliged 
to attend religious instruction. 
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Official Nationhood and Gendered Citizenship in the Oireachtas 
The Sovereign People and the Constitution 
The principle of national self-determination at the heart of nationalism 
(Kedourie 1961: 31) was key to the terms within which the Oireachtas debate 
on the proposed Eighth Amendment took place. As in the press coverage, a 
moral discourse of nationhood was also constructed in the Oireachtas in 
explicitly anti-abortion terms. 5 The constitutional focus of the debate directed 
official attention towards the purpose of a republican nation-state, namely to 
guarantee popular sovereignty. However, this effectively produced an official 
construction of the nation-state project in authoritarian terms. 
The People as the Moral Majority 
A major aspect of the debates on the Eighth Amendment concerned the role of 
politicians in producing laws on behalf of the sovereign 'people', to whom they 
were constitutionally accountable. The official Government position articulated 
by Minister Noonan presented the referendum process, through which the 
proposed amendment would be presented to the 'people' for a decision, as a 
legitimate form of constitutional politics, as the Oireachtas would thereby 
ensure that the people's sovereignty would be guaranteed. As he said, 
... 
if the people of this State now indicate through a referendum that 
they do not want abortion to be facilitated, it seems to me that that 
expression of the people's will must prevail. (Dail Eireann, 9th 
February 1983, Vol. 339, Col. 1354-5) 
5The term 'moral' is not employed in this Part in an evaluative sense. Rather, it describes a 
level of discourse which signifies, in its own terms, a normative position. 
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This constructed the role of elected representatives as servants of the 'people's 
will', defined in terms of the moral 'majority'. 6 The anti-abortion will of the 
people was simply assumed, as the willingness of the government to amend the 
Constitution under pressure from the anti-abortion lobby, together with the 
specific terms within which that amendment was to be presented to the people 
in a referendum, indicated. Neither the power of legislators to define the 
proposed Constitutional change, nor the process through which that proposal 
came to be debated in the Oireachtas were viewed as relevant to official 
perceptions of what the'people's will' might be. 7 
Thus, the hegemonic terms of the debate in the Oireachtas assumed national 
moral unity, not least through a discourse of moral majoritarianism. For 
example, the Minister for Justice defended the proposed amendment against the 
charge of sectarianism as follows: 
Why cannot we have clearly expressed exceptions for the views of 
minorities? ... 
first, 
... we are 
dealing here with deep-seated 
convictions that what is at issue is not the right of dissent but the 
protection of independent human life and, second, that there is such 
wide disagreement about the exceptions that no law could cater for all 
opinions without reducing itself to something meaningless. (Minister 
for Justice, Däii Eireann, 9th February 1983, Vol. 339, Col. 1364) 
'In the words of Deputy Padraig Flynn, 'there is nothing more democratic than giving the 
ultimate decision on constitutional matters to the electorate' (Dail Eireann, 23rd February 
1983, Vol. 340, Col. 976). Deputy Michael Cosgrave also articulated this view: 'It was the 
men and women in the street and in the field who nave to us this Constitution. It is to them 
that we must return if we want to change it' (Dail 
tireann, 
8th March 1983, Vol. 340, Col. 
2048). 
7For example, deputy Maire Geoghegan-Quinn viewed the position of the Anti Amendment 
Camp in precisely these anti-democratic terms: 'Their wish is not so much to influence the 
vote of the people as to prevent the people from exercising the right to vote' (Dail Eireann, 
17th February 1983, Vol. 340, Col. 493). 
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While 'minorities' retain the right to dissent, their position would nevertheless 
be constitutionally excluded, since, Minister Noonan argued, to do otherwise 
would make the law 'meaningless'. 8 Implicit in this defence of the sovereign 
position of the moral 'majority' is a construction of the latter as normatively 
superior, in contrast to the implicit immorality of 'minorities', established 
through their very opposition to the amendment. 9 The assumption that the law 
should act not simply as an instrument of morality, but as an instrument of the 
moral 'majority', clearly informs this official position. 
Official recognition of national 'pro-life' morality would not be sectarian, since 
it would not favour one religious group's values over others, but rather would 
simply reflect the morality of the national 'majority', and protect it against 
threat. That national morality was not directly linked to Catholicism could be 
evidenced, for example, by the fact that anti-abortion legislation in Ireland was 
originally enacted by the Protestant Westminster Parliament, and the ban was 
still largely in force in the north of Ireland. As Minister Noonan said: 
the particular law is exactly as we inherited it at the foundation of 
the State - the same law as then obtained in the neighbouring island - 
and therefore, one may reasonably assume, not influenced overtly or 
8As Deputy Dr. Michael Woods also argued: 'Our [Government] commitment in this regard 
was a response to the widely and very deeply held view of the majority of the people that our 
respect for the dignity of human life should not be undermined' (DAR Eireann, 9th February 
1983, Vol. 339, Col. 1375-6). 
9The normative superiority of the'majority morality' was also emphasized by Deputy Padraig 
Flynn: 'The greatest gesture we can make to other groups, both close by and far away, is to 
show the depths of our beliefs and standards, and our determination as a people to display 
them as the hallmark of our society' (Dail Eireann, 2nd March 1983, Vol. 340, Col. 1592). 
Deputy Michael Cosgrave goes further in insisting on the superiority of the moral majority: 
'In England and other countries where abortion has been introduced the roads are strewn 
with the remains of half-developed bodies, a whole army of would-be citizens. The same 
could happen in this country if abortion was introduced. We would have the remains of half- 
developed bodies strewn all over the place' (Dail Eireann, 8th March 1983, Vol. 340, Col. 
2049). 
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covertly by any ecclesiastical pressure groups. (Dail Eireann, 9th 
February 1983, Vol. 339, Col. 1362) 
It was not, then, as far as the Government was concerned, a question of 
unifying State and church. Rather, the objective in enacting the 'pro-life' 
constitutional amendment was to defend the sovereignty of the people, defined 
in broad moral rather than specifically religious terms. The articulation of an 
official majoritarian construction of the nation in terms which legitimized the 
proposed constitutional exclusion of dissent was thus justified on the basis of a 
constitutional duty to defend the morally homogeneous nation's sovereignty. 
The Authoritarian Nation-State 
Even if it could be shown that that (anti-abortion] view about the right 
to life of the unborn was objectively invalid, those who hold it would 
still have the same duty to act according to their consciences and, in 
so far as they could through the laws enacted on their behalf, to 
protect what they see as human life. For those who believe that 
another human life is at stake, the matter is clearly not a purely private 
decision but a matter which ought to be dealt with by the law and, 
while giving due weight to the rights of the mother, they must 
logically afford that protection even against the wishes of the mother. 
Indeed, if that were not so, abortion law would have little meaning. 
(Minister Noonan, Dail Eireann, 9th February 1983, Vol. 339, Col. 
1360) 
The anti-abortion lobby's moral-political project was incorporated within the 
official view of how a citizen should act, as the above statement indicates. 
Those holding a 'pro-life' morality have a moral duty, as the Minister explains, 
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to follow their consciences and attempt to obtain legal recognition of their 
views, even in the face of objective proof that they are wrong. Again, this 
official construction of active citizenship relies on an association between moral 
duty and nationhood. 
The defenders of foetal rights were thus officially accorded a legitimate central 
(constitutional) position in the debate, as necessary defenders of the right to life 
of 'the unborn', Anti-abortion discourse thus secured the boundaries of the 
debate in terms which located 'pro-choice' perspectives in the 'private', 
implicitly amoral, sphere, where no legal recognition was apparently required. 
The moral regime defended by the Minister did not include any guarantee either 
that women's rights or moral pluralism would be officially considered. 'Pro- 
choice' advocates of women's reproductive freedom were officially positioned, 
through this emphasis on 'privacy', in opposition to concerned and active 
citizens who could appreciate the public and moral significance of the law. 
Significantly, this construction of the reproductive rights perspectives in terms 
of a politics of'privacy' ignores the State's role in defining 'privacy', a definition 
which would become highly significant in the X case, as Part Two has 
demonstrated. 
The nation-state project embedded in this official view of what was at stake in 
constitutional abortion law was distinctly authoritarian, in gendered terms. 
Women could be justifiably compelled to carry a pregnancy to term and give 
birth in these terms, as was later demonstrated by the X case. Women's 
sexuality and reproductive capacity required constitutional regulation in the 
interests of the 'pro-life' nation-state. Women's position in the nation-state 
project was thus officially constructed as both maternal and morally 
untrustworthy. The regulation of the female 'environment' within which the 
'independent unborn' lives provided a means for constructing a distinctly moral 
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official discourse of gender and sexuality, justified in terms of the 'people's will', 
and hence central to the nation-state project. Ironically, this authoritarian 
official nation-state project depended on the apparently democratic procedure 
of holding a referendum, and ensuring that the people's sovereignty was not 
usurped by any branch of the State. 
Constitutional Abortion Law and Citizenship 
Some of that criticism [concerning the impact of the proposal on 
women's rights] has come from people speaking from what I might 
call the secular-humanist standpoint. I cannot hope to convince 
anybody of that way of thinking. If a person believes that a woman has 
a right to have an abortion at any time and for any reason or none - 
that the matter is exclusively her concern and that, as the expression 
has it, hers is the "right to choose" - there is really no common ground 
that I can see for debate between that person and somebody who 
believes that pre-natal life is human life with independent rights of its 
own, rights that are in some sense commensurate with its status as 
human life. (Dail Eireann, 9th February 1983, Vol. 339, Col. 1358-9) 
The proposed transformation in constitutional citizenship rights was officially 
justified through a discourse of foetal independence, in two key ways. First, the 
assertion of foetal 'independence' equated the moral status of the 'unborn' with 
that of women, thereby producing a moral-political imperative to recognize the 
rights of the former in terms no different from the latter. Second, the implicit 
construction of rights-bearers in terms of physical 'independence' further 
compromised women's rights, since women's 'maternal function' compromises 
their 'independence' or 'individuality', as discussed in Chapter Two. Thus, the 
compromise of women's rights involved in recognizing a foetal right to life is 
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assumed as a necessary consequence of the condition of pregnancy. The effect 
of this discursive foetal 'biologization' (Franklin 1991) is to establish a natural' 
moral equivalence between 'the unborn' and women. Constructing the 'unborn' 
as biologically or physically 'independent' or autonomous is implicitly 
contrasted with the construction of women in terms of compromised 
autonomy. 
This justified the official disregard of the effect the proposed recognition of 
foetal rights might have on women. As Minister Noonan argued: 
If a person believes that the unborn have a right to life, even though it 
be only a qualified right, that person cannot agree that the law should 
allow that right to life to be taken away simply because somebody 
else, even somebody so intimately and uniquely related to it as its 
mother, decides that it should be so taken. (Dail Eireann, 9th February 
1983, Vol. 339, Col. 1359) 
The unique position of the 'mother' in relation to the foetus not only does not 
confer any decisional privilege on her in the context of pregnancy, it also 
marginalises her, as she embodies the source of threat to foetal life. By 
contrast, the national-moral commitments of the 'pro-life' lobby do confer 
decisional privilege on them over the 'independent unborn' and consequently 
over pregnant women. 
Minister Noonan refused to recognise the legitimacy of concerns about the 
effect the amendment would have on women's civil and social rights, which he 
labeled 'secular humanist', and hence excluded from the national moral 
'majority' position. Granting civil rights to 'the unborn', as well as according 
political rights to their representatives, could only be done at the cost of 
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compromising women's civil, political and social rights. Not only were women's 
political rights undermined, as the above Ministerial quote makes clear, through 
the assertion of foetal independence from women, but women's civil and social 
rights, such as rights to life; freedom of conscience; bodily integrity; freedom of 
movement; and information were all threatened, to greater or lesser degrees, by 
the proposal to grant foetuses an absolute right to life, as the X case later 
demonstrated. Nevertheless, the assertion that women's rights were not 
significant to the proposed constitutional amendment can be seen, for example, 
in the Minister's dismissal of what he termed 'Christian', implicitly Protestant, 
concerns over pregnant women's mental health: 
I can well understand and sympathize with the feeling of concern 
which underlies references by a Christian clergyman to the 
psychological health of a mother in distress, but the sad fact is that if 
one were to invite someone to write an abortionists' charter something 
that would most simply and effectively provide for abortion on 
demand without actually using those very words, the ready-made 
phrase is 'the psychological health of the mother' - not, indeed that any 
variation on that theme would be much better. It is not a question of 
being on the slippery slope - with that kind of provision or proviso in 
the law, we would have arrived, (Dail Eireann, 9th February 1983, 
Vol. 339, Col. 1365) 
While women's psychological health might be compromised through pregnancy, 
Minister Noonan did not consider this possibility relevant to the proposal to 
recognize a constitutional right to life for the 'unborn'. This official position 
suggests an explicit acceptance that women's rights would be indeed be 
compromised by the Eighth Amendment. However, such a possibility was 
constructed as insignificant in comparison to the desire to protect foetal life. 
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Thus, although the Government denied that women's rights were at stake, for 
example, by asserting that current law was simply to be given constitutional 
status as a means of guaranteeing popular sovereignty in the field of abortion 
law, the above statement suggests that the Government were prepared to 
compromise women's rights in order to avoid the 'slippery slope' to national 
immorality. Thus, the Government's official position relied on an absolute 
opposition between women's and foetal rights in terms which made it 
impossible to argue, for example, that foetal protection might depend on the 
protection of women's rights. 
Thus, the 1983 Oireachtas debate on the proposed Eighth Amendment was 
characterized by the official expression of concern to guarantee national 
sovereignty, a key value at the heart of the republican Constitution. However, 
the official construction of the nation as morally homogeneous nevertheless 
justified an authoritarian political project. This was particularly evident at the 
level of citizenship, where women's rights could, in the official view, be 
compromised in order to avoid a disjunction between national anti-abortion 
morality and the nation-state. 
Marginal Opposition 
Although the Oireachtas debate on the Eighth Amendment was largely 
characterized in the official terms described above, marginal opposition both to 
the proposed amendment itself and to the associated construction of the nation 
and the nation-state, was articulated by some members of the Oireachtas. This 
marginal opposition did not construct national sovereignty in terms of the 
moral majority. Consequently, it did not endorse an authoritarian nation-state 
project. Furthermore, women's citizenship was viewed as key to any 
consideration of abortion law. 
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The Sovereign People and the Constitution 
The oppositional view of constitutional popular sovereignty emphasized moral 
diversity within the nation, and insisted that this diversity should be recognized 
at constitutional level. The Constitution should not embody simple 'majority' 
opinion, nor should it embrace any one morality, defined in religious terms, 
over any other. As Senator Mary Robinson argued: 
We are going to have a pro-life group and one denomination 
campaigning for this change in the Constitution, Is that not nice in a 
country which proclaims itself to be committed, and indeed on which 
its existing Constitution is committed, to a pluralist society? 
Is that where we have brought ourselves in this very sad and 
regrettable debate? (Seanad Eireann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 
515) 
Although the idea of a homogeneous nation informs this position, it does not 
rely on moral homogeneity. The constitutional commitment to religious or 
moral pluralism was clearly threatened by the amendment, which was 
supported by only one religious denomination. 10 The fundamental right to 
freedom of conscience would be directly compromised, if not negated, by the 
proposal. " The primary function of the Constitution was, Senator Robinson 
argued, to ensure the protection of 'minorities', i. e., those who dissented from 
t0As Minister for the Environment, Ruairi Quinn, argued: This debate is not about abortion. 
It is about using the Constitution in a particular way which reflects the private moral view of 
what happens in this instance to be the view of the vast majority of people in this island but 
doing it in what is clearly a sectarian way because a number of minority Churches have said 
clearly that they would prefer if the Constitution were not amended in this way' (Ddil 
)rireann, 2nd March 1983, Vol. 340, Col. 1626). 
11Indecd, Senator O'Leary explicitly compared the activities of the PLAC with those of the 
Moral Majority movement in the United States, commenting that '[t]hey are remarkable for 
their intolerance of those with whom they do not agree. In general their approach to public 
life smacks too much of what would be termed McCarthyism' (Seanad >rireann, 4th May 
1983, Vol. 100. Col. 579). 
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'national' morality, in particular by ensuring a separation between the law and 
morality. '2 
This morally impartial view of the role of the Constitution in relation to 
morality was also argued in relation to attempts to exclude consideration of the 
sectarian implications of the amendment from the political debate: 
Any attempt made, certainly as I have found it, in a public context or 
on a public platform to broaden the debate meets with the response 
"Oh, well this is the basic human rights issue; we must deal with it 
first" and then somehow all the other broader social problems, as is 
apparently envisaged, would fall into place. But that is not the case. 
(Seanad Eireann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 563) 
Here, Senator Robinson contested the Government's assumption that 
'minorities' must bow to the values of the apparent national 'majority', in other 
words, that the right to freedom of conscience is subordinate to the values or 
morals of the supposed sovereign national 'majority', defined in this instance as 
anti-abortion. 13 
In contrast to the moral majoritarianism defended by the Government, a more 
complex view of the constitutional relationship between elected representatives 
and the sovereign 'people' was articulated by Senator Robinson, speaking 
12As she argued: 'Standards pitched beyond the reach of the ordinary individual may be 
acceptable in ethics and theology, where indeed they may well be the norm, but they have no 
place in the criminal law. The criminal law is concerned with the regulation of human 
conduct, not with the perfectibility of human nature' (Seanad Eircann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 
100. Col. 534). 
t3This was echoed by Senator Catherine McGuinness, commenting on the term 'pro-life': 
it gives the impression that anyone who opposes the amendment is pro-death and many of us 
have been accused of being so [... J Where were these people when some of us were 
advocating a change in the Constitution to give basic human rights to living children [... ]? ' 
(Seanad Eireann, 10th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 755). 
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specifically as a lawyer as well as a democratic republican politician. Key to this 
position was an emphasis on the role of members of the Oireachtas as 
mediators between the sovereign 'people' and the process of law making. The 
law would not simply emerge transparently from the people; nor would the 
meaning of particular laws be self-evident to the electorate, particularly in 
contexts where a referendum would be held to decide on the desirability of a 
specific law. Elected politicians had, in Robinson's view, a constitutional duty 
to explain clearly the meaning and possible implications of proposed changes in 
the law to the 'people': 
We have responsibility to ensure that the proposal that goes through 
this House is capable of being understood [... ] by the people of 
Ringsend, of Kerry and of Mayo - the ordinary people of this country 
- in the context of "do you approve? " or "do you not approve? " If it is 
not capable of being understood as meaning something in that sense 
then it is not a proper proposal and we should not allow it to be put 
forward as a proposal. It is wrong to say let the people decide. The 
people do have a role to play. They approve or they do not approve 
but before they do they must have a proposal on which they can in 
fact make an informed and intelligent decision. (Seanad Eireann, 4th 
May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 513-4) 
Robinson here was criticising the ambiguity of the wording, particularly its use 
of the undefined term 'the unborn', 14 as well as the proposed amendment's 
statement that the rights of 'mothers' and 'the unborn' were equal, leading to 
14Deputy Alan Shatter commented on the problematic lack of definition of this term: 'A child 
that might be born to a family in 20 months' time, at this moment in time, could quite 
correctly [be] said to be unborn' (Dail Eireann, 17th February 1983, Vol. 340, Col. 584). 
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problems of interpretation in cases where these rights conflicted. IS Indeed, the 
Government's legal advisor, the Attorney General, had advised that the 
wording be redrafted in less ambiguous terms, advice which the Government 
had followed. However, their alternative form of words were rejected by the 
Dail in favour of the Fianna Fail wording, as outlined in Part One. 
Robinson was also criticising the Governing Party's decision to abstain from 
voting in the Seanad debate. Although that party was committed to a 'pro-life' 
constitutional amendment, it had been unable to devise an unambiguous form 
of words which would guarantee a ban on abortion without infringing women's 
right to life. The Governing party's official position, therefore, was to 'let the 
people decide' on the specific form of words. As Robinson insisted, this 
position failed to acknowledge their constitutional responsibilities to the 
sovereign people, to provide them with proposals upon which decisions could 
be unambiguously made. 16 The possibility that extensive legal abortion might 
result from the amendment would be the result, she claimed, of the 
Government's failure to outline to the electorate the implications of this 
ambiguous wording (Seanad Eireann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 527). 17 
Consequently, she argued that if Senators abstained in the vote on the Eighth 
I5Senator Brendan Ryan commented that 'if you put emphasis on a different word each time 
the wording meant something entirely different. If you looked at the Irish version you got 
further ambiguity' (Seanad Eireann, 5th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 649). The Irish language 
version of the Constitution takes interpretive priority. 
16This was echoed, for instance, in Senator Michael D. Higgins's comment: '... if you want to 
live in a democracy and if you have a Legislature -a DAil and a Seanad - it is there to take 
decisions, it is there to lead on philosophies, option and strategies. It is not there to toss 
matters out to the public like a greasy ball and say when it comes back we will have made up 
out minds on the basis of what you, the people, decide' (Seanad Eireann, 5th May 1983, Vol. 
100. Col. 645). 
"Deputy Alan Shatter also took this view, arguing that 'if it in its present form becomes part 
of our Constitution it will essentially secure a constitutional judgment in the not too distant 
future requiring the House to enact legislation to permit women to have abortions' (Dail 
Eireann, 17th February 1983, Vol. 340, Col. 533). Senator O'Leary argued of the PLAC that 
'these people have brought the horror of abortion nearer to this country by many years' 
(Seanad Eireann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 582). 
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Amendment Bill, the Seanad should be dissolved, since its constitutional role in 
the process of law making would have thereby been surrendered. 18 
The Oireachtas, from this marginal perspective, had a constitutional duty to 
limit the power of specific groups over the law by providing accurate legal 
interpretation of the meaning of the proposed amendment, rather than by 
announcing that it would not officially campaign for acceptance of the proposal 
in the referendum. As Senator Robinson argued: 
It looks at the moment as though the explanatory role will be taken 
over not by the ordinary political forces in this country but by the 
small minority self-styled pro-life groups who have been very 
instrumental in pushing this amendment from the beginning and, it 
would appear, senior Bishops and other members of the Catholic 
Church. [... ] (T]he explaining would be done by very sectional and, on 
this issue, partisan parts of our community. Therefore the people 
would be potentially open to distortion of the wording, to being told, 
not on any great political or legal authority, but simply by lobbies who 
wished to read into the words what they wished to read into them, 
what the words mean. (Seanad Eireann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 
515) 
Thus, this position contrasted sharply with the official claim that the 
Government was simply performing its constitutional role as the servant of the 
people in introducing the Eighth Amendment Bill, In this view, the 
Government's constitutional duty was to ensure that proposals put before the 
"As she said, '... the Seanad has an important constitutional role to play in this area. If we 
abdicate that role then the only other approach is to table a motion at the next sitting of the 
Seanad calling for our own abolition' (Scanad Eireann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 511). 
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sovereign people for ratification were both unambiguous and clearly explained. 
Furthermore, the Government should limit the power of unelected lobby 
groups in influencing the law, in this instance by exercising their duty to vote in 
the Oireachtas debate, and by providing clear information during the 
referendum campaign on the legal and political issues connected to the 
proposed wording, from an official rather than the politically partisan anti- 
abortion point of view. 19 
The Pluralist Nation-State 
This alternative marginal view of the constitutional relationship between the 
sovereign people and the Oireachtas explicitly defended a morally pluralist 
nation-state project, rather than assuming that official recognition of national 
sovereignty would necessarily entail defending authoritarianism. The centrality 
of women both to reproduction and to the republican nation-state project was 
key to this oppositional view, which constructed nationhood primarily in terms 
of a tradition of struggle against injustice. The value of building a State based 
on principles of moral impartiality and inclusiveness was thereby affirmed. 
Senator Robinson's speech invoked an alternative conception of the nation, 
characterised primarily by its struggle against domination, rather than its 
religious convictions. The nationalist project could only be achieved in this 
view on the basis of the republican tradition associated with Wolfe Tone, who 
19Senator Michael D. Higgins explicitly condemned the Government's failure to act in the 
best interests of the people, due to the influence of the anti-abortion lobby: 'Is there anything 
as disgusting as the bad faith that is being sown in our political system by people who wander 
the corridors saying that they know that this measure is wrong, say in private it is 
unnecessary, that they disagree profoundly with the people who are proposing it and yet, at 
the same time, politically vote and behave differently? ' (Seanad Eireann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 
100. Col. 636). Senator Shane Ross also expressed this view: 'It is relevant that Nye should 
ask who this group of people are. Are they elected? Whom do they represent? Is this country 
beginning to be run by the SPUCs and the PLACs? I have never come across a time in this 
country when so few people have exercised so much power over so many' (Scanad Eireann, 
10th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 794). 
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famously expressed his desire to see Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter united 
under 'the common name of Irishman'. 20 This albeit explicitly gendered 
discourse advocated a non-sectarian State as a means of protecting the freedom 
of religious minorities, and achieving reunification of the national territory. 21 
However, rather than reinventing the nation as itself an unstable entity with a 
variegated history, Senator Robinson appealed to the nation to tolerate 
'minority' others, whose identities and allegiances apparently precluded them 
from belonging to, or being included within the nation: 
... we are coming of age as a people, we are maturing 
to a stage where 
we are realizing the price we are going to have to pay if we ever get 
the fulfillment of our aspiration for a united Ireland. We are beginning 
to realise that it hurts in that we cannot just go along and have our 
own moral certainties enshrined in the Constitution, that we have to 
listen to and have regard for the statements and commitments of 
others who are equally entitled to have their view respected and not to 
have them abused or simply overridden by the force of a majority in a 
referendum. (Seanad Eireann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 544) 
This adoption of a national republican idiom as a means of advocating religious 
pluralism necessarily reproduced the discourse of nationhood which the anti- 
abortion lobby had so successfully appropriated. Thus, the Irish people are 
20As Senator Catherine McGuinness argued: 'In passing this amendment we are tying to shut 
out from the common name of Irishman those who do not accept the views of one particular 
Church' (Seanad Eireann, 10th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 763). 
2 Deputy Thomas Mac Giolla also made this point: 'What kind of republicanism is it that 
would bring forward an amendment like this? Would a republican party in the tradition of 
Wolfe Tone or Davis do that? Fianna Fdil are supposed to be against sectarianism, for 
democracy and pluralism, for the type of society Wolfe Tone wanted when he gave such 
tremendous support to the French Revolution at the end of the 18th century, out of which the 
seeds of republicanism came to Ireland. Republicanism is not just a matter of getting the 
Brits out' (Dail Eireann, 27th April 1983, Vol. 341, Col. 2040). 
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characterized here in terms of moral certainty and a distinctive political project. 
The use of this language serves to maintain the stability of a normative 
Irishness, constructed in terms of an anti-abortion morality, implicitly Catholic. 
Groups or individuals who reject the nation's moral certainties are located 
outside of the nation. However, the project of constructing a pluralist State in 
order to take account of moral differences would deprive the nation of its 
authoritarian political power. As Robinson argues: 
It is important for historians that the text be put on the record of the 
House so that it will not be said of us that we did something in 
ignorance or lack of appreciation or knowledge of the views of 
spokespeople for minority groupings in our country. We will have 
done it in the teeth of their protests and assertions of their rights as 
citizens in our land. (Seanad Eireann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 
549)22 
The rights of citizens who do not share the assumed moral consensus of the 
nation are defended here against the non-recognition of those rights, 
particularly the right to participate in the political sphere, as well as the right to 
freedom of conscience. The nation, through its incorporation into an impartial 
democratic State, should, in this democratic pluralist framework, be displaced 
from its dominant political position. As citizenship should necessarily be 
extended to include those who inhabit the territory of the nation-state 
regardless of moral affiliations, assumptions concerning the moral character of 
the nation could then become open to renegotiation in more inclusive terms. 
22Senator Michael D. Higgins also emphasized this: '... I want it on the record of this House 
that at every stage of the debate we asked for a definition of the words and for somebody to 
spell out the implications for women and for our society of accepting a form of words that 
nobody seems to want to answer' (Seanad Eireann, 25th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 1129). 
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Constitutional Abortion Law and Citizenship 
In insisting that women do have a particular interest in abortion law, which is 
being excluded from consideration, Senator Robinson argued: 
There should be a special women's campaign on this referendum. If 
this text goes through then women should be alerted to the dangers to 
their existing rights in equating the right of the unborn equally to the 
right to life of the mother that it threatens. (Seanad Eireann, 4th May 
1983, Vol. 100. Col. 541) 
She maintained that women's rights would be severely compromised by the 
amendment. Thus, she insisted that women as a group should campaign against 
the proposal. The various effects the amendment could have on women, 
discussed in terms of class and age, as well as physical and mental health, were 
outlined as a means of demonstrating the ways in which women's rights could 
be undermined. This added up to an insistence that the effect the amendment 
would have on women should provide the framework of the debate. 
Senator Robinson stressed that the proposed wording could potentially lead to 
women's deaths, since, in cases where a pregnant woman's life was at stake, 
medical professionals would be unable to choose to save her life at the cost of 
terminating the pregnancy. Thus, both woman and 'unborn' would die. 23 In 
making this point, she quoted from the published statement of the Fine Gael 
Attorney General: 
23This aspect of the amendment was also emphasized, for instance, by Senator Katharine 
Bulbulia, who asked '[w]hat is the situation with regard to women who suffer from epilepsy 
and the administration of the necessary drugs? What is the position of the woman with 
extremely high blood pressure or she is threatened with kidney failure or, more important, 
what will her position be? [... ] how much time does the conscious woman have on an 
operating table while medical opinion debates the legal issues? ' (Seanad Eireann, 11th May 
1983, Vol. 100. Col. 909). 
258 
... a 
doctor faced with the dilemma of saving the life of the mother, 
knowing that to do so will terminate the life of "the unborn" will be 
compelled by the wording to conclude that he can do nothing. 
Whatever his intentions he will have to show equal regard for both 
lives, and his predominant intent will not be a factor. (Seanad Eireann, 
4th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 520) 
She also quoted extensively from a European Commission decision concerning 
foetal rights which held that 'the "life" of the foetus is intimately connected 
with, and cannot be regarded in isolation from, the life of the pregnant woman' 
(Seanad Eireann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 532). 24 She pointed out that 
the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act, the legislation banning abortion, 
was a'dead letter', as she put it, since no prosecutions are ever brought under 
its terms. Thus, she argues, there was not an absolute ban on abortion in 
Ireland, since abortions are available to Irish women, although not in Ireland 
(Seanad Eireann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 538). 25 She raised concerns 
that the absolute ban on abortion could result in bans on a wide range of 
contraceptives, on the basis that their use unconstitutionally infringed the foetal 
right to life; that third party injunctions could be issued against women on the 
basis of the proposed amendment, preventing them from travelling abroad to 
terminate their pregnancies; and that medical practices aimed at assisting 
reproduction could be blocked (Seanad Eireann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 
24As Senator Katharine Bulbulia commented, in reference to the assertion of foetal 
'independence': '(i)f this amendment is incorporated into our Constitution, will each foetus 
caught up in such a situation have to be made a ward of court? ' (Seanad Eireann, 11th May 
1983, Vol. 100. Col. 895). 
25As Senator FitzGerald argued: This debate is not about abortion. It is about an attempt to 
introduce into the Constitution something that has been seen in the form of words chosen to 
be sectarian, unhelpful and so much in conflict with the 1861 Act that that Act may be 
declared unconstitutional' (Seanad Eireann, 10th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 805). 
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539). 26 Furthermore, she argued that the abortion rate in Ireland would become 
'artificially high', as there would be intense pressure to make speedy abortion 
decisions (Seanad Eireann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 100, Col. 558-60). She argued 
that the mainstream debate, not least as it was presented by the media, ignored 
the 'real' issues at stake in the referendum, concerning issues of housing and 
poverty, and prevalent ideas about what the family should be. 27 Specifically, 
she claimed that there was no official or popular attention given to 
discrimination against single-parent families, particularly in terms of economic 
policies (Seanad Eireann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 562). 28 She argued that 
the debate on the proposed amendment had not engaged working class women, 
and particularly single mothers, who were largely unaware of what was taking 
place. Thus, the mainstream debate was ignoring those it most affected, and 
doing so in sectarian terms (Seanad Eireann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 
565). 
Thus, marginal opposition to the proposed Eighth Amendment in the 
Oireachtas insisted on the centrality of women to any consideration of abortion 
26She pointed out the effect the amendment would have on contraceptive availability, 
highlighting the fact that the legality of the IUD, a contraceptive favoured by lower income 
and older women, would be threatened. If the amendment were to be interpreted as protecting 
the right to life of the 'unborn' from the moment of conception, the IUD would then constitute 
an abortifacient, and its use would be unconstitutional. Similarly, the 'morning-after' pill, 
usually offered to rape victims, should also be declared unconstitutional. 
27Senator Michael D. Higgins emphasized the social and economic aspects of women's and 
children's rights, advocating that the State concentrate on protecting those very rights rather 
than attempt to recognize the right to life of the 'unborn'. As he said, 'I am branded [... ] as 
being anti-life and yet I have sponsored in the last ten years the only attempt to abolish the 
status of illegitimacy, to give children in institutions the same rights as children outside and 
to remove that stigma from them. I have said that every child should be a wanted child by 
bringing in family planning legislation. I have been involved in relation to changing the 
adoption laws so that children might be adopted by parents who want them. Suddenly people 
who have had no record in any caring activity whatsoever have set themselves up as people 
who not only have the right to represent their point of view but who seek to drive people like 
me out of public life and who have boasted about it publicly in the newspapers' (Seanad 
Eireann, 4th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 595). 
28As Senator Browne argued, '[w]e should not tell girls [sic] that they cannot have abortions 
while at the same time continue to punish those who go through with their pregnancies' 
(Seanad Eireann, I1th May 1983, Vol. 100. Col. 917). 
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law, not least since women's rights were themselves necessarily implicated in 
reproductive law. Furthermore, this critical position rejected the authoritarian 
nation-state project based on the construction of nationhood in morally 
homogeneous terms. Rather, this attempt to counter hegemonic anti-abortion 
nationhood discourse in the Oireachtas constructed the nation as itself anti- 
authoritarian, and politically committed to moral pluralism. However, this 
position made little impact on the official terms of the debate, and the 
amendment was passed in both Houses before being put to the people in a 
referendum, as already discussed. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has considered the official view of the significance and 
implications of a constitutional recognition of a right to life for the 'unborn'. 
The duty of the Oireachtas to defend the constitutional investment of 
sovereignty in 'the people' was central to the official construction of abortion 
law. Thus, the Minister for Justice Michael Noonan insisted that elected 
politicians should strive to represent the nation's will, defined in moral terms. 
Women's rights were not officially viewed as relevant to the political debate. 
The protection of the 'unborn', constructed as 'independent' from pregnant 
women, was apparently at stake, rather than the protection of women's lives or 
health in contexts of pregnancy. No exceptions to the abortion ban could be 
contemplated, in this view, since to do so would weaken the nation's moral 
defences against the immoral and implicitly non-national 'bombardment' by 'pro- 
abortion' forces. 29 In this framework, the construction of unequal gendered 
29As Minister Noonan argued, 'I know of noway in which the law could provide for 
exceptions based on hard cases without leaving the door open for abortion on an increasing 
scale, all the more so when even here the public are being bombarded, day in day out, with 
pro-abortion propaganda' (Dail Eireann, 9th February 1983, Vol. 339 Col. 1365). 
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citizenship, in terms which ultimately produced the X case in 1992, was 
necessary as a means of defending the moral nation-state, defined in the 
explicitly authoritarian anti-abortion terms of enforced pregnancy, against an 
apparently immoral anti-national threat. 
By contrast the marginal feminist oppositional position articulated in the 
Oireachtas, although also expressing a distinctly "nationalist republican 
discourse, viewed the constitutional role of politicians in terms of their 
responsibility to produce unambiguous laws, and to clearly explain the legal 
and political implications of such laws to the sovereign people, particularly in 
referendum contexts. Furthermore, this view insisted that elected politicians 
should specifically defend the rights of citizens, including women, from erosion, 
particularly from powerful lobby groups claiming to represent the sovereign 
nation's moral point of view. Women should be central to any debate 
concerning the introduction of a foetal right to life. Indeed, any such proposal 
should only be considered in terms of the contexts within which women both 
have children and seek abortions. Thus, the social, economic and political 
contexts within which women reproduce should not be ignored. 
The next Chapter will consider the impact of the X case on the hegemonic 
official view of national sovereignty and the constitutional nation-state. The 
Oireachtas debates concerning the constitutional rights of the 'unborn' and 
women will be examined, particularly in terms of how official and competing 
political positions either reversed or reproduced their assumptions concerning 
nationhood, its position in the State, and the constitutional role of the 
Oireachtas and its members in relation to the nation-state and citizenship. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE X CASE IN THE OIREACHTAS: 
DISRUPTION AND REPRODUCTION OF OFFICIAL NATIONHOOD 
AND GENDERED CITIZENSHIP 
Introduction 
The sovereign position of the nation in the republican State was officially 
perceived to be at stake in abortion law during the 1983 Oireachtas debate on 
the Eighth Amendment, as Chapter Seven has illustrated. This perception 
depended on a distinctly moral construction of nationhood, and legitimized an 
authoritarian nation-state project, which assumed that women's citizenship 
rights would necessarily be compromised through pregnancy. Thus, women 
were officially constructed as morally subordinate. This Chapter will consider 
how this official construction of national sovereignty and consequently 
women's citizenship was affected by the X case, when the official interpretation 
of the'people's will' in relation to abortion law was thrown into question. 
Political Context 
The X case effected a legal-political crisis concerning the meaning and value of 
the Eighth Amendment, already discussed. This had a major impact on the 
nation-state's international status, as the State's action in preventing a fourteen- 
year-old pregnant rape victim from leaving the country to obtain an abortion 
was constructed both nationally and internationally as explicitly authoritarian, 
the antithesis of republican democracy. Ireland's position within the European 
Union was now in doubt, since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was 
immanent, a Treaty which had been amended in order to explicitly guarantee 
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that Article 40.3.3° of the Irish Constitution could not be infringed by 
European Law. As already mentioned, opposition to the ratification of this 
Treaty now emerged from both anti-abortion and feminist perspectives, given 
the legal uncertainty about the meaning of that Article following the Supreme 
Court's reinterpretation of it in their decision on the X case. The Oireachtas 
debate on the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution in May 1992, 
concerning the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, consequently became 
enmeshed in a debate on women's and foetal citizenship. The Government gave 
a commitment that the legal confusion thrown up by the X case would be 
resolved, and finally proposed the Twelfth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Constitutional Amendments, concerning the right to abortion, travel and 
information, which were debated in the Oireachtas during October 1992. These 
four Oireachtas debates concerning constitutional abortion law contained a 
more complex range of political positions that those articulated during 1983, 
when the'pro-life' political project had been hegemonic. 
The Government refused to publish the proposed wordings which would be put 
to the people in a referendum, concerning women's rights to abortion, travel 
and information, despite being urged to do so by all other parties and lobby 
groups. If this had been done, the uncertainties surrounding both Irish women's 
citizenship and the legality of abortion would have been resolved. By refusing 
to comply with public demands, the Government was attempting to remove the 
issue of abortion law from the Maastricht debate, a strategy which failed in the 
Oireachtas at least, if not in the voting booths. 
The debates of October 1992 focused largely on citizenship questions in 
relation to the nation and the nation-state. The anti-abortion lobby argued that 
the Twelfth Amendment, on the 'substantive issue' of abortion availability, 
should not be accepted, as it allowed for limited abortion, and so failed to 
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protect the right to life of the foetus. Reproductive rights campaigners, on the 
other hand, called for its rejection, on the grounds that the proposed 
amendment was not only too limited but would reverse the rights recognised in 
the X case judgment. Under the proposed Twelfth Amendment, abortion would 
only be allowed when a woman's life, as distinct from her health, was at stake, 
excluding a risk of suicide. As such, the State was failing to protect women's 
health, and was attempting to draw a sharp line between life and health, as well 
as between physical and mental health, when such distinctions in practice are 
far from clear. 
Key Themes 
Two key themes structure the forthcoming discussion. First, official 
constructions of the sovereign nation in the Oireachtas will be considered in the 
wake of the X case, in relation to competing entrepreneurial constructions. 
This involves considering both official constructions of nationhood, and official 
views of the relationship between the sovereign nation and the democratic 
republican nation-state. The second key theme to be discussed concerns the 
effect of popular sovereignty on women's status as citizens in the democratic 
nation-state. 
The X Case: Rupture and Reconstruction of Popular Sovereignty and 
Gendered Citizenship in the Oireachtas 
The Sovereign People and the Constitution 
As in 1983, the Constitutional debates concerning abortion following the X 
case focused largely on the sovereign status of the people. However, the public 
reaction to the case disrupted the official view that the people' held a clear 
moral position on abortion. The disruption to official perceptions of nationhood 
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produced more dispersed lines of debate in the Oireachtas than was evident 
during 1983, as will be described below. 
Popular Sovereignty: the Moral Nation? 
Anti-abortion positions expressed in the Oireachtas following the X case 
continued to construct the nation in moral terms. From this perspective, 'the 
people's will' should define moral issues at a constitutional level, since only then 
could the nation's sovereignty be guaranteed. ' 'The people' had already 
expressed their view on abortion in the 1983 referendum. Thus, the judicial 
decision in the X case had actually usurped popular sovereignty, by 
disregarding the already expressed national opposition to abortion. As Senator 
Des Hanafin argued, 
[the X case] was a dreadful decision and it cries out to be reversed, 
not to be taken on board and made the law of the land. To do so 
would be to make a mockery of the decision of the people in 1983 to 
reject abortion. (Seanad Eireann, 14th May 1992, Vol. 132 Col. 1049) 
Not only had the judiciary acted 'perversely' in his view by interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment in such a way as to allow for a right to abortion against the 
expressed will of the people, but popular sovereignty was under further threat 
from the European Union. Abortion would, in Senator Hanafin's view, be 
'imposed' on Ireland if the Maastricht Treaty were to be ratified without a 
secure constitutional ban on abortion in place. The Government was 
consequently under a constitutional obligation to restore the people's 
sovereignty: 
'As Senator O'Cuiv insisted, ' ... we have something precious in our Constitution, something in our democracy that a lot of other democracies would give a lot to have, and that is that in 
the ultimate, under God, all authority derives from the people' (Seanad Eireann, 29th October 
1992, Vol. 134 Col. 740). 
266 
The Supreme Court read into the Constitution a right of abortion 
which I believe no Member of the Oireachtas thought to exist. Did any 
of us who voted in the 1983 referendum, on either side, seriously 
think that the Eighth Amendment could be so interpreted? Were we 
not certain, whatever our views, that, as a result of the referendum 
abortion could not be legalised in Ireland without a further decision by 
the people? I do not think it unreasonable to say that this was a 
perverse decision. It has overthrown the clearly expressed will of the 
people, and something has to be done about it. It is a matter of great 
regret to me, and a matter of dismay to many people throughout the 
country, that the Government did not accept at once that the issue 
should be referred back to the people. (Seanad Eireann, 14th May 
1992, Vol. 132 Col. 1046) 
This position insists on the nation's continued and unambiguous moral 
opposition to abortion, a strategy which depended on ignoring the popular 
reaction to the X case, and the popular relief which was expressed at the 
Supreme Court's decision to lift the injunction against X. 2 
However, the construction of the sovereign nation in moral terms was not only 
rejected but was criticized as the cause of the X case itself by feminists in the 
Oireachtas. For example, Senator Avril Doyle argued that 'we are here because 
a certain section of the community believed back in 1982-83 that their view on 
21ndeed, the constitutional duty of the Oireachtas in relation to the sovereign nation entailed 
curbing alternative interpretations, including those made by the Judiciary, in this view. As 
Senator O'Cuiv put it: '... if unscrupulous people try to extend the frontier by misreading or 
misunderstanding this amendment then the Oireachtas will legislate to stop people deviating 
from existing ethical practices. That would ensure that the intention of the people would be 
cemented in legislation if there is an effort to go outside the intention I have outlined' 
(Seanad Eireann, 29th October 1992, Vol. 134 Col. 747). 
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morality should be enshrined in our Constitution' (Seanad Eireann, 28th 
October 1992, Vol. 134 Col. 616). Thus, the construction of the nation itself as 
morally opposed to abortion was not articulated here. Rather, the Eighth 
Amendment was re-characterized as the product of political lobbying by a 
specific (not national) group. Popular sovereignty is not defined here at the 
level of morality: 
The Constitution is only suitable for enunciating democratic principles 
as distinct from moral principles. The function of the courts in 
upholding a Constitution is to ensure democratic principles of 
behaviour. Republican principles, as guided by Wolfe Tone and others 
in forming their Republican philosophy, are the principles I like to see 
in our Constitution, the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity, 
for example, democratic principles, not moral principles of behaviour. 
(Seanad Eireann, 28th October 1992, Vol. 134 Col. 616-7) 
Nevertheless, a moralistic construction of popular sovereignty continued to 
define the official view of what was at stake in abortion access following the X 
case, although in less overtly 'moral' terms. For example, the Minister for 
Justice, Padraig Flynn, in proposing the Twelfth Amendment on the 
'substantive issue' concerning women's right to access abortion, insisted on the 
continued national moral opposition to abortion, which, in his view, the State 
was constitutionally obliged to recognise. As he said, '[t]here is a long and 
proud tradition here which regards the right to life as belonging to the unborn 
as well as to those who have been born' (Dail Eireann, 20th October 1992, Vol. 
423 Col. 1894). 
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Although Minister Flynn claimed that the Government did recognise moral 
diversity within the nation in relation to abortion, saying '[w]e recognise the 
genuineness and the depth of people's feelings and concerns about this whole 
subject - whether from a pro-life, pro-choice or other point of view' (Dail 
Eireann, 20th October 1992, Vol. 423 Col. 1910), he nevertheless repeated the 
perspective of anti-abortion lobbyists in the Oireachtas. In this official view, the 
Supreme Court's decision in the X case had undermined popular sovereignty by 
ignoring the result of the 1983 referendum on the Eighth Amendment: 
There is a substantial body of opinion among the general public that 
the position now obtaining under Article 40.3.3° of the Constitution, 
in so far as a risk of self-destruction can serve as a ground for 
termination, is at variance with what many people thought it would be 
when that provision was adopted by referendum in 1983. (Dail 
Eireann, 20th October 1992, Vol. 423 Col. 1907) 
This reproduces the 1983 official construction of the nation in terms of a moral 
majority. 3 Thus, the apparent recognition of moral diversity within the nation 
was countered by an official desire to actively reconstruct national moral 
consensus on abortion following the X case. For example, Minister Flynn 
justified the Government's decision to take the constitutional route rather than 
3This view of the 'majority' position on abortion was also articulated by opposition Fine Gael 
Deputy Alan Shatter: '[n]either the Fine Gael Party nor the overwhelming majority of people 
on this island want to see general abortion available in Ireland - what some people refer to as 
'abortion on demand" (Dail Eireann, 20th October 1992, Vol. 423 Col. 1918). Indeed, in 
Deputy Shatter's view, abortion had been introduced to Ireland by the anti-abortion lobby's 
constitutional actions: '[t]he primary result of the 1983 amendment was to ensure that more 
people in Ireland were informed about the availability of abortion outside Ireland than would 
previously have considered abortion as an option. It also has now provided for an implicit 
constitutional right to abortion, which right is now to be made explicit, in the terms of the 
Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution Bill' (Dail Eireann, 20th October 1992, Vol. 423 
Cal. 1920). 
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introduce legislation to interpret the Eighth Amendment, as the judiciary had 
demanded, as follows: 
... any 
legislation which would be introduced without an amendment 
of the Constitution would have to accept in full the findings of the 
Supreme Court in the X case, including the finding that a risk of 
suicide would be a ground for abortion. Suicide as a ground could not 
be removed by legislation alone. Also, without an amendment the 
possibility could not be excluded that at some future date the grounds 
for abortion could be widened. (Dail Eireann, 20th October 1992, 
Vol. 423 Col. 1907) 
The official view expressed here was that the people remained opposed to 
abortion, and that the Government and the Oireachtas had a constitutional duty 
to recognize that moral position in law-making. 
When introducing the proposed Twelfth Amendment, Minister Flynn expressed 
the Government's appreciation that all parties had tried, albeit unsuccessfully, 
to reach consensus on the 'substantive issue' of abortion access. However, 
while he was clearly anxious to persuade those holding anti-abortion views of 
the value of the proposal, the Minister commented that there was 'clearly' no 
prospect of achieving consensus with those who, as he saw it, support abortion 
on demand (Dail Eireann, 20th October 1992, Vol. 423 Col. 1897). As he said, 
It would be a tragedy for the unborn if the amendment were to be 
defeated in the forthcoming referendum by a combination of those 
who do not wish the unborn to be protected by the law - i. e. who in 
greater or lesser degree favour permitting abortion in this country - 
and certain misguided persons on the pro-life side who seem to be 
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blind to the merits of the amendment from their own point of view. 
(Dail Eireann, 20th October 1992, Vol. 423 Col. 1902) 
He presented his search for consensus as an attempt to exclude 'extreme' views 
from consideration, thereby producing a law which 'moderate' people could 
accept: 
I hope to persuade the House and the people of our country that the 
more extreme views expressed on either side of the debate should be 
rejected and that the amendment now being proposed should be 
accepted as a moderate and balanced response to the problem 
presented. (Däil Eireann, 20th October 1992, Vol. 423 Col. 1897) 
His definition of 'extreme' views includes advocates of abortion access in 
situations such as the X case itself, where the threat to X's life was one of 
suicide. The public reaction to official attempts to enforce X, a rape victim, to 
remain pregnant and give birth against her will was thus excluded from the 
Minister's construction of a 'moderate and balanced response', since allowing 
abortion in situations of rape and incest, or where a woman's mental and 
physical health is at stake, were the very situations which the proposed Twelfth 
Amendment sought to exclude. In other words, advocating such exceptions 
would amount to an'extreme' view effectively facilitating abortion on demand, 
viewed by the Minister as anathema to the sovereign 'people's will'. 
Thus, the official perception that popular sovereignty had been infringed by the 
judicial reinterpretation of the Eighth Amendment in the X case relied on a 
moral construction of the 'people', despite the official recognition of divergent 
moral positions on abortion. This contradiction required active construction of 
moral consensus by the Government. 
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Popular Sovereignty and the Democratic Nation-State 
Despite the disruption the X case produced in popular attitudes to abortion, 
debates in the Oireachtas during 1992 concerning popular sovereignty in the 
field of abortion law continued to include some overtly expressed authoritarian 
views of the relationship between the republic and the sovereign nation. For 
example, Senator O'Cuiv articulated an authoritarian national-political view 
when he insisted that men's moral positions should be taken into account in 
designing abortion law, not only because legislators had a duty to represent all 
their constituents, but because men were necessarily concerned, as husbands 
and fathers, about the women in their families (Seanad Eireann, 29th October 
1992, Vol. 134 Col. 739). 4 In this view the traditional patriarchal family should 
play a key role both on abortion law and on abortion decision-making. Senator 
Hanafin's opposition to the Maastricht Treaty also relied on an authoritarian 
politics: 
It seems their [sic] is a fundamental principle involved here to an 
independent people[: ] we must be able to ensure [that] whatever 
protection we decide to accord in our Constitution to life before birth 
cannot be undermined or overturned by any external court or 
institution, (Seanad Eireann, 14th May 1992, Vol. 132 Col. 1051) 
The unambiguous characterization of the 'independent people' here in terms of 
abortion morality, which 'we' must ensure is maintained in the face of external 
4As he said'(the] implication that men would view with indifference something that would 
happen to women or that men would view with indifference, if we take it on to a personal 
level, something that might happen to their own wives and to their own daughters [... ] is very 
offensive to me because I believe the bond between family in that sense is a strong a bond as 
exists. I know of very few married men who would not give anything to protect the lives of 
their wives and the lives of their children' (Seanad Eireann, 29th October 1992, Vol. 134 
Col. 739). 
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threat, articulates a morally partisan nation-state project, that necessarily 
reinscribes a subordinate construction of women in primarily maternal domestic 
terms, and that necessarily resists taking account of the X case itself 
The debates concerning abortion law in the Oireachtas during 1992 also 
included feminist interpretations of the connection between ideas of national 
sovereignty the democratic status of the nation-state. From this perspective, a 
moral construction of the sovereign nation's view on abortion has specific 
implications for women. Deputy Nuala Fennell, for instance, underlined the 
impact of official anti-abortion nationhood on women's sense of national 
identity: 
As it is now, more women will be proud of being European than of 
being Irish. Being Irish and female is to have to make excuses, it is 
having to rationalise, it is having to explain why one is not to be 
trusted to make decisions that are right for oneself. It is akin to being 
treated like a criminal or an immature child. (Dail Eireann, 5th May 
1992, Vol. 419 Col. 269) 
Thus, Deputy Fennell explicitly criticized the dependence of the anti-abortion 
nation-state on a construction of women as subordinate to the moral nation. In 
other words, the official view that popular sovereignty should be exercised at 
the level of morality necessarily infringed not only women's moral autonomy, 
but women's position within the anti-abortion moral nation. ' 
5Furthermore, Senator Avril Doyle underlined how the 'pro-life' nation-state project did not 
address social inequality. As she argued, 'If we are really pro-life how have we hospital 
queues and a two-tier system for health treatment in our country between the medical 
cardholder and the private patient? Is it pro-life to have the many prefabricated schools our 
children at primary and secondary level have to put up with? Is it pro-life to have no juvenile 
court system or not to have sufficient paediatric units within easy access particularly in rural 
areas? Is it pro-life not to have enough third level places for our young people given the 
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The impact of these feminist arguments concerning the connection between 
popular sovereignty and national identity could be seen in shifting official views 
of the relationship between popular sovereignty and the nation-state. While 
popular sovereignty continued to be officially constructed in moral terms, as 
indicated above, the relationship between the sovereign moral nation and the 
democratic State was officially reformulated in less authoritarian terms. 
In particular, there was an explicit official perception, following the X case, 
that specifically religious principles could not be used in interpreting the law in 
a democratic State. As Minister Padraig Flynn stated: 
Pro-life groups make much of the distinction between 'direct' and 
'indirect' termination mainly on the basis that an indirect termination is 
an unintended effect of other treatment. It seems to me that this 
distinction could not serve as the basis for a constitutional provision 
on this subject. [... ] As a matter of law foreseen consequences of an 
act are, of course, intended. (Dail Eireann, 20th October 1992, Vol. 
423 Col. 1900) 
This was a significant shift from the 1983 debates, when the Catholic principle 
of 'indirect effect' was key to the official insistence that women's lives would 
not be placed at risk by the recognition of an 'unborn' right to life. As Minister 
Flynn notes, the law defines intention simply as foreseeable consequences, 
whereas Catholic doctrine defines intention in moral terms. Thus, a person is 
legally accountable for the foreseeable (intended) consequences of their 
importance of education to obtain work? Is it pro-life that this Government have not fully 
implemented the Child Care Act? ' (Seanad Eireann, 28th October 1992, Vol. 134 Col. 621) 
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actions, whereas a person is morally accountable, in Catholic terms, not for all 
foreseeable consequences but only for those that were actually intended. 
However, while this appears to indicate a significant shift towards a morally 
impartial nation-state, the Minister's statement was justified not in terms of 
constitutional moral pluralism, but rather in terms of medical and legal 
practicality. Specifically, Minister Flynn argued that the 'indirect effect' 
principle was ambiguous, and would cause confusion to medical and legal 
professionals in practice. 6 
Furthermore, the terms of the proposed Twelfth Amendment, which attempted 
to reassert national sovereignty in the field of abortion law by reversing the 
Supreme Court's judgment in the X case, effectively attempted to realign 
constitutional abortion law with Catholic 'indirect effect' doctrine. The latter 
allows for abortion in circumstances where medical intervention is necessary to 
save a pregnant woman's life, where the intervention is not primarily aimed at 
ending the pregnancy. The proposed Twelfth Amendment could have been 
interpreted in precisely these terms. Indeed, the 'indirect effect' principle 
informs medical guidelines, which, as the Minister for Health Dr. O'Connell 
indicated in the Seanad, the Government intended to rely on in order to 
interpret the Constitution once the Twelfth Amendment was ratified, rather 
than introducing interpretive legislation (Seanad Eireann, 28th October 1992, 
Vol. 134 Col. 623). 7 Thus, while the official position concerning the 
relationship between the sovereign (moral) nation and the constitutional nation- 
6'It is difficult to see', he argued, 'how it can be maintained, for example, that in removing a 
cancerous womb there is no intention of terminating the life of the foetus when that result is 
clearly foreseen from the very outset and is inevitable' (Dail Eireann, 20th October 1992, 
Vol. 423 Col. 1990). 
7The position of Alan Shatter on the effect of the Eighth Amendment, namely that its 
protagonists had effectively introduced abortion into Ireland by highlighting its availability 
abroad (Dail Eireann, 20th October 1992, Vol. 423 Col. 1920), echoes this officially anti- 
abortion, 'pro-life' nation-state discourse. 
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state appeared to shift towards more explicitly democratic terms, the nation- 
state project was nevertheless reformulated at official level in implicitly 
authoritarian terms. 
For example, the apparent shift towards a democratic formulation of the 
relationship between the nation and the State was countered by the continued 
official denial of political legitimacy to feminist reproductive rights arguments. 
This was apparent not only in the official rejection of the legitimacy of 'extreme 
views' described above, but also in the official construction of what constituted 
abortion 'information'. In proposing the Fourteenth Amendment, on freedom to 
provide and receive such information, the Minister distinguished 'directive' and 
'non-directive' counselling as follows: 
Directive counselling, as I understand it, is systematic guidance and 
advice and involves abortion referral. Non-directive counselling, on 
the other hand, consists of the provision of information and does not 
involve abortion referral. Non-directive counselling would clearly be 
covered by the right to obtain or make available information which is 
provided for in the amendment. (Dail Eireann, 20th October 1992, 
Vol. 423 Col. 1914) 
This official definition constructs explicitly anti-abortion counselling as 'non- 
directive'. Thus, anti-abortion counselling organizations would be able to 
operate legally and obtain financial support from the State under the proposed 
Fourteenth Amendment, whereas 'non-directive' counselling which actually 
facilitated women's decision-making, rather than attempting to influence it, 
would be curtailed if'referral' were included in the range of services offered. ' 
8The 1995 Information Act reinforces this distinction, as discussed in Part One. 
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Thus, the reproduction of an official discourse of popular sovereignty as 
morally opposed to abortion, despite the popular response to the X case, also 
effectively reproduced an authoritarian official politics which sought to realign 
the Constitution with Catholic doctrine on abortion. This was evident in post-X 
case official abortion discourse despite the explicit official recognition both of 
the distinction between legal and moral principles, and of divergent positions 
on abortion law within the nation. Nevertheless, the official articulation of an 
apparently more democratic view of the relationship between the sovereign 
nation and the nation-state at least signified a new political legitimacy for 
morally pluralist positions within the nation-state, and the consequent new 
marginality of authoritarian politics, as defended by the anti-abortion lobby, as 
Part Three has illustrated. 
Constitutional Abortion Law and Citizenship 
What effect did this limited shift in official constructions of national sovereignty 
in the nation-state have for women's citizenship? Following the X case, feminist 
perspectives on the impact of the Eighth Amendment were explicitly articulated 
in both Houses of the Oireachtas, attacking the Government's continued denial 
of full citizenship to women. For example, Deputy Fennell underlined the effect 
the X case had on women's perception of their subordinate status in the nation- 
state: 
... 
it is the likelihood of such injunctions [as in the X case) and the 
almost inevitability that they can happen, as much as the reality of 
their happening, which creates such a demoralising climate and makes 
a statement about women's lack of full status as persons and Irish 
citizens. (Dail Eireann, 5th May 1992, Vol. 419 Col. 268) 
277 
Senator Doyle criticized the proposed Twelfth Amendment's failure to take 
seriously the centrality of women's rights to any legal regulation of abortion. 9 
Speaking specifically as a woman and a member of the nation she addressed the 
Minister for Health, Dr. O'Connell, as follows: 
Frankly, as a woman, I feel abused by the Minister's treatment of me 
and other women on that [health] issue; I feel abused by the 
Government's treatment of me and every other woman in the country 
on this issue. I feel abused that there should be a distinction between 
my health, a serious threat to my health and any threat to my life on 
this issue. [... ] I feel abused and you [the Minister for Health] tell me I 
am protected. We are very far apart, Minister, on this and I represent 
the view of most women[t] [sic] between the ages of 14 and 50, the 
category of women most threatened by what is before us today. Please 
listen to us. (Seanad Eireann, 28th October 1992, Vol. 134 Col. 618) 
Not only, from this perspective, were women's rights to be compromised 
constitutionally, but the Government was disregarding the views of women, the 
very group whose rights were at stake, as Senator Doyle's plea, '[p]lease listen 
to us', indicates. Furthermore, her description of the Twelfth Amendment as 
'abusive' reproduces the attacks on the Government in the earlier part of the 
year, when its actions were described as supportive of the rapist, as discussed 
in Chapter Four. In Senator Doyle's view, the State should not properly be 
9Senator Doyle did not present herself as a feminist, although her position can be described 
as such. As she said: 'If only the Minister for Health would listen to the views of the women 
today, sensible balanced women without radical views, the ordinary woman in the street' 
(Seanad Eireann, 28th October 1992, Vol. 134 Col. 619). She positioned her own views in 
precisely these terms. 
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concerned with women's reproductive decisions, particularly in circumstances 
such as the X case. 10 
By contrast with this official feminist perspective, anti-abortion positions were 
also articulated in the Oireachtas during 1992, although now modified in terms 
of the justifications provided for the advocacy of rights for the 'unborn'. Post-X 
case anti-abortion discourse continued to insist that women's rights were not 
compromised by the Eighth Amendment. Senator Hanafin argued that it was 
absurd to suggest otherwise (Seanad Eireann, 14th May 1992, Vol. 132 Col. 
1047). In this view, the official employment of the Catholic principle of'indirect 
effect' would protect pregnant women in cases where their lives were at risk: 
Necessary medical treatment for the mother, even those which have 
the secondary, unintended, effect of the death of the child have always 
been lawful here and elsewhere. Such treatments have not been 
regarded in law or in medicine as abortions. (Senator Hanafin, Seanad 
Eireann, 14th May 1992, Vol. 132 Col. 1048) 
Only in circumstances where a 'mother' and consequently her 'unborn' would 
undoubtedly die should the right to life of the 'mother' take precedence. In 
situations where the 'unborn' might survive independently following medical 
intervention this view would appear to give priority to the foetal right to life: 
... in a situation where the mother might die and 
in that case the foetus 
will die also the obvious and logical thing to do is to ensure the life of 
'°As she argued, 'I was convulsed, as was the nation, in January with the spectacle of the 14 
year old in the X case, a victim being further victimised, being hauled through the courts 
because her parents wanted to take a certain line of action in the crisis pregnancy of a child. 
Whose business is it to tell her - to tell all the other X cases that may arise or to tell me or 
any other woman what we should do? ' (Seanad Eireann, 28th October 1992, Vol. 134 Col. 
619). 
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the mother. On the other hand, if the stage has been reached where the 
foetus is viable if medical intervention takes place, there is an 
obligation in my view of Article 40.3.3° to ensure the survival of the 
foetus as far as is practicable. (Senator O'Cuiv, Seanad Eireann, 29th 
October 1992, Vol. 134 Col. 744) 
However, some post-X case anti-abortion discourses newly acknowledged that 
foetal life did actually depend on women's lives, rather than insisting, as in 
1983, that the 'unborn' were 'independent'. For instance, Senator O'Cuiv argued 
that '[w]e want to ensure the right to life of the child but we cannot ensure that 
without also ensuring the right to life of the mother' (Seanad Eireann, 29th 
October 1992, Vol. 134 Col. 742). This acknowledgment of foetal dependency 
would seem to constitute a major departure from 1983. Nevertheless, the 
articulation of anti-abortion discourse in the Oireachtas continued to insist that 
women's right to life was not compromised by the Eighth Amendment. 
The official Government perspective on the impact of constitutional abortion 
law on women expressed a new recognition that womens rights were indeed 
implicated in a Constitutional recognition of foetal rights. As Minister Flynn 
argued, in defending the proposed Twelfth Amendment: 
... we would be failing in our duty to women and to their entitlement 
to protection where there is a risk to their life if we refused to take 
account of the fact that cases may arise, however infrequently, where 
the woman's life would be endangered by continuation of the 
pregnancy. If there were to be only one case in one million, or even 
ten or more million, we would have to take account of it. There is a 
duty on all of us to ensure that nothing is put into the Constitution 
which might, even in the remotest possible case, mean that action that 
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was necessary to save a woman's life would not be taken. (Dail 
Eireann, 20th October 1992, Vol. 423 Col. 1901) 
Thus, he argued, the proposed amendment would ensure that, where the rights 
to life of women and 'the unborn' might come into conflict, the woman's right 
would take priority: 
It is reasonable to suggest that if a court had to choose between the 
right to life of the mother and the right to life of the foetus, that 
explicit consitutional guarantee would impel the court to save the life 
of the mother. (Dail Eireann, 20th October 1992, Vol. 423 Col. 1902) 
However, the official attempt to exclude a threat of suicide or threats to 
women's health from the constitutional definition of when a pregnancy can 
legally be terminated indicates that the Government were not substantially 
committed to protecting women's rights. Minister Flynn ignored repeated 
interruptions of his speech asking why suicide and health had been explicitly 
excluded from the proposed Twelfth Amendment. His general justification was 
that the Government was concerned to prevent the introduction of abortion on 
demand. 11 As he explained, 
There is considerable room for subjective judgment in assessing 
whether a risk of suicide exists and the availability of such a ground 
for termination would carry the danger of opening the way to 
widescale abortion. It is quite clear that the experience in other 
"This position was echoed by Fine Geal Deputy Alan Shatter, in his speech advocating 
rejection of the proposed amendment. However, Deputy Shatter's position did not ignore the 
X case. He recommended that the risk that allowing for a right to abortion for suicidal 
women might enable access to abortion on demand should be dealt with through legislation, 
rather than constitutionally, precisely because of the circumstances of the X case (Dail 
Eireann, 20th October 1992, Vol. 423 Col. 1929). 
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countries has been that grounds for abortion related to the health, 
physical or mental, lead to abortion on demand. (Dail 
Eireann, 20th 
October 1992, Vol. 423 Col. 1898) 
Thus, the official expression of a concern to defend women's right to life was 
significantly limited by a view of women as morally untrustworthy. As in 1983, 
official regulation of women's reproductive capacity was justified in terms 
which positioned 'national' morality as superior to that of women. The 
consequent compromise of women's citizenship was specifically justified in 
national terms. 
Furthermore, while Minister Flynn insisted that the Government was concerned 
to protect women's rights, the proposed Twelfth Amendment explicitly 
excluded a right to abortion where women's health was at risk. Minister Flynn 
simply insisted that women's health would not suffer as a result of the 
ratification of the Twelfth Amendment: 
Under the amendment women will continue to receive all necessary 
medical treatment to protect their health. Current medical practice in 
this regard will not be affected. (Dail Eireann, 20th October 1992, 
Vol. 423 Col. 1904)12 
The Minister gave no reasons for this assertion. Indeed, he acknowledged that 
fears concerning women's health were expressed not only by women's groups 
and representatives, but by medical professionals themselves. However, he 
121n criticizing this guarantee, Senator Doyle commented '[t]he Minister has no monopoly on 
wisdom in this area, nor has any political party or individual in these Houses. The arrogance 
with which the Minister, Deputy Flynn approaches this topic [.., J given his views in 1983 
worries me considerably. It was not the intention of the amendment in 1983 to put us in the 
position we find ourselves in today' (Seanad Eireann, 28th October 1992, Vol. 134 Col, 623). 
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attempted to characterize those expressing such concerns as 'pro-abortion', in a 
move reminiscent of 1983: 
The suggestion that the words "as distinct from the health" should be 
omitted from the proposed amendment really boils down to this - that 
it should be possible to terminated the life of an unborn child where 
there is no risk to the life of the mother. (Dail Eireann, 20th October 
1992, Vol. 423 Col. 1905) 
Such a position was presented as self-evidently immoral. The Minister had 
already commented that, although he was concerned to construct consensus on 
abortion law, this did not include those who supported abortion on demand 
(Dail Eireann, 20th October 1992, Vol. 423 Col. 1897). Thus, although the 
official position had shifted following the X case towards recognition that 
women's right to life should take priority over that of the 'unborn' in the event 
of a conflict, this did not amount to official recognition either that women's 
rights were centrally involved in any attempt to regulate abortion access, or 
that women should be specifically consulted or considered in drafting any such 
legislation. 13 
The official decision to devise three constitutional amendments rather than 
either repealing the Eighth Amendment or adding one clause declaring that 
women's rights had priority over foetal rights, indicates the contradictions in 
the Government's position. Firstly, this strategy acknowledged that women's 
rights, not only to life, but to travel and information, had indeed been 
13As Deputy Alan Shatter commented, 'I suspect that if the Government introduced 
legislation into this House which sought to include a provision in our Constitution which 
expressly allowed medical treatment in circumstances where a man's life was at risk but not 
his health it would be confronted by a parliamentary riot' (Dail Eireann, 20th October 1992, 
Vol. 423 Col. 1927). 
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compromised by the Eighth Amendment. However, the strategy also enabled 
the continued recognition of 'unborn' rights. This was accomplished by 
explicitly limiting the effect foetal rights could have on specific rights accorded 
to women, namely life, travel and information, while leaving other rights, 
namely health and bodily integrity, in question. To do otherwise, according to 
Minister Flynn, would effectively undermine the force of the Eighth 
Amendment, officially viewed as the expression of the sovereign people's will, 
by facilitating abortion on demand. The Eighth Amendment thus continued to 
be officially constructed as a defence of the 'unborn' against women, rather 
than, for instance, as a means of enabling pregnant women to assert foetal 
rights when accessing medical care. 
Conclusion 
Following the X case, there were a number of significant shifts and 
contradictions within the official position on abortion articulated in the 
Oireachtas concerning the relationship between 'the people's will' and 
citizenship. 
First, the Government were concerned to actively reconstruct a distinctly 
national anti-abortion consensus, despite their new recognition of diverse views 
among 'the people'. This signifies an official attempt to restore the State's 
democratic credentials following the X case, through the articulation of an 
official desire to restore popular sovereignty defined in terms of an anti- 
abortion morality. In so doing, the Government warned 'the people' that if the 
proposed Twelfth Amendment were to be rejected at referendum, legislation 
would be introduced in accordance with the X case reinterpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment. In other words, the Government warned that they would 
introduce what they explicitly considered to be an abortion-on-demand regime, 
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namely a right to abortion for suicidal girls and women, despite their expressed 
view that this would be anathema to 'the people's will'. 14 This explicitly 
authoritarian relationship to 'the people', particularly given popular reactions to 
the X case, appears to abandon any substantial concern to protect or defer to 
popular sovereignty. 
Thus, although the Government appeared to perceive the disjunction between 
their view of 'the people's will' and post-X case popular opinion, they 
nevertheless attempted to assert the former. This is particularly suggested by 
the absence of any substantial debate in the Oireachtas, unlike in the press, on 
abortion access in situations of rape an incest. Such concerns were outweighed 
by the official desire to prevent the introduction of an 'abortion-on-demand' 
regime, in line with the perception of the 'people's will'. 13 Similarly, there was 
no attention given to the relationship between the family and the State in the 
Oireachtas debates, unlike the press coverage, where the State's apparent 
violation of the family involved in the X case was explicitly thematized. This 
possible strand of debate was curbed by the Government's proposal to 
recognize a constitutional right to travel which could not be compromised by 
the Eighth Amendment. Thus, parents could not in the future be injuncted if 
they decided to travel abroad to assist their daughters in terminating a 
pregnancy. II 
'4The actual rejection of that proposed amendment at referendum did not result in the 
introduction of legislation, as discussed in Part One. 
"Indeed, Senator Doyle's appeal to rape victims to seek the morning after pill, on the 
grounds that this was not actually a form of abortion, indicates the difference between the 
debate in the Oireachtas and that in the press, where calls for abortion access for rape victims 
had been prominent, at least during the early part of the year. As she said, '[i]f one good 
message can come out of this debate, let it be a plea to those who have been raped, be it 
inside the family in the case of incest, in under-age relationships or the straightforward rape 
of an older woman of any age, to go for help immediately. There is help available and it does 
not amount to abortion as far as I am concerned' (Seanad Eireann, 28th October 1992, Vol. 
134 Col. 622). 
"Indeed, the Government itself availed of this compromised right to abortion during the 
1997 C Case, discussed in Part One. 
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Second, despite the official articulation of an apparently democratic discourse 
aimed at guaranteeing a morally impartial nation-state, the official nation-state 
project remained implicitly authoritarian. Not only was the Government 
planning to rely in practice on Catholic doctrine as the key mechanism for 
interpreting constitutional abortion law, they employed a distinctly anti- 
abortion construction of what constituted abortion information. 
Third, the post-X case Oireachtas debates on constitutional abortion law 
contained a new official recognition that women's rights were specifically 
implicated in producing such laws. Nevertheless, the Government's attempt to 
exclude cases involving possible suicide or health risks from the constitutional 
definition of when a pregnancy could be legally terminated indicates a lack of 
substantial official commitment to protecting women's rights. In justifying this 
official position, which received little attention in the press, women were 
constructed as morally subordinate to the nation. Nevertheless, despite the 
equivocations evident in the official position on abortion law, the recognition 
that women's rights, particularly the right to life, were indeed at stake was not 
insignificant. While this did not transform abortion law, or the construction of 
anti-abortion morality as 'national', it did allow for a greater degree of freedom 
for women than existed prior to the X case, not least as rights to information 
and travel were now newly guaranteed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The X case had an intensely disruptive impact on 'the people', as well as on the 
nation-state, as the foregoing Chapters have illustrated. The idea that the nation 
was somehow responsible for the appalling situation of a fourteen year old 
pregnant rape victim caused an extraordinary public reaction which saw the 
anti-abortion lobby being publicly vilified for the first time. 
On a personal level, the events of spring 1992 forced me to fundamentally 
reassess my own attitude to abortion law. What had been an abstract 
theological debate concerning the moral status of the 'unborn' was now 
suddenly transformed into tragic personal terms, throwing my unexamined 
assumptions into confusion. I became politically active for the first time as I 
attempted to reconsider my attitude to abortion law, attending public meetings 
held by the Galway Repeal the Eighth Amendment Campaign at the Atlanta 
Hotel. After I emigrated to London during the Summer of 1992, I began to try 
to make sense of what had happened, and what impact it had had both on 
myself and on Irish politics and society. My encounter with feminist cultural 
studies at Birkbeck College in London shifted my perspective significantly, 
enabling me eventually to re-situate the abortion conflict in the much broader 
context of discourses of nationhood, reproduction and sexuality. I was struck 
by the significance of gender both for law and politics, and for discourses of 
nationhood for the first time. This in turn has enabled me to reassess the key 
significance of abortion politics and law for hegemonic discourses of gender 
and sexuality. 
The process of researching and writing this thesis had underlined to me both 
the significance of nationhood to abortion and reproductive politics, and the 
significance of abortion and reproductive politics for the idea of the nation and 
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the nation-state. The assumed and asserted identity of 'the people' was key both 
to the recognition of a right to life for 'the unborn' in 1983 and to the 
subsequent demonstrations against the High Court injunction in the X case. 
The traditional familial nation championed by the 1983 anti-abortion campaign 
became the assertively compassionate familial nation that would not force a 
fourteen-year-old to give birth to a rapist's baby. The moral absolutism on 
which the anti-abortion nationhood project depended was thereby undermined, 
both at the level of their own political discourse, as they were now forced to 
defend a woman's right to obtain an abortion abroad in order to retain their 
claim to be democratic, and at the level of the nation-state, as women's right to 
life was now officially recognised as superior to that of 'the unborn', in the 
event of a conflict. 
The second thing that has impressed me in writing this thesis is the profound 
effects colonialism has had on popular and political culture. ' The anti-colonial 
discourse relied on by the anti-abortion lobby, both in the run-up to the 1983 
campaign, and in response to the X case, was key to the success of their 
campaign. The threat that Ireland would lose its independence from England 
through a form of cultural imperialism epitomized by legal abortion served to 
establish anti-abortion politics as distinctly national, and to characterise 
feminism in particular in neo-colonial terms. Thus, opponents of the Eighth 
Amendment, particularly feminist reproductive rights activists and workers, 
were disregarded in political debate, and actively prosecuted and criminalized 
thereafter. 
In writing the thesis I have also been impressed by the political and personal 
significance of national identity in the context of abortion politics. The impact 
'This point has been noted, for example, by Smith (1994: 242) in the context of right-wing 
politics in Britain. 
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of discourses of Irishness was very striking amongst both anti-abortion and 
feminist activists. The former demonstrated a clear concern with defending a 
'pro-life' Irishness, as Chapter Five has outlined. The significance of Irishness 
for feminist activists was also apparent, although their less 'commonsensical' 
national-political identities was more personally problematic, and could not be 
publicly expressed prior to the X case. 
I found thinking about the connection between abortion and national identity 
particularly disturbing, however, for the thousands of Irish women who had 
been forced to secretly obtain abortions in England, the very act which the 'pro- 
life' nation publicly abhorred, particularly prior to the X case. That temporary 
migration continues to be the only option open to women seeking abortions, 
regardless of their circumstances, underlines the official construction of women 
as morally subordinate to the nation, as women's status as citizens is 
compromised on the basis of 'the people's will'. Clearly, the official construction 
of 'the people' as anti-abortion excludes consideration of women's actions in 
seeking abortions abroad, relying instead on the result of a referendum held 
under circumstances of severe political pressure, where the proportion of 
people voting was uncharacteristically low, as an apparently unmediated and 
democratic statement of what 'the people' think about abortion. 
Thus, abortion politics has been the site of major contestation over who 'the 
people' are. The anti-abortion lobby situated itself explicitly as a representative 
of the people in the early 1980s, and again following the X case, despite the 
popular demand that X be allowed to travel to Britain for an abortion. This 
particular attempt to assert authority over the terrain of the nation-state, as well 
as over women's embodiment, illustrates the neo-colonial tendency of this type 
of politics, a tendency which was indicated by the critical employment of the 
idea of internment in relation to the High Court injunction against X. Feminist 
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advocacy of reproductive freedom could not so easily claim to represent 'the 
people's will' until after the X case, when the very idea that there was a clear 
and unambiguous national position on abortion was thrown into question. 
Indeed, this was something that feminists had consistently pointed out, not least 
by highlighting the high numbers of Irish women who had traveled to Britain 
for abortions since the 1967 Abortion Act had been passed. This fact in itself 
undermined the assertion that the Irish nation was essentially anti-abortion. 2 
This thesis has underlined the centrality of 'the people's will' to the formulation 
of policy and law, and consequently for the possibility of feminist political 
success. The legitimacy of official policy and law, key stakes in gender and 
sexuality politics, depends on their position as 'popular', something that the 
anti-abortion lobby has significantly benefited from. The anti-abortion lobby in 
Ireland were already situated as 'national' prior to their campaign in the early 
1980s, given the historical hegemony of conservative political culture since 
independence. Feminism was also consequently already associated with the 
antithesis of Irishness, namely English liberal political culture. While the X case 
disrupted these alignments, the ongoing uncertainty over abortion law suggests 
that the nation has not been entirely reformulated in terms which are hospitable 
to feminism and women's reproductive rights. 
Nevertheless, the construction of Irishness has shifted since the X case, 
something I noticed, for instance, when I recently met two Irish emigrants in 
London, both in their early twenties, who could not understand the sense of 
exclusion expressed by women who had left Ireland during the 1980s. In their 
view, Ireland is a modern nation, and the idea that it is, or has until very 
2This point was reiterated my a number of feminist interviewees, 
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recently been, conservative, traditional and misogynist is peculiar and 
incongruous. 
Finally, this thesis has emphasized the significance of ideas of nationhood to 
feminist political theory, by underlining the ways in which popular political 
culture, articulated through contested discourses of nationhood, is central to 
women's status as citizens. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that women 
around the world are forced to temporarily migrate between jurisdictions in 
order to obtain abortions, Thus, discourses of nationhood have direct effects on 
women's reproductive freedom. This connection between nationhood and 
women's citizenship illustrates the ways in which discourses of gender and 
sexuality are key to the operation of political power. 
Epilogue 
Following the Supreme Court's decision to lift the injunction against X, whose 
experience of rape and pregnancy have had such a profound impact on national 
political culture, she travelled to Britain, and her pregnancy miscarried while 
she was in hospital arranging an abortion (Holden 1994). 
The prosecution of the rapist went ahead. He was charged with nine counts of 
sexual assault, and with unlawful carnal knowledge of a minor in July 1992. He 
denied the allegations against him until the last minute, attempting instead to 
implicate a young school friend of X's in the pregnancy. His claim that the 
publicity concerning the X case would prejudice his trial was rejected by the 
High Court in December 1993, and again by the Supreme Court in March 
1994. He finally pleaded guilty to two counts of indecent assault and one of 
unlawful carnal knowledge in May 1994 (O'Morain 1995). He was convicted 
and sentenced to a total of fourteen years imprisonment in June 1994. 
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However, this sentence was reduced to 4 years on appeal in 1995, on the basis 
that his guilty plea had saved X the trauma of having to give evidence in court. 
Indeed, the appeal judgment described him as 'hard-working, a good family 
man who had never been in trouble before and who had surfaced from humble 
origins to a position of some influence' (Irish Times Editorial, 15th March 
1995, p. 11). He was eventually released in May 1997, having served only three 
years (Balls, 1997). He subsequently became a taxi-driver in Dublin, and has 
been accused of indecently assaulting another schoolgirl in his cab in September 
1999 (O'Loughlin 1999). 
Abortion politics in Ireland remains unresolved, as this thesis has demonstrated. 
Nevertheless, the impact of the X case on the official perception of'the people's 
will' in relation to abortion was particularly evident in 1997, when the Irish 
State itself sought an abortion in Britain for a thirteen-year-old pregnant ward 
of court, also a suicidal victim of rape, in what is referred to as the C case. This 
case had also received national media attention, when C's father spoke on 
national radio about his daughter's pregnancy, and his own support for her 
decision to travel to Britain for an abortion. The Government's decision to 
assist her in terminating her pregnancy in Britain indicates an official awareness 
that 'the people' would not be upset by such official action, whereas denying 
her an abortion by 'interning' her within the state would involve a return to the 
political crisis generated by the X case. 
However, I was again struck by the ongoing 'commonsensical' status 
connecting Irishness and anti-abortion politics in November 1998, when I 
attended a UK Parliamentary reception to launch an all-party Irish in Britain 
Parliamentary Group, as one of two representatives of the Irish Women's 
Abortion Support Group. A Labour Party MP introduced himself to us, and 
seemed quite shocked when he learned who we were, asking that we repeat the 
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group's name. As I noted in my research diary, his face literally fell, and he said 
that he didn't know there were any 'pro-abortion' Irish groups. 3 The X case 
appears, if anything, to have reinforced a British construction of Irishness as a 
conservative and morally absolutist national identity. 
Yet, anti-abortion politics have become increasingly unpopular in Ireland since 
the X case. Not only have the activities of the anti-abortion direct action 
organisation Youth Defence received critical press coverage, as outlined in the 
Introduction, but the activities of an anti-abortion pregnancy counselling 
agency, the Aadams Women's Centre, have further damaged the anti-abortion 
project. The cases of 'Baby A' and 'Baby B' received critical national and 
international media attention in August and September 1999, when the agency 
unlawfully took custody of babies from two young women who had sought 
crisis pregnancy advice. The agency had deliberately directed the two women 
away from state support, and had misrepresented the law to them, with the 
assistance of legal and medical professionals. The couple running the agency 
had intended to adopt the babies themselves, despite the fact that privately 
arranged adoptions had been outlawed since April 1999 (Coulter 1999 'Crisis 
3This MP's hostility to feminist reproductive rights activism was evident in his repeated 
comment during our conversation on abortion and the law, instigated by him, that if we 
shone a light into his eyes he would tell us everything. Not only did he thereby construct us 
as interrogators, he also suggested his own awareness of the contradictions in his position, 
since he resorted to this phrase rather than defending his views against our criticisms. He 
insisted that he was not a fanatic, believing that abortion was justifiable in cases of rape, a 
position he explained in terms of his paternal concern for his two daughters' safety. Although 
he seemed keen to end our conversation, repeatedly pointing to a nun on the other side of the 
room, and saying that he should go and talk to her to ensure balance', he nevertheless stayed, 
apparently concerned that he would appear anti-feminist. Indeed, he posed with us for a 
photographer. When my friend asked about his position on the failure to extend the 1967 
Abortion Act to Northern Ireland, he responded that in his view that Act should be restricted 
to bring British law in line with that in Northern Ireland. I was afraid he would cause a scene 
when the speeches began. One speaker commented on the struggles over highly charged 
controversial issues which have characterised Irish/British politics. This MP turned to me 
saying aloud 'that's you - abortion'. However, his apparent desire not to appear anti-feminist 
was also evident when he left the reception, ostentatiously saying 'good-bye' to us across the 
room. 
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pregnancy group at centre of network' Irish Times 2nd September, p. 7; Irish 
Times Editorial 3rd September 1999, p. 11). 
The future direction of abortion law remains unclear, not least due to the 
continued official construction of 'the People' as anti-abortion-on-demand. The 
public hearings held by the All Party Committee on the Constitution mentioned 
in the Introduction have not resulted in proposals for legislative or 
Constitutional change. Rather, the Committee's report has been referred back 
to a Cabinet sub-committee on abortion, whose report to the Government is 
not expected until the end of October 2000 (Irish Times on the Web 'Abortion 
Report Delayed' 26th September 2000). Furthermore, four Independent anti- 
abortion TDs, whose support the Government depends on to maintain power, 
are pressing for the reinstatement of an unambiguous constitutional ban on 
abortion (Donohoe, Miriam 'Group opposed to abortion wants position 
clarified' Irish Times on the Web 18th July 2000). It appears that another 
constitutional referendum on abortion is likely, an official strategy which would 
again construct 'the people' as the authors of abortion law. The effects on 
women as citizens and as members of the nation remain to be seen. 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
INTRODUCTION: 
" Explain research; 
" Indicate that I am interested in personal motivations and opinions; 
" Tell something about myself; 
" Discuss what the research will be used for (PhD) 
" Answer any questions; 
" Request that the interview be recorded. 
ORGANISATION'S HISTORY & POLITICS: 
Organisation/Group: 
Why was this org. set up? / What are your organistations aims? 
When did you join? 
What attracted you to this particular organisation? 
Where do you draw most of your support from? 
Who are your main opponents? 
Did the X case have any effect on your organisations aims and objectives (if 
org. pre-dates 1992) 
What do you think is the general perception of your group? 
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Why do you think there is so much resistance to your group's ideas and 
agenda? 
What do you think of Mary Robinson? 
THE MEDIA: 
What did you think of the media coverage of the X case? 
Did you think your views/aims were (fairly) represented by the media? 
If not, why do you think that was? 
What did you think of the international reaction to the X case? ie., why do you 
think there was such a strong reaction against the High Court injunction 
internationally? 
NATION: 
At the time of the X case newspapers seemed to suggest that what really 
concerned people about the case was the message it gave to the world about 
what kind of nation Ireland is, and what kind of people the Irish are. What do 
you think of this? 
Do you think that the recent and ongoing liberalisation of the constitution and 
the law [eg. contraception; homosexuality; abortion information; divorce) has 
anything to do with the outcome of the X case, and if so, is this a good thing? 
Do you think the X case affected how Irish people view England, in the light of 
it being called a "safe-haven" for a pregnant rape victim after the X case? 
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Is Ireland the kind of place you want it to be? ie., the kind of place, for 
instance, that you would like the next generation to grow up in? 
INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION: 
Name: 
Sex: 
Place of residence: 
Occupation: 
Other political affiliations: 
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